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ABSTRACT
IN SEARCH OF AUTONOMY:
NEPAL AS A WEDGE STATE BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA
Sagar Rijal
Old Dominion University, 2015
Director: Dr. David C. Earnest

Traditional International Relations (IR) theories consign small states to the
reactive roles of “bargaining, bandwagoning or buffering.” Small states are deemed to be
inherently vulnerable, forever concerned with their mere survival. However, the present
global system o f states is characterized by numerous smaller states, many o f which are
not only surviving but also thriving in both economically and politically spheres.
To unravel this anomaly, this study proposes a theory o f wedge states as a
separate category o f small states, which are compelled to deep engagement with two or
more rival powers simultaneously. The study analyzes a case o f a typical wedge state
using the interaction between Nepal and its neighbors China and India to inquire if the
“wedge” situation o f Nepal being located between two rival powers provides it any
strategic agency or autonomy. To understand such outcomes, the study uses material
gains as the proxy for strategic autonomy.
The analysis of three cases o f Nepal’s tripartite interaction—policies on Tibetan
exiles and refugees; competitive Chinese and Indian investments in the hydropower
sector in Nepal; and environmental cooperation along the fragile ecosystem o f the shared
Himalayan region— finds that Nepal has often enjoyed significant agency and generated
material gains due to the rivalry between its two larger neighbors. Nepal’s strategic
options and material gains, especially in economic and environmental realms, contradict
the conventional IR theories and point to increasing autonomy o f similar cases o f small
wedge states in the global system.
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CHAPTER I

IN TR O D U C TIO N : W ED G E STA TES IN W O R LD PO L ITIC S

One might as well begin with Thucydides’ narration o f the Melian Dialogue
during the Peloponnesian War. For Athens, the superpower rival of Sparta, the small
neutral island of Melos offered nothing more than a target to demonstrate its power and
to make an example of by intimidation. The Melians resisted Athenian demands of
submission and requested to remain independent from the Delian League. But the
powerful Athens would not budge. Since then the fate o f weak states in world politics
was sealed by the response o f the Athenians: “The strong do what they will, and the weak
suffer what they must.”1 The devastating meaning derived from this episode has been that
in the matters o f interstate relations only the behavior and choice o f great powers are
decisive.
Fast-forward 2500 years and another island nation found itself in the midst o f a
tug-of-war between two relatively superior powers. In 2004, Taiwan and the People’s
Republic o f China openly competed for recognition by the pacific island state of
Vanuatu. Each state made competing declarations o f monetary aid amounting to millions
o f dollars for Vanuatu’s recognition and loyalty. For Vanuatu, although the stakes were
not as dire as those faced by Melos, it was a delicate decision as evidenced by the
vacillations and recurrent change o f hearts among its leaders. After initially recognizing
Taiwan as a legitimate sovereign, Vanuatu seemed to have changed its mind and then
reverted to Taiwan before doing another about face. The internal dynamics o f Vanuatu’s
competing politicians and ministers surely played a part in such open demonstration of
what has been termed “bribery diplomacy.”2 The bidding war for recognition between
China and Taiwan is not just limited to this one instance o f Vanuatu but includes many
1 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Modem
Library, 1982), 269.
2 Mark Magnier, "China, Taiwan Wooing Vanuatu in Dollar Dance," The Los Angeles
77mes(November 13 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2004/nov/13/world/fgvanuatu 13.(accessed on April 18, 2013).
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other small states in Latin America, Africa and the Pacific.3 This contemporary example
suggests a phenomenon different from the one o f coercive bargaining involving Athens,
Sparta and Melos. The weaker state seems to have accrued some choice, a form of power
so that the role, function and fate o f small states in international relations (IR) are in dire
need of updating. Today, states that are unequal in relative power seem to have more
space for negotiation and bargaining than in earlier eras when such matters would simply
be decided by force alone.
In the flowering of the post-Westphalian interstate system to its present day
maturity, the signal transformation has been in the calcification of the notion of
statehood, sovereignty and respect for territorial boundaries. The defining notions of
sovereignty and non-intervention, pioneered in Western Europe in the eighteenth and the
nineteenth centuries—which spread across the world in due time by the so-called process
of “globalization o f the state system” by the twentieth century—have largely become the
backbone of the modem state system.4 In the post-War period, as decolonization
progressed through the continents and as the liberal world order took root under the
admittedly tenuous sanctuary of United Nations and myriad inter-state organizations,
boundaries between states have been normalized to an extent that seems unprecedented in
history. Wars fought strictly for empire and territory have become quite rare indeed.
Although there have been major redrawing o f the map—due to breakup of the USSR, for
instance, or that of Yugoslavia—most states perceive high degree o f certainty about their
boundary relative previous eras in history. O f course, it would be premature to assume
that the superpowers are automatically thwarted in their ambitions by boundaries fixed on
paper—cases in point, U.S. in Iraq & Russia in Ukraine. Yet, the superpowers have also
used their power to affirm the sanctity o f the international boundaries to aid weak
states—liberation o f Kuwait being a prime example o f war waged to, among many other

3 See, among others: Daniel P Erickson and Janice Chen, "China, Taiwan, and the Battle
for Latin America," The Fletcher Forum o f World Affairs 31(2007); Timothy S Rich,
"Status for Sale: Taiwan and the Competition for Diplomatic Recognition," Issues &
Studies 45, no. 4 (2009); Joel Atkinson, "China-Taiwan Diplomatic Competition and the
Pacific Islands," The Pacific Review 23, no. 4 (2010).
4 Robert H. Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations :
Theories and Approaches (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 17-18.
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reasons, uphold the sovereignty o f a small state. Thus, it is not erroneous to state that the
emerging interstate system places a high value on the adherence to international law,
observance to the norms o f sovereignty and non-intervention, and allowance to selfdetermination. This is a qualitatively and temporally novel development.
For the subject matter o f this research project—the smaller and weaker members
of the state system and the factors, patterns and outcomes o f their interactions with major
powers— the emergent international system o f states with almost-fixed boundaries is
essential. If, in fact, this system is able to protect the weakest against arbitrary aggression
for territory or coercion, the implications are substantial. It would fundamentally change
that dictum o f Thucydides so that the strong would hesitate from doing what they will,
and the weak would not compliantly suffer what they must. It would mean the minnows,
secure at least in the sturdiness of their borders, do not need to fear their mere survival as
much as they had to in earlier eras o f territorial expansionism, imperial encroachment,
and recurrent modification o f boundaries. Today’s weak states might thus feel relatively
less vulnerable, but by no means entirely secure, at least in regards to their basic survival.
In most other spheres— political, economic, social and environmental—the
smaller and weaker states also face ample vulnerabilities. They may routinely buckle
under political pressure to adhere to the demands o f greater powers. It has become a wellestablished proposition that as the so-called “price takers” in the international system of
behemoth economic powers, the small states are unable to compete and remain inherently
vulnerable. Their voices and concerns on social and environmental issues usually fall on
deaf ears o f the greater powers. For the majority o f small/weak states, especially those in
the global South, independence and autonomy o f strategic policy choices are unusual.
THE PUZZLE: STRATEGIC AUTONOMY OF SMALL STATES
Traditional IR theory presumes small states to be entirely structurally constrained
and irrelevant to the major global issues. The major powers would rather pigeonhole
small states into their traditional roles o f “balancing, bandwagoning or buffering” than
negotiate with them as sovereign equals. Their newfound relative freedom from
existential worry stands uneasily with the continued political, economic and social
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vulnerabilities o f most small states vis-a-vis major powers. This offers a striking puzzle
in world politics. Do small states possess “strategic autonomy” in their interactions with
greater powers?
The number of small states—whatever definitional criteria is used, the variation
o f which we will tackle in the next chapter—has risen dramatically in the post-Cold War
world. Along with the rise in numbers, there has been a small but burgeoning scholarship
on the topic o f small states research, which in direct contradiction to the mainstream IR
theory, seek to understand and explain the myriad ways in which smaller, weaker states
of the international system have managed to not just survive but thrive, economically and
politically, while tangling with the structural constraints o f major power politics.
This puzzle of the acutely vulnerable small states that may nonetheless exhibit the
curious pattern of autonomy and resilience in varying degrees raises questions that are
both theoretically interesting as well as empirically substantive. Do the weaker states now
enjoy uniform autonomy of strategic action? Has their role as the pawns o f the rival great
powers changed significantly? Under what conditions do the weaker state benefit
materially from their inherent position? How have some o f them managed to overcome
the presumed inherent vulnerability owing to their position in the structure o f IR? In the
last few decades, many bodies of literature in international relations, international
political economy and related fields have addressed this puzzle of the small state
problematic.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SMALL STATES
Foremost, the scholarship is divided by the theoretical and practical inability to
find a common and widely acceptable definition o f what could be termed “small state.”
Reflecting these definitional squabbles, observers have employed various objective and
subjective criteria to delimit the type o f state that is being discussed under such
contending labels as “small states,” “small powers,” “weak states,” and “micro states,”
etc., a process that has managed to further muddy the analytical waters. The next chapter
begins with a section tabulating and sorting out the various definitional issues and
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detailing the conceptualization o f the terms to be used in this research. A brief
observation of the core standoff should suffice here.
Robert Keohane, in a widely cited review article published in 1969, highlighted
the empirical and conceptual difficulty in categorizing the group o f small states.5 He
found two principal criteria: empirical based on material elements, or conceptual based
on subjective, psychological criteria. Some scholars at the that time had either used
strictly material criteria such as population or geographic size with somewhat arbitrary
cutoff points to separate the category o f small states from middle or great powers. Others
favored a conceptual definition using level o f perceived security and self-reliance a state
could count on. Another long-time popular approach involved setting aside the
superpowers and the major powers, and then treating the “residual category” as small
states, which were mostly deemed unnecessary to explain a whole lot in world politics.6
Moving beyond the definitional squabbles, observers from contending traditions
have grappled with the small state problematic is diverse ways. In a survey o f small state
scholarship, Matthew Louis Bishop identifies three competing approaches to the analysis
of small state: mainstream IR theory; economic and development studies; and
international political economy approaches.7 To Bishop’s approaches, one could add a
couple complementary perspectives: “emerging state system and norms” and “societal
actors” perspectives. The former is contingent on the larger concerns of state systems
suitable for the emergence and survival of small states, and the later focuses on the
factors emanating from within the small states in producing their behavioral outcomes
vis-a-vis greater powers. These groupings of scholarship will form the basis o f the
theoretical literature review in chapter two. Here I provide a brief introduction to show
the scope of each approach.

5 Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,"
International Organization 23, no. 2 (1969).
6 Christine Ingebritsen et al., eds., Small States in International Relations (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2006).
7 Matthew Louis Bishop, "The Political Economy of Small States: Enduring
Vulnerability?," Review o f International Political Economy 19, no. 5 (2012).
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Traditional IR theorists concerned as they are with the major powers and global
issues, have given less attention to small states. Yet, their implicit position is
deterministic on the structure o f international system and the distribution o f power, which
places the small states in the system as inherently powerless and lacking agency. From
the economist and developmental studies approach the core concern states has been in
trying to quantify those states’ levels of vulnerability to internal and external shocks and,
more recently, in trying to forge ways o f “nurturing resilience” against those immutable
shocks. Relatedly, the recent strain o f critical IPE scholarship has been concerned with
the idea o f “agency” that the small states possess in the face o f structural constraints. By
participating in niche market areas or by activating particularistic norms, many small
states have been able to overcome their vulnerabilities. The societal actors approach takes
a more traditional view in identifying the important unit-level, societal and individual
determinants, of foreign policy behavior of small states.
However, I show that the extant theories do not sufficiently take into account the
varieties o f small states and the variation o f the outcomes in interaction with greater
powers. Rather than uniformly denying strategic autonomy and gains from interaction for
all small states, I argue that we have to allow for specific contextual, temporal and issuerelated consideration. The point o f departure o f this research is to begin and unravel the
“power of the small” puzzle by enumerating the empirical ways in which small states
have managed to overcome their supposed vulnerability. We can then analyze the
specific assumptions of smallness, vulnerability and resilience o f small states.
WEDGE STATES: THEORY AND APPROACH
To adjust the limitation in these theoretical perspectives, I propose, theorize and
analyze a special class o f small states, what I call the “wedge states.” Wedge states are
defined as those small states that are able to enlarge their strategic autonomy and accrue
material benefits from the two rival great powers, due primarily to their geographic
location, ideological inclination or strategic self-interest. With the help o f the typology of
small states, I distinguish wedge states as a sub-category within the population of
small/weak states and differentiate them from others historical usage, such as the concept
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of “buffer states.” The theoretical expectation is that wedge states are able to expand their
strategic autonomy, which means ability to accrue higher gains from interaction.
As explained in detail in chapter II, the concept o f wedge states denotes those
small states that are forced to interact with two rival greater powers. And because o f their
interaction with each o f the competing rival powers, there is theoretical possibility they
might enlarge their space for strategic autonomy, which in practice leads to greater share
of gains from interaction in any of the myriad interactions they are involved in. It is in
this context that I apply the insights from the extant theoretical perspectives to the context
of wedge states. The goal is to explain the dependent variable, namely “gains from
interaction” in a specific case and attempt to explain the variation in gains.
In Chapter III, I present the theoretical model of the wedge state along with the
specification o f independent variables that might explain the variation in the level of
gains. The leading variables identified are: the type o f state system; extent o f sovereignty
norms; distribution o f power; level of institutionalization; level of interdependence; type
of the domestic political system; level of political stability; level o f economic
dependence; level of economic development. From these leading variables, I draw three
relevant hypotheses to explain the behavior and outcomes of interaction by wedge states.
To test those hypotheses and to help in building the theory o f wedge states, I
present a qualitative research design based on a single-unit o f analysis. Using the
qualitative methodology o f process-tracing and within-case analysis over time, I propose
to study the factors that impact the level o f gains from interaction accrued by a typical
wedge state. The goal is theory building and generation o f testable implications of the
proposed theory o f wedge states, in regards to the primary research question, which is the
level o f gains from interaction enjoyed by the wedge state in various issues areas.
EMPIRICAL CASE AND EVIDENCE
For empirical analysis, this research will rely on the case o f the small South Asian
state of Nepal, which is landlocked between the rising superpowers, India and China. The
historical rivalry and current competition between the regional and global players
provides a perfect wedge opportunity for substantial but relatively tiny Nepal. Thus,
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analyzing Nepal as my unit of analysis allows for testing the hypotheses on wedge states
in its interaction with rival powers.
In presenting the evidence from this geo-political unit to analyze the theoretical
issues raised, I shall examine three distinct cases to collect evidence o f how this “wedge”
state negotiates from a position o f weakness. The three issue-areas discussed in detail,
which provide the bulk o f evidence in chapters IV to VI are:
1. The first case involves political, social and cultural issues. For more than half a
century, the three states o f Nepal, India and China have been involved in a delicate
balancing act to manage each other’s expectations in dealing with the issue o f Tibet and
Tibetan refugees. The long-running strategic interaction between the three countries on
their individual positions on this delicate issue and their actions vis-a-vis Tibetan
refugees provides a suitable case to determine the degree o f autonomy or independence
that a weak state might possess when interacting with major powers. This case is
analyzed in detail in chapter IV and provides the evolving situation o f three-player
strategic interaction over time.
2. The second case is of the economic interaction in foreign investment into
Nepal’s hydropower sector from its rival neighbors. As one o f the poorest countries of
the world, Nepal has relied in economic aid and investments from outside, primarily from
India and China to maintain its economic positions. Chapter V will examine the historical
pattern of state investment in hydropower projects made by India and China into Nepal
and interrogate if the investment decisions have exhibited any discernible patterns of
strategic interactions between the three actors. Review of specific hydropower projects
analyses if Nepal’s wedge is able to gamer higher gains from one or both of the rival
powers.
3. The third case covers the problem o f global climate change and environmental
cooperation in the high Himalayan region. This issue is of utmost strategic importance to
all three nations under consideration. The Himalayan range, which forms the natural
barrier between Nepal, China and India is the source of the major river systems in South
Asia. As the global temperatures rise, the fragile ecosystems o f the high Himalayas are
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said to be under threat and require close coordination and cooperation between the all the
national stakeholders in the region for any meaningful success in combating the
dangerous effects. Chapter VI reviews the strategic interaction between the three states
regarding climate change and its effects on the region and the joint efforts to mitigate the
impending disaster.
The chapters on the three cases provides crucial evidence used to analyze the
pertinent research questions and test hypotheses about the role, function and ability of
small, wedge states to manage their affairs and interactions with their powerful partners.
Chapter VII presents the comparative cases summary findings, implications and
conclusions.
As for the method and process of data collection and evidence testing, this study
relies on the method o f “systematic process tracing” to outline the causal mechanisms of
Nepal’s interaction and choices in those three issue areas o f interaction with India and
China. This project draws as much as possible on primary sources of data, in the form of
government declarations, treaties, official agreements as well as official figures and
statements collected from official sources. Significant data also come from secondary
sources as well in the form o f newspaper accounts o f developments, journal articles,
books of historical records and major international databases for data. Due to the inability
of the author to travel for data collection, the research compensates by using sources
available in the Internet and library research.
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CHAPTER II

SM A LL A N D W ED G E STA TES IN TH E O R Y

An explosion in the number of new independent states characterized the second
half o f the twentieth century, and the majority of the emergent states were “small.” Lake
and O ’Mahony have shown that, after rising in the previous century, the average size of
the states steadily shrunk in the twentieth centuiy.1 Each new state was welcomed to the
community o f nations as evidenced by its membership in the United Nations and other
international and regional bodies. The membership in the United Nations almost
quadrupled from the original 51 members in 1945 to 193 in 2011.2 This phenomenon o f a
growing number of sovereign and formally equal, but empirically smaller and weaker
states has spawned contending theoretical and policy questions.
Smaller geographic units, principalities and duchies had long been a historic
feature o f European state system and geopolitics. Yet, the classificatory rubric o f dividing
Europe into the “great powers” and the rest— made up of “middle powers” and what has
been called the ‘'‘'residual category” o f “small powers”—only came into usage after the
Congress o f Vienna, during which the five major powers began formalizing the
interactions among themselves and with the rest of Europe by setting the traditional rules
of the diplomatic game.3 Those states that did not have a seat at the table were small
powers. The period after World War I saw the breakup o f the empires into smaller units;
after World War II came the accelerating pace o f nationalism and decolonization,
creating numerous new states which joined the international system. Thus began the
intellectual curiosity and a budding literature on small states in the disciplines of

1David A Lake and Angela O'Mahony, "The Incredible Shrinking State: Explaining
Change in the Territorial Size o f Countries," Journal o f Conflict Resolution (2004).
2 United Nations, "Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present,"
http://www.un.org/ en/members/growth. shtml.
3 Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstohl, "Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver's
World?," in Small States in International Relations, ed. Christine Ingebritsen, et al.
(Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2006), 4.
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international relations, foreign policy analysis, economics and development studies, and
international political economy. Enquiry on small states has centered on such research
problems as: their political and economic viability and survivability; their internal
circumstances and external behavior with neighboring states; and their role in the
international political and economic system dominated by the Western powers.
The early scholarly concern on small states focused squarely on their economic
and political “viability” and doubted their prolonged survival as independent entities. The
departing empires attempted to patch together the largest configuration o f territory—
successful examples included multiethnic conglomerates of India and Indonesia— so that
the newly independent area would have a chance at survival. Vaughan Lewis alludes to
such traditional colonial view, which believed that “the construction of large-scale
sovereign political entities, even of multiple ethnicities and cultures, was more likely to
permit long-term stability in the modem world.” 4 He cites the failure o f other creation
attempts as the Federation o f Malaysia, the Caribbean confederation, and in East Africa,
which ended up creating many independent small, and thus presumably vulnerable, states
around the globe.
As the Cold War intensified, many of those frail small states seemed to discard
their dire vulnerability and acquire some sort o f international presence. Analysis shifted
focus from mere survival to investigate: their alliance decisions; their purported use
(some would say abuse) of their power in numbers at the United Nations and other
international organizations; and the practicability o f non-alignment as their foreign policy
strategy.5 Cooper and Shaw classify that era’s research concerns on small states,
conducted under the shadow o f the bipolar world, in the “pre-globalization” group, which

4 Vaughan A. Lewis, "Foreword: Studying Small States over the Twentieth into the
Twenty-First Centuries," in The Diplomacies o f Small States : Between Vulnerability and
Resilience, ed. Andrew Fenton Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009).
5 David Vital, The Inequality o f States: A Study o f the Small Power in International
Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small
Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). Keohane, "Lilliputians'
Dilemmas." Annette Baker Fox, "The Small States in the International System, 19191969," International Journal 24, no. 4 (1969).
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they argue was rooted in conflictual bipolarity and is distinct from the concerns o f small
states in the present post-Cold War globalized era.6
In the contemporary era of globalization and complex interdependence, when it is
argued that security is no longer the only or the top issue in the hierarchy o f issues,7 the
age-old small state problematic regarding their survival and independence seems to have
given way to much finer concerns. The evolving post-war international system o f states
has enhanced to a considerable degree the chances for small state independence and
continued survival, so that there are more “small” states now in existence than ever
before in history.8 Most post-WWII and post-Cold War small states have survived with
their independence intact. Yet, major ecological and economical vulnerabilities in a
globalized world beset many small states, which seek to build resilience and nurture
maturity in their diplomacies in our post-globalized era.9 At the same time, contrary to
early concerns, many small states, especially the Northern European ones and a few
others such as Singapore or Qatar, have actually managed to thrive as well-managed units
domestically, and are even able harness globalization to project economical and
ideational influence externally.10 Indeed, major institutional and ideational changes have
given new options for small state in the international and interstate relations. No longer
are they doomed just to “bandwagon” with regional and global powers or face probable
extinction.
The primary research question o f this research concerns the strategic autonomy,
agency and influence of certain types o f small states, those that I call wedge states, in

6 Andrew Fenton Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., The Diplomacies o f Small States :
Between Vulnerability and Resilience (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 3.
7 Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York:
Longman, 2001).
8 Lake and O'Mahony, "The Incredible Shrinking State: Explaining Change in the
Territorial Size o f Countries."
9 Cooper and Shaw, The Diplomacies o f Small States : Between Vulnerability and
Resilience, 4.
10 Alan Chong, "Small State Soft Power Strategies: Virtual Enlargement in the Cases of
the Vatican City State and Singapore," Cambridge Review o f International Affairs 23, no.
3 (2010); JE Peterson, "Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State," The Middle
East Journal (2006).
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contemporary interstate relations characterized by overarching globalization. To begin to
unravel that complex problem, this literature review chapter evaluates the intellectual
journey on small state scholarship beginning with a critique o f the interdisciplinary
muddle on defining “small states,” which I show to be quite unsatisfactory. Instead I
propose grouping the smaller states o f the globe into typical subclasses, including the
subject matter o f this research, which I introduce as wedge states. The chapter then
progresses by reviewing the major disciplinary and theoretical perspectives, each of
which highlights specific independent causal factors to try to explain the behavior of
small states’ interrelationship with greater powers.
WHAT ARE SMALL STATES?
Evidently, how one defines a small state determines largely the answers to related
questions o f agency or autonomy. The definition o f small states, may lead us to either
ascribe them autonomy or not, which, in turn, determines their role in the international
political and economic interrelationships. But there are gaping differences o f opinion and
analytical preferences on the matter o f definitions and on which values and attributes
should be considered fundamental to define this category and their constituents. One such
constituent subclass o f small states is wedge states. Therefore, I begin by reviewing the
definitional heterogeneity o f “small states” to show their inadequacy and the need for
disparate subclasses, after which we can delve into the disparate theoretical perspectives
on their behavior.
In order to delimit “small states” as a discrete category one must begin with a
classification scheme of all the states o f the world based on certain defining criteria and
using specific principles of categorization. Aristotle pioneered comparative studies by
classifying the city-states o f Greece using the defining criteria o f the states’ political
system as either true or deviant types based on their commitment to the common good. In
the modem disciplines of political science, international studies and development
economics the complexity in classifying states in general, and the ostensible lack o f a
commonly agreed-upon definition of “small states” in particular, even after decades of
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enterprise, have been duly and periodically noted in the literature." Most books and
articles on small states begin by first discussing the lack o f definitional consensus.
Surveying the literature yields that the classification schemes of all states can be
grouped into two varieties: Material (or Quantitative) and Conceptual (or Qualitative).12
Material schemes are based on such objective defining criteria as size (of landmass,
population or economy) or relative capabilities and power. Conceptual schemes, on the
other hand, favor such defining criteria as a state’s level o f systemic influence or role, or
ability to provide self-help and security. A sub-class o f conceptual definitions is based
entirely on a psychological categorizing principle by which “perceptual” notions of
“smallness” as perceived by a state or others, defines it as such.13
Material classification schemes using quantitative defining criteria, such as
geographic size, population, and the size o f the economy, singly or in combination, seem
to make intuitive sense and have been the most prevalent method o f states classification.
In his pioneering research on small states in IR, David Vital used a strictly quantitative
criteria, famously stating that small states are those states that have “a) a population of
10-15 million in the case of economically advanced countries; and (b) a population of
20- 30 million in the case o f underdeveloped countries.” 14 When many thinly populated
former colonies, mostly islands in the Pacific or the Caribbean, gained and survived
independence by the 1970s, observers o f international politics used population size to
delimit what they called “micro” (population less than 100,000) or “mini” (population
less than 300,000) states, and questioned if these polities could participate in the
international diplomacy adequately and whether they might pose a problem in the

11 Matthias Maass, "The Elusive Definition o f the Small State," International Politics 46,
no. 1 (2009); Tom Crowards, "Defining the Category o f ‘Small’ States," Journal o f
International Development 14, no. 2 (2002).
12 This distinction is adapted from Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas," 292-97.
13 Jeanne A. K. Hey, ed. Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy
Behavior (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 3.
14 Vital, The Inequality o f States, 8.
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efficient function of international fora such as the UN.15 Quantitative classification
schemes have been especially pervasive in economics and development studies. In 1957,
the International Economics Association held a conference to discuss the “Economic
Consequences of the Size of Nations,” where Simon Kuznets suggested that small states
are those with less than 10 million population16—many others have carried on research in
that line o f inquiry.17 Subsequently economists, and primarily development economists,
have attempted a variety o f statistical techniques and methodological approaches to arrive
at a scientifically valid classification scheme using distinct cut-off points to classify states
in terms o f population, the size o f arable landmass, and GNP.18
These studies suffered from the bane o f all material-quantitative classification
schemes—where to set the cut-offpoints to categorize states? As Tom Crowards
incisively points out, the cut-off population threshold for small states have “varied, very
generally, from around 10 million or 15 million in the 1950s and 1960s, to 5 million in
the 1970s and 1980s, and to around 1 million or 1.5 million in the 1990s.” 19 As a
corrective, Crowards combined the variation in population, land area and total income of
the 190 states in the world to derive a classification scheme based on “non-hierarchical
cluster analysis,” which generated “four clusters (micro, small, medium, large and very
large states) from equally spaced initial cluster-centers” out o f which 79 countries were
classified in the “small and micro” category.
The Commonwealth Secretariat, an association o f the former British colonies
based in London, has successfully led the most widespread policy and academic
application of the term “small states,” which is based on strictly material-quantitative
criteria. In 1985, the Commonwealth published a pioneering report, which classified
15 Tony Thorndike, "Review o f "Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and
Options." By Elmer Plischke; "Mini-Nations and Macro-Cooperation: The Caribbean and
the South Pacific." By Herbert Corkran.," International Affairs 54, no. 1 (1978).
16 Quoted in Paul Sutton, "The Concept o f Small States in the International Political
Economy," Round Table 100, no. 413 (2011): 142.
17 A recent review is provided in Alberto Alesina, "The Size o f Countries: Does It
Matter?," Journal o f the European Economic Association 1, no. 2 - 3 (2003).
18 Sutton, "The Concept o f Small States in the International Political Economy," 143.
19 Crowards, "Defining the Category o f ‘Small’ States," 145.
20 Ibid., 162-70.
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states with population less than 1 million as “small states.”21 Researchers working on this
framework argued that population size correlated well with other material sizedescriptors and could be used as proxy o f all quantitative criteria.

In 1997, the

Commonwealth updated and revised the criteria in a new report so that the upper
population limit o f “small states” was raised to 1.5 million.

Some states with more than

the threshold population—Jamaica, Lesotho, Namibia, etc.—were included into the
group as exceptions. These definitions have been accepted to a large degree by the policy
advocacy networks and international organizations in that area including the World Bank.
Thus, in this institutional policy-area, the definition o f small states and its implications
have largely been institutionalized across policy and academic worlds to mean states with
population of 1.5 million or less (a cut-off point or criteria that might have used for to
group “micro-states” in an earlier era), an admittedly arbitrary, and sometimes even
political, decision, according to one o f the authors o f the 1997 report.24
Scholars in other disciplinary and theoretical traditions have qualms about
classification schemes based on entirely absolutist and arbitrary cut-off points of the
quantitative criteria such as the one promoted by the Commonwealth. Those scholars
concerned with the relative positioning o f states in the international hierarchy argue that a
superior classifying scheme is the use o f “relative capabilities,” using composite
measures o f the states’ economic resources and level o f development, population and
human capital, and military power including possession of nuclear weapons. In the field
of international relations (IR), Michael Handel employed such material-capabilities
approach in his classic study Weak States in the International System (1981), in which he
categorizes the states of the world into three groups: great powers, middle powers, and
weak states (not weak powers), explaining the salient implication that the latter are

21 Commonwealth Secretariat, "Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society. Report
of a Commonwealth Consultative Group," (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985).
22 Ibid., 8.
23 "A Future for Small States : Overcoming Vulnerability : Report by a Commonwealth
Advisory Group," (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997).
24 Sutton, "The Concept of Small States in the International Political Economy," 141-42.
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characterized by their need to be “continually preoccupied with their survival.”25 Handel
uses the defining criteria of “relative capabilities” to classify weak states into that
category.
In contrast to these material-quantitative classification schemes, the other variety
of classification schemes uses “conceptual” terms, often paired with “perceptual” metrics.
What function is served by conceptual definitions that cannot be provided by merely
material-quantitative ones, which are after all more intuitive? In a trenchant critique
against strictly material-based definitions, Keohane argued in favor o f “precise analytical
definitions,” which could “facilitate behavioral comparison.”26 Thus conceptual
definitions and classificatory systems might provide more leverage for analytical and
comparative analysis o f small states based on their characteristic behavior in the
international system, rather than the merely descriptive purposes o f strictly quantitativebased classifications.
The conceptual definitions o f small states have been extended to ascribe those
states with group-specific behavior, which separate them from other states. While great
powers have global impacts and aspirations, the small states are expected to have limited,
local and regional foreign policy footprint; they are seen to be more reliant on
international institutions and international law and economically and politically
dependent on great and regional powers; they exhibit more communal behavior and make
decisions identified with the group as a whole; finally, their internal behaviors are also
constrained by the structure to seek “domestic strategies such as consociational
democracy, corporatism, or federalism,” all behaviors consistent with the desire of small
states as a group to “mitigate the effects o f structural constraints.”27 However, this line o f
reasoning has been challenged because scholars disagree if these unique behaviors are

25 Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System, 3rd ed. (London: Frank Cass,
2005(1981)), 10-11.
26 Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas," 294.
27 Neumann and Gstohl, "Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?," 10-12.
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inherent causes of these states’ “smallness” or if they are indeed the effects, causing
problems of circular reasoning.28
Keohane himself provided an example o f a “conceptual” definition when he
categorized the states of the world based on the defining criteria of their “systemic role,”
based on which states can range from “system-determining,” “system-influencing,”
“system-affecting” and “system-ineffectual” states. Adding a component o f the level of
perception o f a state’s systemic role by its leaders, he then proposed four groups o f states:
great powers, secondary powers, middle powers and small powers, which show variance
in their behavior in international affairs based on the perception o f their ability to effect
*

the system.
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The pioneering scholar of small states in IR, Annette Baker Fox in her 1959 book,
The Power o f Small States: Diplomacy in World War II, used conceptual groups of “great
powers” and “small powers” based on the simple criteria of which states were engaged in
struggle for dominance and which merely wanted to get out o f the way to survive. Fox’s
evidence included such “small states” during WWII as Spain, Turkey, Switzerland,
Sweden, Ireland and Portugal, which endeavored to remain uninvolved in the destructive
path of war to varying degrees o f success.30 Reflecting the post-war era concerns of
alliance behavior of small states, Robert Rothstein used the conceptual-perceptive
defining criteria of the “self-sufficiency to provide for one’s own security” and
categorized states into groups o f those that are able to provide their own security, and
others that aren’t able to and are forced to rely on others through alliances.31
Other scholars have extended the conceptual definitions to imbue them with
purely psychological notions of “perception o f smallness” held by a particular state and
others in the system. The most prominent example of this position is Jeanne A.K. Hey,
who dismisses attempts to categorize small states on quantitative attributes such as
geographic size, population or GNP, as “rigid definitions,” which necessitate
28 Maass, "The Elusive Definition o f the Small State," 78.
29 Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas," 295-96.
30 Annette Baker Fox, The Power o f Small States: Diplomacy in World War Two
(University o f Chicago Press, 1959).
31 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers.
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“exceptions”; instead, she and the authors in her edited volume of small state foreign
policy analysis rely on the conceptual notion of the perception of smallness— so that “if a
state’s people and institutions generally perceive themselves to be small, o f if other
states’ people and institutions perceive that state as small, it shall be so considered.”32
Thus, the case studies found in that volume on small states’ foreign policy analysis
include countries ranging from Luxembourg, Caribbean islands, Paraguay, Gambia,
Jordan and Laos. Hey’s approach has been criticized as problematic because there ample
chances for ambiguity on perceptions about “smallness” based on differing empirical
criteria, and also possibility of “skewed” self-classification, such as that leaders of South
Korea, which despite its military and economic power, perceive their country as a
“small” state based on its sensitive geographic location and existential qualms.33
In international political economy (IPE), the most notable application o f the
small state label and its domestic and structural implications is Peter Katzenstein’s study
of the industrial policy of the “seven small European states” published in 1985 in Small
States in World Markets.34 In that pioneering volume Katzenstein treats advanced
European states, such as Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Netherlands as representative
small states, a classification that would be in direct contradiction to a number o f criteria
o f some o f the material definitions reviewed above. In a 2003 retrospective review o f his
research on small states, Katzenstein argued that the most important factor in his
consideration o f those states was that “small size was a code for something more
important,” namely their “perception o f vulnerability, economic and otherwise.”35 He
found that a myriad o f behavioral outcomes in the European small states, including social
cohesion and economic corporatism characterized by flexibility, derived directly from
this perception o f external vulnerability, which was the “first and most important

32 Hey, Small States in World Politics, 2-3.
33 Maass, "The Elusive Definition o f the Small State," 79.
34 Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).
35 Peter Katzenstein, "Small States and Small States Revisited," New Political Economy
8, no. 1 (2003): 11.
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explanatory variable.”36 Definitions and implications of small states based on perceptions
should thus be accorded needed attention.
VARIETIES OF SMALL STATES AND WEDGE STATES
The study of “small states” suffers from a fundamental lack o f consensus on the
matter of definition. Acknowledging the clutter on this topic and the empirical reality of
numerous “small states,” one reviewer has called for definitional and conceptual
“flexibility” in studying small states.37 The preceding section attests to the need for
flexibility amid the varieties o f definitions, classifications and approaches to the study of
what are all termed “small states.” The best possible solution o f the analytical tangle
might be to accept that there are varieties of small states and to acknowledge the
definitional flexibility among researchers.
This relative view of “small states” is not novel. Jeanne Hey suggests that it might
be useful to consider the fact that when scholars in the various disciplines speak o f “small
states,” they are talking about three specific groups o f mutually exclusive states: 1) The
group of states, many of them islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific, with a population
of less than 1 million (or 1.5 million according the updated Commonwealth criteria); 2)
The group of small, advanced and wealthy small states in Europe, varying in size from
the Netherlands to Luxembourg; 3) The group of the small states in the rest o f the world,
in Africa, Asia and Latin America, most o f which are larger in size relative to the other
two groups and also economically backwards.38 The first and the last group includes a
majority o f states that have also generated sustained research interest under the rubric of
the least developed countries (LDCs) by the international aid communities.
The thriving research program on European small states is contextual of the roles
and functions those states play in the European Union integration processes, and the
resulting problems and prospects.39 As noted in the previous section, the Commonwealth

36 Ibid.
37 Maass, "The Elusive Definition of the Small State," 65-66.
38 Hey, Small States in World Politics, 2.
39 See inter alia: Laurent Goetschel, Small States inside and Outside the European Union
Interests and Policies (Springer, 1998); Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp, Adapting to
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Secretariat has led the academic and policy research on those small states with
populations less than 1.5 million, based on that criteria, small states comprised a third o f
the Commonwealth member nations, many o f them island states.40 In terms o f outward
material features, such as GDP or population size, there is not a whole lot that is in
common between Nauru and Netherlands. Yet, different scholars study both as part of
“small states” in their particular context.
One approach to analytically contextualize similar small states into a group is
shown by two scholars working on the European small states. To characterize small states
in EU, Thorhallsson and Wivel propose using the “relational definition o f small states,”
which stresses the value of the “spatio-temporal context” o f small state behavior.41 This
approach basically suggests that “being a small state is tied to a specific spatio-temporal
context, not a general characteristic of the state; a state may be weak in one relation, but
simultaneously powerful in another,” so that we are compelled to “change our focus from
the possession of power to the exercise of influence.”42 Using this flexible and contextual
definitional approach, the authors are able to show that the differences in foreign policy
behavior of different small European states towards EU integration processes could be
explained by the various systemic, domestic and ideational spatio-temporal contexts in
which those states found themselves. This contextual definitional approach, although
European-centric in their application, might be applied fruitfully in analyzing other
varieties of small states in other parts of the world.

European Integration: Small States and the European Union (New York: Longman,
1998); Baldur Thorhallsson, The Role o f Small States in the European Union (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2000); Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel, eds., Small States in Europe:
Challenges and Opportunities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010).
40 Commonwealth Secretariat, "A Future for Small States : Overcoming Vulnerability :
Report by a Commonwealth Advisory Group."
41 Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel, "Small States in the European Union: What
Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?," Cambridge Review o f International
Affairs 19, no. 4 (2006): 654. Thorhallsson and Wivel adapt this concept fromAnders
Wivel and Hans Mouritzen, The Geopolitics o f Euro-Atlantic Integration (London:
Routledge, 2005).
42 Thorhallsson and Wivel, "Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and
What Would We Like to Know?," 654-55.
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Wedge States
Such flexibility o f classification and the consideration o f “spatio-temporal
context” is one o f the goals of this present study as well, which attempts to bypass the
“imprecision” and conceptual mess to argue for a categorization o f small states based on
the latent understanding of their real power relations. The point o f departure here is that
there is an undeniable gap in material capabilities, power and influence between the
major powers and many smaller states that they regularly interact with. I argue that we
can fruitfully study groups of those smaller states that share common concerns in their
interrelations with greater powers.
The specific group that this study analyzes is comprised of those small states,
which exist in the sphere of influence o f two competing major powers. I propose this sub
class of small states be called “wedge states.” Having solved the dilemma o f survival
because o f the emergent international system o f calcified sovereignty (which I review in
the next section), this sub-class o f small states, theoretically, could seek benefits and
influence from their competing benefactors. Let me briefly outline the working
definition, assumptions, and the predicted interstate strategies o f wedge states.
Wedge states are defined as those smaller and weaker members o f the current
global system of states, which are characterized by their practically equal affinity with
two major, competitive powers. In the “spatio-temporal context,” the wedge states are so
ideally situated—geographically, ideologically, influentially—that they must navigate
between the diplomatic, security and economic pull from the two rival power patrons. In
other words, these states are “wedged” between two the rival powers. It is easy to
understand that many major powers are in a state of competition if not in conflict. For the
wedge states, the motivation o f trying to play coy between two immeasurably powerful
powers is evidently self-interest in the form o f monetary transfers, economic aid, and
diplomatic prestige, in addition to survival. For the rival powers, the motivation of
bargaining for access and influence may be strategic, material or simply related to
prestige, influence and recognition, as is the case o f PRC, Taiwan and Vanuatu. In that
case, then, Vanuatu would be the “wedge state” and the relatively powerful states o f PRC
and Taiwan are the rival powers.
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The main assumptions for the wedge states to exist as I propose them are as
follows. First, by definition the power differential between the wedge state and the two
rival powers is assumed insurmountable and readily visible. There is no prospect o f the
power gap being bridged; the wedge state always remains relatively less powerful that
either of the rival powers. The second assumption is that the overarching system of states
allows for predictable norms of “sovereign equality” to all states in the system and there
are functioning interstate institutions for coordination and cooperation. This assumption
allows for the mere independent survival o f the weak wedge state among major powers
that could as easily annex the wedge but do not. The third assumption is lack o f actual
war between the two or more rival powers, which just means that it is assumed that the
existence o f wedge state as an independent, non-aligned state would signify periods of
peace between the powers. During periods of all out war, most if not all small and weak
states are forced to either choose sides o f the warring powers or to be gobbled up by
them. Therefore, in a specific “spatio-temporal” context o f an international system of
formal, sovereign equality among states o f all power levels, and during times o f peace, I
argue that wedge states are expected to formally maintain interstate relations with two
rival powers to generate benefits from each power.
In the current international state system, there are many avenues for weaker states
to receive benefits and ensure their survival and well-being. Different theoretical
perspectives, as I shall review them below, have identified many different paths: 1.
Joining an international organization, where even the least powerful states generally have
some rights. 2. Banding together to form supra-state bodies. 3. Join an alliance with the
hegemon. 4. Bandwagon with a protector to receive security guarantee in exchange for
loyalty. However, in the proposed theoretical model o f the “wedge states,” certain weak
states under specific conditions might pursue any o f the above paths in conjunction with
“wedging strategies” to receive benefits from two rival powers.
When it comes to the strategy of “wedging,” similar strategies might be used by
greater powers in their interaction with other powers. Actually, major powers have
historically been able to wedge between other powers to accrue gains. But the way
wedging is used in this study is specifically applied to small or weak states because they

24

do not have many other avenues o f accruing gains. In short, greater powers have other
choices if the wedging strategies fail, while the small states might be inherently reliant on
gains from wedging to realize strategic autonomy. As such wedging is the relatively
exclusive strategy o f the powerless.
Historically, weak states caught between the competitive forces of rival powers—
“wedge states”—have used a variety o f wedging strategies. O f course, the original
strategy was the one tried by the Melians, which was to attempt to persuade the
Athenians to let them remain “neutral.” The fact that Melos’ dilemma presented itself
during an all-out war, which happens to be an unyielding security realm and not
peacetime economic and social competition, made the offer o f neutrality not a successful
wedging strategy. Subsequent weaker states in history have tried to play the neutrality
strategy. Neutrality as a diplomatic tool has a long and deep history.43 Switzerland in
modem European history and other states, microstates and principalities (for example,
Luxembourg, Liechtenstein) have been successful in maintaining their precarious
independence by remaining neutral against all powerful forces. But mere declaration of
neutrality doesn’t guarantee safe passage, especially through a period o f major power
war, as many o f the weaker European states found out during the 20th century world wars.
When great powers are not engaged in war, such peacetime situation offers wedge
states better alternatives to uncertain, unsafe neutrality. One such strategy employed by
the weaker, wedge states caught between rival superior powers is what is termed
“pendulum politics.”44 This term has been used to describe behaviors o f smaller South
American states in their relationship to Brazil and Argentina, when a new leader might
sway country’s loyalty and closeness to one side or the other. During peacetime or during
periods of cold war, the wedge states might pursue another policy, which can be referred
to “equidistance.” In this strategy, the wedge state maintains cordial relationship with
both rival powers while seeking to remain in the good graces of both. This strategy is
different than the neutrality option in that the wedge state endeavors to receive benefits,
43 Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (London: Routledge, 2010 (1988)).
44 Frank O. Mara, "Paraguay: From the Stronato to the Democratic Transition," in Small
States in World Politics : Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Jeanne A. K. Hey
(Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).
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which necessarily entangles them in the interactions between the powers. O f course,
when the rival powers actually begin wars, they suffer no waffling and demand loyalty,
one-way or the other, from the wedge states.
Some empirical cases o f small states that behave in patterns close to that o f the
proposed wedge state model might now be specified. It is well known that many “nonaligned” small states dining the Cold War exploited both sides for economic gain.45 In
the post-Cold War era, many Eastern European states have tried to apply wedging
strategies between the rival powers of Russia and the United States or the European
Union. In that particular area, for example, Ukraine seemed to be a prime candidate to
find itself between the powers. However, more recently the success o f its approach has
come increasingly under question. In South America, Uruguay, a natural and
geographical wedge state, and other smaller states such as Paraguay and Bolivia, have
historically tried to play the wedging role between the regional rival powers o f Argentina
and Brazil. In Southeast Asia in the last decade, relatively weaker states such as
Myanmar, and others to a lesser degree, have responded to China’s rise with possible
wedging against the United States or India. The country o f Laos seemed wedged between
the local powers of China and Vietnam. Even a significant economic power such as
Australia, increasingly finds itself to maintain equal distance between both China and the
US for the foreseeable future. Countries in South Asia, either bandwagon with one of the
regional powers, Pakistan with China or Bhutan with India, or seem to attempt a wedging
strategy.
The empirical case study o f this study, Nepal, forms a natural and geographical
wedge, between the rival powers of China and India. Nepal has historically maintained
close relationship with both its rival neighbors; the power gap between Nepal and either
China or India is so huge as to be never surmountable; both India and China have treaties
recognizing Nepal’s independence, hence obviating the problematic o f mere survival; and
both China and India seem to be historical and natural rivals in security, economic and
global sphere, considerations o f which might spill over into their relationship with their
immediate neighbors, including Nepal. So there is ample room to test the proposed theory
45 Fox, "The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969."
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of wedge state in this tripartite relation, especially when the analysis proceeds into
specific cases where possibility o f Nepal’s use o f wedging strategies might be
anticipated. The next chapter presents the design o f the research to investigate those
questions.
It would be a fair criticism, at this point, to question if the above definitional
discussion and empirical examples warrant the proposed theoretical category o f wedge
states as a sub-class from the considerable number o f smaller and weaker states in the
global system, and also if those states actually are able to use wedging strategies to
accomplish any of their foreign policy goals. With an eye towards answering those
concerns and setting the context o f the theoretical discussion, the next section o f this
chapter presents the literature on the nature, role and behavior of small states in the
international system. The review shows that there are significant disagreements and gaps
in extant theoretical perspectives on small states. For now, let us note that the notion of
“wedge states” might fruitfully solve some of the disagreements and attempt to fill the
analytical gaps apparent in the literature.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SMALL STATES
From issues of classification, definition and the varieties o f small states, let us
now discuss the matters o f “implications” o f being a small state as viewed from various
theoretical lenses. We find that many o f the smaller members o f the international political
and economic system experience similar constraints and opportunities across regions and
definitional groupings. Analysts have used different theoretical perspectives to analyze
and explain the behavioral actions and outcomes of small states in international relations.
I review and summarize what the major theoretical and disciplinary perspectives have to
say about the implications for small states.
The first perspective view small states in the historical context o f evolving system
o f states perspective and argues that the international state system has evolved to allow
small states to survive, and also given rise to certain norms, which are argued as
necessary to understand current small state outcomes and behavior. The second approach
takes a structural perspective and sees small states behavior and action being inherently
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circumscribed by structural, systemic forces. Another approach, which I call societal
actors perspective, argues the opposite and sees room for internal processes and actors
within small states influencing the level o f autonomy and independence enjoyed by them.
The fourth and final approach is the economic and developmental perspective, which sees
unique economic features o f small states resulting in their inexorable vulnerability
against which they must endeavor in cultivating resilience. Each o f these theoretical and
disciplinary angles highlights unique factors or major variables that explain the behavior
o f small states in world politics. These explanations are offered generally for the class o f
small states, such that the sub-groups and classes, including wedge states, are usually
covered.

Evolving System o f States and Norms Perspective
In his influential volume on weak states in the international system, Michael
Handel argues that two crucial factors underlie small state outcomes: one is geographic
location, and the other is the specific historical period and the international system
specific to that period, which determine greatly the “position and relative security o f any
weak state.”46 The second factor is the topic o f this perspective, which emphasizes the
idea that the international system of states had evolved by the second half o f twentieth
century to become more conducive to the emergence and survival o f newly independent
smaller states. Such proposition rests on the assumption that “the system o f states” can be
differentiated according to some intrinsic features and that it can change and evolve. In
short, this view is the ultimate “spatio-temporal context,” that of the changing
international system itself.
Adapting and expanding from Adam Watson’s seminal study o f international state
systems47, Viotti and Kauppi present the four ideal types of international state systems:
independent state system; hegemonic state system; imperial state system; feudal state
system.48 Unlike the ancient imperial systems such as in the Roman or the Persian zenith,
46 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 5.
47 Adam Watson, The Evolution o f International Society: A Comparative Historical
Analysis (London; New York: Routledge, 1992).
48 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism,
Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2007), 44-48.
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and the feudal system as was the case during the medieval dark ages in Europe, modem
world politics has seen the prominence of the hegemonic state system, which began in
Europe in after the Peace o f Westphalia. Once rulers, such as Napoleon or Louis XIV,
became the sole sovereign within their boundaries and accumulated enough power, they
wanted to expand their state so that they turned into hegemons. Although not in the
territorial expansion sense, the dual-hegemons o f the Cold War behaved much like their
predecessors from earlier centuries. The US preponderance o f power remains in the
present era but a semblance o f the “independent state system” has come into existence,
which might be argued to be more conducive to the existence and survival o f small
independent states.
Scholars share a consensus that The Thirty Years War and the 1648 Peace of
Westphalia sowed the seeds o f an independent state system—one that was based on the
ideas o f mutual recognition of sovereigns, non-intervention, diplomatic practice, and
international law.49 Early European monarchies moved away from the Hobbesian “state
of nature” toward one dominated by strong, domestic authority via a process of
centralizing control achieved by the economic and cultural unification o f elites and
increasing incorporation o f the periphery to the centralized authority o f national armies
and bureaucracies built for and by the purposes of revenue extraction and services
provisions.
Yet, even in the supposed new era of central control and sovereign recognition,
the fate of the powerless smaller states remained dire in the face of unbridled territorial

49 For the extensive literature of state formation, and development and evolution of states
and state systems, see Charles Tilly and Gabriel Ardant, eds., The Formation o f National
States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press & Social Science
Research Council, Committee on Comparative Politics, 1975).; Martin Wight, Systems o f
States (Leicester Univ Pr, 1977).; Watson, The Evolution o f International Society.',
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990 - 1992 (Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell, 1992). Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building: A
Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe.," in The Formation o f
National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1975). For critical perspectives on state theory, a basic review is given in C.W.
Barrow, Critical Theories o f the State: Marxist, Neomarxist, Postmarxist (University of
Wisconsin Press, 1993).
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expansionism. Equally salient is the fact that the valuable commodity of state sovereignty
was certainly not to be shared outside o f the Western European states so that the major
European powers used superior arms and power to subjugate all outsiders into their
imperial rule. Peace o f Westphalia did not immediately (or ever) create a system o f fixed
boundaries respected by invaders; rather territories changed hands frequently outside
Europe and within. Early Westphalian system was characterized by regular and periodic
wars for territorial expansion, resource accumulation, and princely hunger for power. The
sovereignty ideal was young; the sanctity o f borders was routinely punctured and
disregarded.
To go from such initial system o f willful disregard for sovereignty to one with a
modicum o f restraint, European states devised various diplomatic processes, systems and
traditions to moderate and restrain the powerful, which they were able to achieve in a few
occasions. The most successful historical example was the “Concert o f Europe” system
with balance o f power as the guiding principle, which was able to secure prolonged
peace, at least amongst the major powers o f Europe. The essential condition for balance
o f power was existence of the state system with independent states. By the early 1800s,
Europe had achieved a defined state system encompassing the territories from the
Atlantic in the west to the Urals in the east and the Mediterranean in the south. Also,
unique to Europe were the proximity of powers with a common history and the feeling of
shared destiny. According to Edward Gulick’s popular study o f the subject, the survival
o f the independent states and the state system itself was the primary aims o f the balance
of power system, and not, as Gulick emphasizes, securing peace. Indeed, the statesmen
believed that war was frequently necessary to stop any one actor from gaining too much
power and disrupting the power equilibrium among the independent states but the state
system had to survive.50 To achieve those aims, the Concert of Europe pioneered a whole
host o f innovative interstate diplomatic traditions in behavior, expectations and norms.
Though it was narrowly applied among the great powers o f the time, the concept of
sovereignty found nurturing environment in the experimental lab o f Western Europe.
50 Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance o f Power; a Case History o f the
Theory and Practice o f One o f the Great Concepts o f European Statecraft (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press for the American Historical Association, 1967).
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Modified versions of these interrelated diplomatic concepts eventually traveled with the
Europeans via their colonial adventures to the rest o f the world. In the twentieth century,
the emergent notions of “collective security” organizations replaced the balance-of-power
system o f the earlier century. Interstate institutions were formed that eventually enshrined
the notions o f sovereignty and formal equality o f different states.
For our concern of small states, another significant innovation among the rapidly
codifying standards o f conduct was the idea o f “neutrality.” The major European powers
accorded the tiny state of Switzerland neutrality that has never ever been entirely
breached.51 It can be assumed that o f the many determined, militaristic and powerful
European sovereigns, one could easily have annexed Switzerland despite the geographic
fortress o f the Alps. The fact that such outcome never occurred and Switzerland to this
day enjoys unblemished neutrality has major implications regarding the effects of
particular forms of interstate codes of conduct and the survival of small states. There
were other less fortunate “neutrals” in history, such as Norway or Finland, and other
successful ones, including a few that were effectual in keeping their states from harm’s
way during the Second World War, including Sweden, Spain, and Ireland.52 Relatedly,
another diplomatic and geopolitical innovation concerning small states is the idea and
practice o f “buffer states.”53 When major European powers came face to face, they found
it prudent to leave a strip of land as buffer. Such buffer states served an important
purpose o f keeping the belligerents from having to wage constant war. Although created
for geopolitical strategy by outside major powers, the buffers themselves highlight the
fact that small states served a purpose. Undeniably, history is littered with examples of
supposedly neutral and/or buffer states periodically and repeatedly crumbling on the
warpath o f marauding armies. Poland, and Belgium are as prime examples from
European history. The unique and long-observed Swiss neutrality may be the one
exception that proves the rule o f easily punctured boundaries o f the weak states.
However, the fact bears highlighting that the evolving diplomatic codes o f conduct and

51 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States.
52 Fox, The Power o f Small States.
53 Trygve Mathisen, The Functions o f Small States in the Strategies o f the Great Powers
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971).
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norms of sovereignty has been—not always but on many situations and occasions—
conducive to the existence, survival, specialized function, and autonomy o f the smaller
and weaker states in the evolving international system o f states.
In this regard, special reference has to be made o f the concept of sovereignty. In
the Westphalian sense, sovereignty o f states is characterized by the recognition of
domestic self-determination by the community of nations.54 It is with the evolution of the
system o f states and the norms defining it, that we see increasing legal restrictions,
procedural constraints and normative principles, which have slowly begun to calcify the
sanctity of state boundaries to protect real sovereignty. Seen from the constructivist
perspective sovereignty is now an “international institution and an discourse,” which is
constantly seen to be evolving.55 In a long and tumultuous process beginning with
European imperialism, and propagating in the subsequent development o f nationalist
awakening, to finally decolonization and independence, the institution o f sovereignty was
spread in the decades after the Second World War to incorporate the farthest reaches of
geography—a process which has been called “the globalization o f the state.”56 Certainly,
the number of United Nations’ current membership would indicate the expression of
sovereignty at its historical peak. Nowadays, theorists actually talk about intensifying
challenges to the notion o f sovereignty from within and without, in the form of civil
society and international institutions, and the malign effect o f multinational corporations
that control the flow of labor and capital across borders and spreading global production
networks.57

54 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1999). A basic introduction o f the concept from the international
society perspective is: Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis o f International
Society (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986).
55 Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, State Sovereignty as Social Construct
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11.
6 Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations : Theories and
Approaches, 17-18.
Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? : Sovereignty in an Age o f Globalization (New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 1996). Gordon Smith and Moises Naim, Altered States:
Globalization, Sovereignty and Governance (Ottawa: International Development
Research Centre, 2000).
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In summary, since its inception in Westphalia to the present day the number of
formally sovereign states has skyrocketed to 191; their average relative size has
decreased; and most importantly, the increasingly codified rules, laws, and norms o f
sovereignty in interstate interactions has become the defining feature o f the current state
system. This perspective argues that today’s small states, in fact, can count on
unprecedented levels of physical security and survivability, thus solving, to a vast extent,
the major knot o f the small state problematic.

Structural IR Perspective
The dominant debates in the field o f international relations have been conflict and
cooperation in world politics writ large. Owing to this preoccupation with global war and
peace in the mainstream scholarship in IR, most o f its research programs and insights
focused on major powers and their interactions. The major powers were clearly important
and their influence obviously predominant, which meant that the rest were consigned to
the sidelines. In considering the major assumptions and considerations of the structural
IR perspective, it can be seen that certain behavioral outcomes and predictions are
ascribed to the smaller and the weaker members o f the international system. The
traditional structural perspective argues that the purposes and functions of the small states
in world politics can be summarized as bandwagoning, balancing or buffering.
The anarchic structure of the international state system is argued to have decisive
implications for the existence and range of behavior available for all states, including
major powers as well as the smaller and weaker states, under a particular system in time.
The bedrock o f the structural realist perspective is that the distribution o f power among
the units of the structure determines the hierarchical level o f autonomy and independence
experienced by individual states, which are forced to seek self-help.58 Lacking the ability
to self-help small states, postulating from these basic structural IR assertions, would be
denied all autonomy and independence and be forced to be entirely dependent
economically with a more powerful benefactor and “bandwagon” with a major protector

58 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
1979).
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power.59 Additionally, their dependent and constrained nature means that the
explanations for small state behavior are found in the structure and not within them. Due
to their lack of capacity and influence, small states’ foreign policy and behavior have
necessarily narrow and local focus, unlike the more regional and global attention o f the
major powers.60 These assumptions and considerations coalesce into the basis o f the
traditional structural perspective, encapsulated in the unequivocal observation by
Barrington Moore: “The fact that the smaller countries depend economically and
politically on big and powerful ones mean that the decisive causes o f their politics lie
outside their own boundaries.”61
It could be argued that the strongest would not be easily constrained in any
system, with the implication for the wedge states because wedging is merely a transient
state until they are forced to bandwagon with a patron power. So structuralist theorists
may argue that bandwagoning is inevitable for wedge states. However, that prediction
implies that the structure of the system is qualitatively no different that basic anarchic
model, despite the claims of expanding sovereignty of the emerging state system
perspective. Also, the empirical observation o f multitudes o f independent small states
engaging with more than one major power problematizes such notions o f inevitability.
Thus, it can be concluded that wedging does not have to necessarily be a transient state
but become o f tool o f long-term strategy adopted by small states.
Therefore, for those with limited resources and capabilities, whether the rules of
the game are conducive or not, matter greatly. A system that privileges and honors the
norms of sovereignty is qualitatively different than the one that does not from the point of
view of small states. For instance, an international system based on the state o f nature
would most certainly mean the automatic demise and dismemberment o f its weaker units.
On the other hand a system of strong rules, constraining procedures and, well-agreed
upon laws would mean that the strong would be restrained in their wills and desires, thus
limiting the chances for Melian tragedy. Changes in the structural features o f the system
59 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins o f Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
60 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 41.
61 Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant
in the Making o f the Modem World (Boston: Beacon Press, 2003 (1966)), xix.
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would most definitely result in material differences in the existential conditions of small
states. Echoing such sentiments, Erling Bjol writing in 1971, in that era o f Cold War
competition and budding interest in the rising numbers o f new small states, argued about
the priority o f the type o f state system upon the fates of small states, thus:
“The problems, possibilities and behavior of small states vary considerably
according to the types o f international systems in which they operate - hegemon
systems, confrontation systems, integration systems, security communities according to the geographic parameters which condition their foreign-policy.. .”62
In the earlier decades o f the 20th century, small states had often been viewed as
nuisances o f (Cooper and Shaw 2009)the international system, sometimes even held
responsible, historically incorrectly, for being the causes o f wars among major powers, a
view that was especially prevalent in the aftermath o f the First World War, given the
proximate causes of that war.63 The interwar period can be seen as the birthing period of
the recognition o f the “idea” of the viability and independence o f small states. President
Woodrow Wilson’s declaration o f the rights o f self-determination of all peoples and the
establishment of the League o f Nations on the basis o f “one sovereign, one vote” became
the watershed change that expanded “the possibilities” of fashioning the structure o f the
international systems in which small states could survive.64 But the small state moment
remained premature.
Yet, the sorry fates o f the small states during the great recession and especially
during the Second World War might have put a damper on notions o f their viability and
survival in an anarchic world. Upon annexing Austria in 1938, Hitler himself put the
structural problematic o f small state existence in its most basic, starkest essence, when he
declared, “What can words like “independence” or “sovereignty” mean for a state of only

62 Erling Bjol (1971) quoted by Lewis, "Foreword: Studying Small States over the
Twentieth into the Twenty-First Centuries," xiii.
63 Roger MacGinty, "War Cause and Peace Aim? Small States and the First World War,"
European History Quarterly 27, no. 1 (1997).
64 Woodrow Wilson, "The Fourteen Points," in Classic Readings and Contemporary
Debates in International Relations, ed. Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M.
Shafritz (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006 (1918)), 33-36.
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6 million people?”65 For any small state o f the international state system contending with
that basic question when demanded by a powerful adversary is existentially analogous to
the familiar no-win dilemma that the Melians faced against the unyielding demands of
Athenians. But Hitler’s pronouncement has to be read in the context of the nature o f the
system that obtains during a period o f total war, and the fact must be considered that
there were enough states that opposed Hitler’s view, which ended up saying that
independence and sovereignty applied even to the smaller states.
Precisely because it takes someone like Adolf Hitler, hell-bent on his mad project,
to espouse such denials about the viability, independence, and sovereignty o f small states
proves the unreasonableness o f his argument. That a country such as Austria—or Poland,
Burma, Ethiopia—might have a right to coexist as a state formally, jurisdictionally equal
to major powers, even if such rights were not enshrined in the system o f international
states prevalent before the Second World War, in its aftermath, the world could not allow
itself to deny such rights to all. The Second World War had been fought in part to uphold
those fundamental rights against an indiscriminate aggressor.
For the small states, the post-war international system ushered into being was
fundamentally and characteristically different than what preceded it. Formal sovereign
equality o f the small states was enshrined in the auspices o f the United Nations and the
American dominated Western state system that rose from the ashes o f the World War II.
So much so that by the late 1960s, observers contended that the international system had
changed due to the aggregation o f actions and desires by the increasingly assertive, and
ever numerous small states, acting in unison at the sympathetic forum o f the UN and
other international bodies.66 The Third World small states were seen to be attempting to
fundamentally change the international regime and its post-war rules and norms by
capturing the international rule-making structures themselves.67

65 Quoted in James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis o f International Society, 2. from
Stanley A. de Smith, Microstates and Micronesia (New York: New York University
Press, 1970), 19.
66 Fox, "The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969," 756.
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The bipolar competition of the Cold War was yet another wrinkle on that period’s
structural system of interstate interaction, which constrained and structured the glut of
new small states that came into being. In Alliances and Small Powers Robert Rothstein
highlights such heterogeneous system-specific influence on small state condition and
choices. Concerned with small state alliance decisions resulting from Cold War bipolar
competition, Rothstein showed that different types of historical balance o f power systems
have produced markedly different impacts and choices sets on small state survival and
security.68 As Keohane summarizes in his review of small state literature, Rothstein
identified various balance of power arrangements during the 19th century, ranging from
“conservative stability” to a “fluid and competitive” scramble for allies. Based on such
schema, Rothstein theorized that small states’ interest o f survival is best protected in the
conservative and stable balance of power system; but their autonomy and
maneuverability are best maximized, albeit compromising on their security, in a balance
of power system characterized by fluidity and competition and among major, hegemonic
powers.69 The prime application o f this conceptual analysis in the Cold War era thus
concerned the “alliance decisions” o f small states faced with choosing between the rival
superpowers. Theoretically, the research questions were, what option, in the realist sense
of either bandwagoning or balancing, and which side a small state chooses or is forced to
choose would depend upon what state system prevails at the point o f decision. During
periods when the superpowers are scrambling for allies, such as during the Cold War,
some small states enjoy “bargaining advantages that may accrue from offering to
dismantle a new alliance and the political and psychological advantages of allying with
the prestigious and powerful state.”70
Observers of small state alliance decisions cautioned that, in general, the alliance
o f the week with a great power is a losing hand. The fates o f Eastern European
communist states ostensibly allied as equals with USSR under the Warsaw Pact, serves as
key evidence, which Keohane memorably termed the “A1 Capone alliance,” in which a

68 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers.
69 Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas," 299-300.
70 Quoted in ibid., 301. from Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 50.
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weakling pays a powerful thug for protection against the selfsame thug.71 To escape such
a precarious structural situation, it was concluded that the best alliance for small states, if
one has to be made, would be “mixed, multilateral alliances,” which might be further
logically extrapolated to mean “multilateral institutions,” if they could be made strong
enough, as the best allies of small states. Ideally, small states would prefer a system o f
states with strong constraining multilateral institutions committed to the norms o f
collective security.
For small states a seductive alternative to Cold War alliances, against the grain of
the structural prescriptions of bandwagoning, was non-alignment. While the superpowers
were busy carving up the globe via alliances into two conflicting camps o f ideological
rigidity and all-out competition, some middle powers wanted no part o f that and declared
a policy of “non-alignment.” In analyzing the attraction and viability of this strategy, it
has to be borne in mind that the leaders and powerbrokers o f the non-aligned movement
(NAM) were major secondary powers, such as India and Yugoslavia, and not small or
patently weak states.72 In joining the movement the true small states were following and
not leading, and instead o f openly aligning with one o f the great powers, they were
hedging on the ability o f middle powers to provide them with some security and
economic aid. Ultimately the progressive strengthening of the multilateral institutions and
the conclusion of the Cold War might have removed the need for the third way of
nonalignment. Or for that matter the primary decision o f alliance choice.
By the 1970s scholars began to anticipate that the anarchic structural constraint of
the international system had undergone a radical transformation due to the interweaving
“interconnectedness” and what was described as “complex interdependence,” a
phenomenon which began to manifest in the American hegemonic Western centric states.
In their path breaking work, Keohane and Nye famously argued that the three crucial
characteristic of this evolving structure predicated on interdependence were the multiple
channels o f interactions between states, removal o f military force as a tool of dispute

71 Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas," 302.
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resolution, and the lack of hierarchy among issue areas, meaning that states that did not
possess large capabilities in terms o f security could also be major players in other realms
and issues.73 Furthermore, in many cases states managed to compromise the impediment
o f anarchy and security dilemma to cooperate by creating “international regimes,” which
constrained the actions o f all members irrespective of their size. Soon enough the web of
interdependence spread to the far reaches of the globe turbocharged by technological
innovations and a novel ethos o f openness, eventually embracing all states, small and
large, in a phenomenon that has been called globalization.
In these early years of the 21st century, in the post-Cold War era of globalized
system of states characterized by contested but well-established norms o f sovereignty,
increasing calcification and respect for international borders, an era that is characterized
by epochal economic, political and social interdependence, small states find themselves
in a system, which affords them unique opportunities and challenges along with formal
security unmatched in history. However, the vulnerability inherent in the position o f
smallness and weakness in a still anarchic structural system persists. The fact remains
true that centralized authority has not extended beyond the state’s borders, so that
anarchy prevails in the international system as a whole. Concerning the existence of
modem smaller, weaker states, the implication o f an anarchic but rule-bound state system
must be: why do the powerful states in the anarchical world allow the powerless small
states to exist? Why are the small states not annexed by major neighboring powers? The
only answer is that anarchy remains but has been tempered, at least in the overt
expansionist sense, from the earlier, historical eras.

Societal Actors Perspective
The societal actors perspective challenges the structural view, which accords
decisive primacy solely to the external, systemic factors in small state outcomes. Rather
than being uniformly constrained by the structural forces, this perspective argues that
states respond uniquely based on the distinct interplay among their internal actors,
coalitions, institutions and processes, dependent on their level of institutional
development and regime type. The level o f analysis is at the unit level and individual
73 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 21.
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level because powerful personalities and their foreign policy apparatus are sometimes
able to overcome the structural constraints placed upon small states.
In a volume o f empirical case studies devoted to investigate the level-ofanalysis— systemic, state or individual—which best explains small state foreign policy,
Jeanne Hey concludes that in most circumstances the systemic factors play a major role.
However, she argues that “although small states face a common systemic challenge,
operating at a disadvantage to local hegemonic powers, they respond in a myriad o f ways
that reflect historical circumstance, domestic political dynamics, individual choice and of
course, the behavior o f the hegemonic powers.”74 While state-level factors are found to
be o f lesser importance than systemic ones, Hey suggests two important considerations at
the state-level: regime type and level o f development o f the state.75 Whether a small state
is an established democracy or a teetering dictatorship explains the form o f international
legitimacy that the state enjoys, hence expanding or limiting its strategic space. Level of
economic development determines the number and kinds o f international engagements
that a small state is able to sustain. Each o f these two factors would have profound impact
on the policy choices available and behavioral outcomes o f small states, even under the
same systemic environment. The varieties o f small states seen around the globe today,
differing in their level of dependence and available choices from Singapore and Sweden
to Bhutan and Cuba, gives empirical weight to those two state-level factors.
On the other hand, individual-level factors of leadership and personality are quite
persuasive in explaining the levels o f autonomy and independence that can be asserted by
an otherwise systemically constrained small state. Hey argues that “the actions of often
charismatic or authoritarian leaders (are) all the more forceful and independent.”76 In
many small states, foreign policy is the exclusive province o f an individual leader or a
small group o f elites, unencumbered by the large foreign policy apparatus found in a
major power. Such powerful leaders might use the freedom to easily respond to
incentives and switch sides or policy directions and preferences. Such switches and

74 Hey, Small States in World Politics, 187.
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changes o f direction might be extremely important for those small states that are also
wedge states. Since there is little margin for error in their interstate relations, the personal
qualities and diplomatic abilities o f the small state leaders in diplomatic negotiations—
which have been called the “right handmaiden of the weaker states”77—would be
extremely vital.
A special illustration o f the power o f leadership personalities to sway the direction
of foreign policy in a small wedge state is the phenomenon that has been termed
“pendulum politics” in the context o f South American small states lurching from the lap
of one regional power in Argentina to another in Brazil. Frank O. Mora discusses the
classic of example this phenomenon in Paraguay under the paternalistic leadership of
President Alfredo Stroessner, who personally swung the pendulum from longstanding
loyalty to Argentina, the dominant economic benefactor, towards Brazil in the 1960s.78
Powerful unitary leaders such as Stroessner can “drag” their foreign policy in
idiosyncratic directions in response to the systemic forces acting on their countries, which
scholars on South America has characterized as “dragged” foreign policy.79
The external influence factor may be necessary but not sufficient to explain how
small states can react to the structural imperative. The specific question about whether the
direction of change comes from the structural forces to bind the choices o f small states or
if internal reactions to systemic forces have intrinsic, a priori, salience has been of
especial concern in the post-war experience of European small states. The major problem
faced by all Western states, including the smaller ones, was how to respond to economic
openness and liberalization o f the Western economies in the second half o f the twentieth
century. In his authoritative work on the topic, Peter Katzenstein has cogently argued that
in the case o f the smaller European states, the domestic economic and political
transformation proceeded from cohesive and flexible bargaining between the internal
societal actors, who were responding to the demands of the systemic forces of open
competition. Disputing the primarily “external influence” view of the structuralists,

77 Fox, "The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969," 754.
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Katzenstein argues that the external influence “acted as an opportunity as much as a
constraint” in shaping the local societal actors to compromise in specific ways, so that in
OA

many o f the smaller European states, variants of democratic corporatism emerged.
In disputing the basic argument that systemic forces solely determine the
foreign policy choices o f small states, Miriam Elman finds evidence in emerging weak
states. Analyzing the evidence from the state formation, institutional consolidation and
military strategies of the United States during the nineteenth century, which was
admittedly a weak state in that time and context, Elman argues that external influence is
sufficient explanation in phase of the development o f local institutions. But once
institutions take hold and societal actors emerge, domestic factors take precedence in
explaining subsequent foreign policy behavior of these states based on domestic
institutional procedures, sectoral politics and distributional conflicts.

Q|

Structure does not

automatically socialize weak states, especially if process of state formation and
consolidation have completed.
In summary, the societal actors perspective questions the unqualified explanatory
power o f structural factors in small state foreign policy behavior. Various state and
individual level factors, such as geographic location, regime type, role of national and
transnational non-state actors, or the personality o f a powerful leader, necessarily
complicate the pidture. This perspective argues that, especially for well-established small
states, domestic politics seem to play equally important part in explaining behavioral and
foreign policy outcomes.

Economic and Developmental Studies Perspective
The concern with small states or “small economies” in the field o f economics and
developmental studies began with the fundamental question o f whether general economic
theories hold equally and similarly in all types and sizes o f states. Reality shows that
there are states of different sizes and varying levels o f developmental levels and
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economic complexities, which exhibit a range of economic conditions, often inconsistent
with received wisdom in the mainstream economic literature. Are small states viable
economically and if they are not, how do they respond? Obviously, the answer to these
questions would also inform how small states interact economically with their wealthier,
economically powerful, partners.
The earliest attempt to grapple with these concern was a 1957 conference
organized by the International Economics Association with the theme o f “Economic
Consequences of the Size of Nations,” the proceedings from which was published as a
edited volume under the same title in I960.82 The questions, assumptions and definitions
generated by this research program dominated the discussion in this field in the
subsequent decades. Subsequent scholars in this research program concluded that size of
the economy does indeed matter, and small size is especially indicative o f unique
economic implications. According to the general economic consensus then, small states
suffer from the following generalized economic problems:
1. Because of their small territorial size, most small states do not possess a large
variety of natural resources or agricultural land. They can only produce one or a
few primary commodities as their exports becoming “one-dimensional states,”
because they have to rely on the exports o f a single primary commodity.
2. Because of their smaller population, smaller labor force, and thus smaller
domestic market, small states suffer from “diseconomies of scale”—the inability
to produce high returns to scale in manufacturing and production of goods. They
are forced to seek outside markets for their primary products and reliant on
imports from foreign producers to fulfill domestic consumption.
3. Owing to these fundamentally inalterable conditions, small states exhibit high
trade to GNP ratio and have no choice but to open their borders for trade. Thus,

82 E. A. G. Robinson, ed. Economic Consequences o f the Size o f Nations; Proceedings o f
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Press, 1960). More recent attempts to explain the causes and consequences o f state sizes
are: Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore, On the Number and Size o f Nations
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau o f Economic Research, 1995); Alesina, "The Size of
Countries: Does It Matter?."
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they are acutely sensitive to volatility in trade patterns and dependent on other
states for market access and trade terms.
4. Also, since their primary product exports constitute a fairly small percentage of
the total in world markets, they are “price-takers” and doubly vulnerable to the
swings in external demands and prices.83
As the number o f small states continued to climb up and their relative size
continued to decline, observers questioned the economic “viability” o f small states based
on concerns about the “economically determinist” view o f state size. Nevertheless, many
small European states had managed to overcome the general economic predictions of
unalterable vulnerability and dependence. Yet, many others, mainly Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), seemed to be indeed
mired in the exact predictions made by mainstream economic theories. Ironically for
these smaller economies, the orthodox models of economic development and growth,
such as the Lewis Model based on large-scale industrialization, could not be applicable
due to their lack o f a large population base and small market size.84
However, in the last couple of decades rigorous quantitative analyses have
challenged and often modified the economic consensus on small state vulnerability,
volatility and dependence. In 1988 Srinivasan analyzed small states defined as those with
population less than 5 million, and he found mixed evidence on each o f the constituent
points o f small state economic consensus: the concern for economies o f scale was not
really warranted on goods for sale but proved true for infrastructure costs because o f high
cost per unit; in terms of environmental and economic vulnerabilities, many small states
indeed faced catastrophic ruin due to the former but the latter could be managed better by
the governments; many remote small island nations indeed faced high costs o f transport
and communication; but in regards to access to capital markets, macroeconomic policy

83 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 220-28.
84 Harvey W Armstrong and Robert Read, "The Determinants of Economic Growth in
Small States," The Round Table 92, no. 368 (2003): 102.
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independence or low income levels, he did not find conclusive evidence.

In most o f the

cases, smallness alone was not the cause o f the purported economic ills. Along the same
vein, a 2000 study conducted by Easterly and Kraay analyzed a large data-set evidence to
ascertain if small states (population less than 1 million) were different from other states in
terms of their income, growth and volatility outcomes. The authors found that small
states had higher per capita GDP due to “productivity advantage,” and comparable
growth rates to other states, while they did seem to suffer from higher volatility due to
trade openness and terms of trade volatility, although the openness factor resulted in a
“positive net payoff for growth.”86
Such findings and some empirical examples problematize the economic
consensus on small states. On the one hand, many policy and advocacy organizations
continue to argue that small states, especially those with less than 1.5 million population,
suffer from significant barriers to economic well being. Research continues on that vein
to enumerate the specific vulnerabilities faced by those small states while recommending
special policy tools, including aid and tariffs protection, to help build resilience to combat
against the vulnerabilities. The institutional leadership provided by the Commonwealth
has supported an extensive research program for the unique concerns o f small states
facing high levels of vulnerability. The creation o f the Commonwealth Vulnerability
Index (CVI), and measures of resilience,87 continued with the publication o f a joint task
force report by the World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat in 2000.88

85 T. N. Srinivasan, "The Costs and Benefits o f Being a Small, Remote, Island,
Landlocked, or Ministate Economy," The World Bank Research Observer 1, no. 2
(1986): 211-17.
86 William Easterly and Aart Kraay, "Small States, Small Problems? Income, Growth,
and Volatility in Small States," World Development 28, no. 11 (2000): 2014.
87 Jonathan P Atkins, Sonia Mazzi, and Christopher D Easter, "A Commonwealth
Vulnerability Index for Developing Countries: The Position o f Small States," in Small
States in the Global Economy: Background Papers Presented to the Commonwealth
Secretariat, World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States, ed. David Peretz, Rumman
Faruqi, and E. J. Kisanga (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000); David Peretz,
Rumman Faruqi, and Eliawony J. Kisanga, eds., Small States in the Global Economy,
Background Papers Presented to the Commonwealth Secretariat, World Bank Joint Task
Force on Small States (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001); Lino Briguglio et al.,
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On the other hand, most less developed small states have to face the phenomenon
made popular by Briguglio’s phrase, the “Singapore Paradox,” which is a case o f a highly
vulnerable small state able to achieve rapid economic growth and high levels o f GDP per
capita.89 While there are no ready solutions to the paradox, analysts, working in this
intersection o f small state research, economics, international political economy and
developmental studies, have generated theoretical and empirical scholarship to explain
the evolving nature of vulnerabilities facing small states and novel ways that they have
resorted to overcome the said vulnerabilities and build resilience. In a penetrating study,
Naren Prasad shows how small island states of the Caribbean have used unique economic
and political strategies to cope with their inherent vulnerability: using sovereignty to set
up off-shore financial centers; relying on the traditional means o f tourism, aid and
remittance; such unorthodox means as “selling sovereignty” in the form o f fishing rights,
military bases, shipping rights, allowing “flags o f convenience,” selling passports,
hosting internet gambling sites and domain names, etc.,.90 These kinds o f niche economic
comparative advantage might only apply for the “micro” states and island nations o f the
Caribbean and the Pacific, or the entrenched ones in Europe such as Luxembourg or
Lichtenstein.
However, for relatively larger small states relying on the global capitalism while
adjusting to its rules is inescapable. At issue again is whether the volatility and
vulnerability is produced exclusively by external influence or more by internal factors.
While both types o f influences may be in play, their exact interplay and relative
importance along with societal factors has been the theoretical contribution to the
"Economic Vulnerability and Resilience: Concepts and Measurements," Oxford
Development Studies 37, no. 3 (2009).
88 Commonwealth Secretariat and World Bank, "Small States: Meeting Challenges in the
Global Economy; Final Report Prepared for the Joint Task Force on Small States,"
(London/Washington, DC.: Commonwealth Secretariat / World Bank, April 2000).
89 Lino Briguglio, "The Vulnerability Index and Small Island Developing States: A
Review of Conceptual and Methodological Issues" (paper presented at the AIMS
Regional Preparatory Meeting on the Ten Year Review o f the Barbados Programme of
Action: Praia, Cape Verde, 2003).
90 Naren Prasad, "Small but Smart: Small States in the Global System," in The
Diplomacies o f Small States : Between Vulnerability and Resilience, ed. Andrew Fenton
Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 41-64.
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economic perspective by the IPE scholars. In that regard, at least in the case of small
European states, Katzenstein maintained that they were forced to adopt a “preference for
a reactive and flexible” economic and social policies to mitigate the external influence o f
global economy.91 Thus, the nature o f internal response—reactive but flexible—has to be
paramount in considering the economic and developmental perspective, as well as the
other perspectives, on small states’ interaction with their larger economic partners and the
global economy as a whole. Rather than painting with a wide brush and analyzing all
small states using the vulnerability paradigm, disaggregating the political, social and
economic responses o f sub-groups o f small states, including wedge states, would be more
fruitful.

91 Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets, 27.
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CHAPTER III

RESEA RC H D ESIG N A N D M ETH O D O LO G Y

The objective of this chapter is to design a research project that answers the
questions of whether small wedge states can possess autonomy o f strategic policy choice
in their international relations with great powers, and what factors determine the
likelihood o f such instances o f small state autonomy of strategic action. To explore these
primary research questions, this chapter shall: a) Specify the theoretical model o f “wedge
states” and deduce crucial theoretical elements—variables and hypotheses—of the
model; b) Drawing from the model specification, present a research design and
methodology; c) Introduce the empirical unit of analysis of a typical wedge state of Nepal
and its tripartite relationship—in three crucial cases o f differing strength of preferences—
with India and China. Taken in aggregate, the theory o f wedge states and the selection of
Nepal’s tripartite relationship with India and China form the research design foundation
for the remainder o f the study.
MODEL SPECIFICATION
The proposed model of wedge states involves one small (weak) state in a tripartite
relationship between two rival powers. In terms o f material power and capabilities, both
the rival powers enjoy an unbridgeable gap in comparison to the wedge state. These two
powers are in a mutually competitive environment but not in a declared or undeclared
state o f war because during wars greater powers demand absolute loyalty o f the small
states. The wedge state maintains cordial relations with both the rival powers and engages
with and negotiates with each o f them on a host o f wide-ranging and crosscutting
interactions. The wedge state may theoretically try to adopt wedging strategies to derive
maximum gains from interaction with each o f the rival powers because many o f these
interactions are coordination or collective actions problems with distributive
consequences.
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In the context o f these interactions between the wedge state and either of the rival
powers, we can speak of and investigate the space for or the extent o f the foreign policy
autonomy and independence afforded to the wedge states. Strategic autonomy refers to
any state’s ability to choose policy options based on prior consideration o f national
interest and distributive gains. The proposed model situates wedge states in a possible
position of utility maximization based on the competitive rivalry between the two
powers. Theoretically, wedge states are able to “solve” the small state problematic and
create the necessary space for autonomic strategic policy choices, precisely due to their
strategic position between competing rival powers in a forgiving and favorable
international system o f states and institutions.
A couple o f caveats are in order. First, when we think of the wedge state as a
small state, we do so in a relative sense compared to the rival powers between which it is
wedged. Simply, in absolute geographical or other material sense the wedge state may
not look “small,” but in relation to either rival powers, it is definitely smaller and weaker.
For example, Mongolia is not small geographically, but in relation to Russia and China, it
can be seen as a small wedge state. Second, it is possible that there are more than two
rival powers acting upon the wedge state at any given time. Historically, Poland or
Belgium might be seen as wedge states between three or more superior powers. However,
for the sake o f the theoretical simplification, this research focuses on wedge states
between two rival powers. The insights gleaned from such a heuristic model might be of
some application to cases of more than two competing powers but extrapolating such
implications is beyond the scope of the present research.
This model o f a wedge state differs significantly from the extant theoretical view
of a typical small state. As discussed in the literature review, extant theories, especially in
the structural perspective, view small states through the lens of: “balancing,
bandwagoning or buffering,” in each o f which the small state’s relationship with a greater
power is based strictly from the perspective o f the great power’s utility derived from
using the small state. However, when there are multiple great powers in a mutually
competitive mode, the small states might also accrue utility despite their gap in material
power. If there were no great power competition, then there would be no existence of
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wedge states, because there would be no space available for possibly taking advantage of
the great power rivalry. Extant perspectives on small states highlight the vulnerabilities
and external factors that circumscribe the range of action options available for small
states. In contrast, the notion of wedge states views them as theoretically capable of
independent action.

Theoretical Variables
In this model, the unit o f analysis is a wedge state situated between two rival
powers, and the subject of inquiry is the patterns of interaction among the three.
Therefore, the study variable is the strategic autonomy of the wedge state in its
interaction with the rival powers in various cases o f tripartite interests. The study variable
could vary between high and low levels o f strategic autonomy acquired by the wedge
state in a given case or in a certain period. In order to study “strategic autonomy,” this
abstract notion is operationalized into material and political gains or losses that the wedge
state might enjoy or suffer in due course of bargaining or negotiation in matters of mutual
concern from either of the rival powers.
Although the concept o f strategic autonomy is used here to largely correspond
with national strategic policies adopted by a state, the concept o f material gains is, of
course, not a unified conception o f national interests. We could disaggregate material
gains of a small state to investigate if various sectors of the society or different
stakeholders are impacted differentially by wedging strategies. In other words, there may
be winners and losers from what politicians and policymakers might consider “strategic
autonomy,” thus, problematizing the dependent variable (DV). However, since this study
is concerned with interstate interaction between a wedge states and its rival powers, we
will refer to material gains as a aggregated average o f positive outcomes from wedging
interactions. In various cases that are studied, multiple sectoral interests are analyzed
organically whenever they arise.
Therefore, in this research I represent strategic autonomy o f wedge states by the
as the wedge state’s “gains from interaction” or simply “gains.” Gains might be positive
or negative (loss) corresponding to the high or low levels, respectively, o f the strategic
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autonomy acquired by the wedge state in a given negotiation, under given conditions and
in given circumstances. For example, interstate agreements in trade and foreign direct
investment policies result in distributive economic gains, whereas cooperative
agreements in environmental regulation might result in short term economic loss with
unequal burden to be shared.
The literature on small states as covered in the previous chapter informs the
generation and selection of the proposed independent variables (IVs). We begin by
enumerating a number of factors that have been proposed in the bodies of literature to
explain the level of gains accrued from interaction by small states with greater powers;
then a couple o f variables are chosen for this purposes of this study. The four theoretical
perspectives discussed in the previous chapter propose the following major explanatory
IVs to explain the level of gains and structural autonomy for small states.
The emerging system o f states and norms perspective argues that the smaller
members of the state system emerged and have managed to survive due to the evolution
o f a conducive state system itself as well as the expanding norms o f sovereignty across
the globe. The primary IVs identified in this perspective are: type o f state system and
extent of sovereignty norms prevalent in a certain system. The structural IR perspective
focuses on the inherent distribution o f power among the units of an anarchic state system
as well as the institutions that have emerged to overcome the hurdle o f anarchy to forge
cooperation and coordination in the context o f globalization, and generates the following
IVs: distribution o f power, level o f institutionalization and level of interdependence. The
societal actors perspective emphasizes the important roles played by the internal factors
including the response-making processes and actors o f the small states themselves in
explaining the variation in behavioral outcomes so that the major IVs to explain the small
state outcomes are: type o f the domestic political system, level o f political stability, and
the role o f non-state actors. Finally, the economics and developmental studies perspective
highlights the economic difficulty inherent with small market size and limited economic
capabilities, generating these two IVs: level o f trade dependence and level o f economic
development.
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From the extant perspectives on small states then, we have derived the following
ten independent variables (IVs) each o f which might explain the variation in the
dependent variable (DV), the gains from interaction: type of state system; extent of
sovereignty norms; distribution o f power; level of institutionalization; level of
interdependence; type o f the domestic political system; level of political stability; role of
non-state actors; level o f trade dependence; level of economic development. From this
potential pool of ten identified theoretical IVs, now we select three to generate test
hypotheses for this research project.

Test Hypotheses
One limitation o f the present research project is related to Lijphart’s famous
pronouncement on the limitations of case study and comparative method, namely that of
“many variables, small number of cases.”1 For theory testing, Lijphart offers the now
familiar recommendations of either increasing the number of cases or reducing the
number of variables into a few “key” variables by combining two or more related
variables. Using Lijphart’s criteria, from the above listed ten theoretical IVs based on
extant literature, I select two for hypothesis generation. The criterion for selection is the
choice o f the case-study research method and the process o f combining related variables.
The empirical question centers on the proposed notion o f a single wedge state and
its two neighboring rival major powers over a short period of time allows the study to
control for larger structural IVs, namely type of the state system and extent of
sovereignty norms, so those are not considered for study. Similarly, the distribution of
relative power among the three states in the triad remains constant, in that the two rival
powers remain more powerful that the small wedge state, so that variable isn’t chosen.
Another two IVs— level of political stability and level of economic development—seem
equally and independently interesting, yet the short-period single-unit case study may not
capture the possible variation on these long-term trends, and are thus not considered.

1 Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," The American
Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 685.
2 Ibid., 690.
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From the theoretical orientation of societal actor perspective, the type o f domestic
system o f governance, whether it is a democratic system or an authoritarian system—
“type o f the domestic political system”— is definitely observable and it is noticeable
when it changes. So, this IV forms our first test hypotheses.
Hypothesis HI: When considering wedge states, a democratic political system in the
wedge state produces higher gains in its interaction with the rival powers.
As evidenced in the literature reviewed, the societal actors perspective is not clear
about the directionality o f this IV, whether a democratic system or an authoritarian
system produces higher material gains for the wedge state. However, this study is
agnostic about the directionality o f causality in this relationship. Analyzing the effect o f
the type of political system may show higher gains for either authoritarian or democratic
system, which would add to our inventory of our theoretical tests. As the subsequent
discussion o f case selection shows, this hypothesis takes into account the political change
in1990, when Nepal went from a autocratic monarchical system to a democratic
constitutional monarchy, which is to note that this IV, type of political system in the
wedge state, varies in the unit of analysis.
Two other IVs— level o f systemic institutionalization and level of
interdependence—may be combined because both are related to impacts of political and
economic globalization, to generate the second test IV— level of systemic globalization—
and the operational hypothesis thereof. This combination may also capture the effect of
another IV, the role of transnational non-state actors operating in the period of
globalization.
Hypothesis H2: When considering wedge states, their strategic autonomy vis-a-vis rival
powers is higher i f there is higher level o f general political and economic
interdependence in the state system.
Finally, from the economic and developmental perspective the IV, level of trade
dependence, captures a more o f a dynamic o f interaction o f trade between the wedge state
and the rival powers. Thus, we choose this IV to generate the third test hypothesis for this
study:
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Hypothesis H3: When considering wedge states, the higher its level o f trade dependence
on either o f the rival powers, the lower its gains from tripartite interaction.
It is necessary here to highlight the fact that both H2 and H3 are, at least partly,
concerned with issues of economic interrelationship between states. However, each of
them is profoundly different in the factors that it is trying to measure. The IV “level
systemic globalization” relates to global economic and political interdependence in the
system, and its effect on all the states involved, the wedge as well as the rival powers. But
the third IV, “level o f trade dependence” is strictly looking at the measure of the wedge
state’s specific trade relations with either of the rival powers. So these two IVs and the
resulting hypotheses are used to capture independent factors at different levels, systemic
against bilateral, that might explain the outcome on the level o f material gains, which is
theDV.
Now that we have three IVs under consideration and the corresponding test
hypotheses, I now present the design o f the research project that would allow us to test
the most empirically salient implications o f these hypotheses.
RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY
The ideal research design to investigate the behavioral outcomes for my
theoretical notion of wedge states would be to test the hypotheses and implications on the
empirical cases of the universe of all wedge states. That approach is not feasible here, not
just for the usual caveats of finite time and resources, but also because the research
problem is related to the issue of preliminary theory building on a proposed notion of
wedge states, this project is indeed nearer to an initial plausibility probe o f a nascent
theory building rather than an exercise in testing a mature theory.
In recent decades, the disciplines o f political science, international relations and
comparative politics have been mired in methodological debates about qualitative against
quantitative approaches to research. The leading lights o f the field have concluded that,
“the differences between the quantitative and qualitative traditions are only stylistic and
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are methodologically and substantively unimportant.”3 The important task is actually to
define succinctly a research question and design the empirical research to answer that
question. When the primary research goal is theory building, as it is in this research
project, the usability of a single case study is indispensable. By holding many structural
variables constant and by probing the plausibility o f the notion of wedge states, this
analysis of the single unit o f study contributes to our understanding o f larger population
of similar units. This approach is especially useful in generating new hypotheses based on
novel theoretical claims, which can subsequently be tested and built upon. By employing
the discussed research design to answer my research question, this project aims to
contribute such new insights to the discipline.
To that end, this research design employs the approach o f a qualitative analysis
over time of three cases within a single triadic unit. One o f the pioneers o f comparative
social science research, Arend Lijphart, suggests that there are essentially four scientific
methods o f empirical evidence testing: experimental, statistical, case-study and
comparative. He viewed the case study method as a complement to the comparative
method, arguing that inter alia, a single case study over time approach could be
hypothesis generating, theory confirming or theory infirming.4 The choice of a single unit
of analysis to probe the theory o f wedge state behavioral outcomes is based on such
theory building and testing aspirations.
Stephen Van Evera highlights five main purposes o f case studies: “testing
theories, creating theories, identifying antecedent conditions, testing the importance of
these antecedent conditions, and explaining cases o f intrinsic importance.”5 One of the
ways to test theories with single-unit cases is by “process tracing” in which we observe
within units rather than across them. David Collier defines process tracing as “the
systematic examination o f diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light o f the

3 Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry : Scientific
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 4.
4 Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 682-92.
5 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods fo r Students o f Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1997), 55.
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research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator.”6 The evidence presented
in this research, in the form o f a detailed qualitative study tracing the historical and
temporal processes o f a wedge state interacting with two rival greater powers across three
cases, provides an inductive method o f theory building and testing as well as explaining
necessary preconditions.
While the traditional connotation o f a case study is a research design that
“investigates a single phenomenon, instance or example” o f the research topic, more
recently John Gerring has argued for a more systematic understanding o f the case study
approach, which he defines as, “an intensive study o f a single unit for the purposes of
understanding a larger class of (similar) units.”7 Gerring’s main innovation is to situate
the qualitative case-study approach within the framework o f an increasingly quantitative
research paradigm in social sciences, especially political science. Thus, his definition
allows for case studies to be designed as rigorously as necessary for meeting the essential
feature o f empirical research, in which “covariation is demonstrated by a single unit,”
from a possible population o f similar units. Gerring’s observation guides my selection of
a single unit o f research. The investigation o f a prototypical wedge state would constitute
a unit studied from the population o f such units. As such my research design constitutes,
analyzing in detail the processes, preferences and outcomes o f negotiations between a
theorized wedge state with its two rival great power neighbors. The goal o f social
scientific research is drawing inference, which can be either descriptive or causal in
nature. Case studies are better suited to draw descriptive inferences and “enjoy a natural
o

advantage in research o f an explanatory nature.”
I maintain a temporal boundary, the over time feature, o f the case analysis by
analyzing a period marked by changing conditions and variables. To further add to the
explanatory power o f the research design, I delve into the unit of analysis of a single
wedge state and examine three crucial cases of interaction, each o f which highlight a
6 David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," PS: Political Science & Politics 44,
no. 04 (2011): 823.
7 John Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?," American Political
Science Review 98, no. 02 (2004): 342.
8 Ibid., 349.
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particular perspective in the tripartite relationship. This within-unit analysis of three
separate cases o f interaction also allows for controlling some variables in specific areas,
and provides the opportunity for within-unit comparison o f evidence that might explain
the variation over time o f the dependent variable.9
EMPIRICAL CASES & EVIDENCE
To explore the empirical manifestation of wedge states and their wedging
strategies, and to analyze the theoretical implications o f different factors determining
wedge state behavioral outcomes, this study will present the evidence from one
prototypical wedge state. The cases are derived from Nepal’s relations with two rival
powers India and China in the modem period since 1947, with the study period focused
primarily between 1980 and 2010. This historical tripartite relationship provides a natural
unit of study over time o f a wedge state that has formal, longstanding and friendly
relations with both its rival neighbors. These three states are also a good unit to study
because myriad issues o f local, regional as well as global significance bind them. The
examination of a sample of cases from the pool o f crucial issues provides variation in
their relationship to explore the nature and characteristics o f the Nepal’s wedge position
and the possibility o f using wedging strategies vis-a-vis India and China. This unit is an
instance of a small wedge state, which might not fit the typical behavioral patterns of
typical small states, but may be seen as a distinct subclass of small states. Thus, the case
also provides the necessary material for inductive theory building on wedge states.
Furthermore, by looking at one example o f a small state that is wedged between
two historical and current powers, the research design controls for rival variables,
primarily structural variables, especially power distribution, as well as societal factors,
when examined in the same time period. Since their existence as modem nation-states,
the distribution of material power between these three countries has remained the same:
Nepal has been and is clearly a small, weak state in contrast to both India and China.
There is no question that both India and China view each other as great powers whereas
Nepal is a small state in their periphery.
9 James Mahoney, "Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics," Comparative
Political Studies 40, no. 2 (2007): 131-33.
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However, we can observe variation in the strategic choice autonomy and
independence afforded to Nepal by the rival powers in the various issues in which they
are entangled. Historically, security relations between China and India have been
problematic and Nepal has served as a buffer state and geographic demarcation between
the two powers. Both India and China have vigorously labored to enhance their influence
within Nepal at different times. But the realms o f non-security issues are equally
compelling and offer prime evidentiary scope for research into Nepal’s successes in using
a wedging strategy or lack thereof.
The intensity o f interests shown by India and China on the three cases described
below are strong enough historically or now to justify the selection of this unit o f study.
While each o f the rival powers may have gone through a variation in the strength o f their
preferences over time, we can expect to see the impact on the material gains on the
wedge state because o f the changing preferences as well. Also, it is to be expected that
sub-national interests in China or India might have strong economic or financial interests
in cases where the central state may not exhibit strong enough preference. Ultimately, the
study hopes to ascertain the strength of the preferences shown by the rival powers in the
selected cases by conducting the analysis o f their policies and actions, which will become
visible in the course of the analysis itself.
As shall be emphasized in the following description o f the three cases to be
studied, this research relies in qualitative case-study evidence. The comparison o f the
cases introduces variation in the dependent variable, which is the strategic autonomy o f
small states. Analyzing the processes and political developments in the period from 1980
to 1990 and from 1990 to 2000 also allows for the domestic institutional change that
occurred in Nepal in 1990, when it went from an autocratic monarchical system to a
constitutional monarchy with a democratic parliamentary system. Thus, analyzing the
same core of three states controls for the structural power distribution factor which did
not vary, as well as the internal political structure, which remained uniform in a single
period.
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Three Cases o f Tripartite Relationship
Within the single unit o f Nepal’s wedge relations with India and China, I analyze
evidence from three distinct cases o f their interaction from the period 1980 to 2000. The
selection o f the three cases introduces variation. If the nature o f the international system
doe not change and with that the power distribution remains uniform, the wedge state
might be able to negotiate differently depending on different cases. Here the notion o f the
“spatio-temporal context” of a small state’s various interaction with larger powers, as
used by Thorhallson and Wievel and discussed in the previous chapter, proves a useful
guide to specify how small states can influence outcomes against more powerful actors
depending certain temporal conditions and under certain circumstances.10
Each case features a particular social, economic, and environmental arena of
interstate interaction. In each case, I shall analyze the possible existence of the wedging
strategy that the wedge state tried to adopt and the result o f such efforts in enhancing or
reducing its strategic choice space. The presumed interests o f the wedge state, the
expected outcomes o f the interaction in the particular case, and the process o f outcome
formation will generate crucial evidence to test our selected test hypotheses.
The three cases chosen for analysis are: the issue of the migration o f Tibetan
refugees into Nepal and India; Nepal’s economic policies regarding foreign direct
investments from India and China in its hydropower projects; and prospective
cooperation on environmental issues related to global climate change pertaining the high
Himalayas region, which forms the boundary between the three states. Each case will
show a differing intensity of interests o f the three actors and highlight the possibility of
the wedge state finding space for strategic choice or the powerful rivals attempting to
curtail the wedge state’s preferred choice.
Most interestingly, these three cases represent three different kinds o f cooperation
problems for the wedge state and rival powers, with distinct distributive consequences,
which allows us to test and differentiate between levels o f normative or material gains

10 Thorhallsson and Wivel, "Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and
What Would We Like to Know?."
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from the interaction. The first case o f Tibetan refugees is a classic zero-sum game where
relative power should dominate. The second and third cases o f hydropower investment
and environmental cooperation are types o f coordination problems with material
distributive consequences for the three players.
Tibetan Refugees a n d Exiles
The historical interrelationships in South Asia have been shaped by the
experience o f Tibet and the continuing policy reactions on this sensitive issue by the two
major stakeholders, namely the People’s Republic o f China and the Republic of India. In
such a delicate balance, Nepal’s geographic, historic and cultural ties with both Tibet and
India generate ample chance for interactions and reaction to the needs and demands o f the
rival superpowers. Although the issue o f Tibetan sovereignty has been resolved de ju re,
in practice there are considerable problems outstanding. The prime concern is that since
India offers the sanctuary to the spiritual leader Dalai Lama and a large population of
Tibetan refugees in Dharamsala, new Tibetan refugees have to traverse Nepali territory in
most cases to migrate to India. Also, large populations o f Tibetans make their home in
Nepal itself and are engaged in activities o f Tibetan politics, which produces demands
from China and India upon Nepal. Such a political, social and security issue of concern
requires Nepal to continually leverage a high degree o f cooperation and interaction in
response to conflicting demands and requirements from both China and India.
Referring to the theoretical hypotheses, this case of the status, treatment and safe
travels for refugees is not just a national or regional concern but also one that relates to
international regimes and institutions o f human rights. Other explanatory factors of
impact are Nepal’s changing domestic societal actors and institutions, which have
handled the conflicting demands differently. As we shall see Nepal’s gains from this
interaction are not strictly material but political, social and ideational, although there have
been instances o f quid pro quo relating to certain treatment o f exiles living in Nepal and
refugees passing through it. Thus, the analysis of this case teases apart how the wedge
state operates under the demands o f its rival great power neighbors as well as the appeals
of global norms in a globalized setting.
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Competitive H ydropow er Investm ent
At the beginning of the millennium, both the Chinese and Indian economies are
roaring so much so that they are challenging the major Western economies. While
numerous domestic economic problems persist in both countries, the overall economic
health is trending up. However, their common neighbor Nepal remains mired in poverty
and a dearth o f capital for any real investments and productivity gains. Nepal’s historical
economic role was that of a trading post between Tibet and India. In the modem era, that
benefit has eroded but still Nepal relies on its trade relationship with its two neighbors
and sees them as major sources of intergovernmental aid and investments. As a
landlocked, least developed country, Nepal is quite dependent on trade with its neighbors,
especially India. As such, trade interactions have produced wedging situations so that
trade negotiations with favorable terms with one neighbor have followed similar
agreements with the other.
In terms of capital-intensive infrastructure investment, Nepal’s interest is in
developing its large natural bounty o f hydropower resources. To make that dream a
reality, Nepal has sought the investment from both China and India. For the concern of
this study, the pertinent question is if Nepal’s wedge position has allowed it to accrue
economic benefits from the rival economics powers on the question of capital investment
in hydropower sector. Do either India or China take into account Nepal’s wedge position
in considering foreign direct investments into Nepal? Has Nepal been able to maximize
its gains in attracting capital-intensive investments, especially in its abundant hydropower
resources sector? Such evidence would point towards the heightened ability by Nepal to
leverage its wedge strategy to enlarge its strategic benefit. Do Nepalese policymakers
consciously use strategic competition between India and China to accrue economic
benefits in the form o f higher foreign direct investments in sensitive assets? Analysis of
this case will provide insights into the factors such as Nepal’s level o f trade dependence,
which would impact its ability to negotiate with autonomy and gain from the interaction.
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Environm ental Cooperation
All three countries share the geography o f the Himalayan range and the
concomitant environment challenges, especially the need to mitigate and adapt to the
consequences o f the global climate change. In the context of the growing crisis o f global
climate change, the vulnerable environments and ecosystems o f the high Himalayas have
the possibility of profound impacts on Nepal, India and China. Environmental
degradation resulting in melting glaciers, management of water resources for
consumption and related trans-boundary issues would be expected to force all three
stakeholders to collaborate to stanch the damage and minimize the climatic effects.
In addition to the regional environmental concerns, all three states operate under
various international and global agreements and regimes regarding global climate change.
As emerging economic powers, China and India have global and regional interests that
may not be shared by Nepal. Additionally, various non-state actors, NGOs and INGOs,
are involved in activities related to the environmental conservation in the high
Himalayas, which try to generate state-based policy coordination and cooperation by the
involved states. If there is one area in which common interests of all three states align, it
might be that of environmental preservation under the specter of global climate change.
Although due to the recent provenance o f the phenomenon of climate change policy
debate in the region, compared to the other two cases, it is an open question whether or
not there is enough evidence to be found in this case. Simply, the tripartite interaction in
this case may not be mature enough to assess the existence o f wedging or of beneficial
gains. It means that this may be a tough case for this study, so that if there is evidence of
wedging by Nepal in this case the argument in favor the theory o f wedge states is so
much stronger. Analysis of the existence or lack thereof o f cooperation and coordination
among the three states and the possible determination of the distribution o f gains or costs
from cooperation would shed light on the question o f the wedge states’ strategic
autonomy. However, it is equally possible that differing economic and social priorities
will limit the wedge state’s space for generating cooperation and coordination between
the two rival major powers.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter developed three test hypotheses to test the identified independent
variables that might explain the presence and variation o f the dependent variable, which
is the material gains accrued by the wedge state in its interaction with two rival powers.
The dependent variable is a proxy for the ultimate question directing this study of
whether small wedge states possess strategic autonomy in dealing with rival major
powers.
To analyze the research question and test the hypotheses, this chapter also
presented a research o f a typical wedge state Nepal in its tripartite interaction with India
and China. The next three chapters form the evidence base o f this study, where the
tripartite interactions between those three states are analyzed in three cases: the case of
Tibetan refugees in Nepal, the case o f competitive hydropower development in Nepal,
and the possibility of environmental cooperation in the high Himalayas. We begin by
analyzing the first case of Tibetans in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV

TH E C A SE OF TIB E TA N EX ILES IN N EPA L

THE OLYMPIC DIVERSION
In the six months leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the world witnessed
unprecedented levels o f anti-China protests around the globe. As the Olympic torch
travelled the continents, in major cities from San Francisco, to London, Paris, Hong Kong
and New Delhi, Tibetan exiles and free-Tibet demonstrators used the global media
spotlight of the Olympics to orchestrate particularly symbolic and visible protests against
the Chinese rule in Tibet." While the activists asserted a litany o f historical and recent
Tibetan grievances, their urgent rallying cry was centered on the recent heavy-handed
repression of the restive population in Lhasa and other towns o f Tibet by the Chinese
security forces. In mid-March o f that year Tibet had erupted in violent riots, where it was
alleged that anti-Chinese Tibetan locals had attacked Han Chinese settlers and burned
their businesses leading to a security backlash o f total lockdown and police action amid
conflicting reports of deaths numbering from dozens to more than a hundred.12 World
leaders and global media reacted with predictable concern entreating restraint on both
sides, and some even called for a boycott o f the Olympics in solidarity.13 Predictably, the
Chinese authorities lay the blame for the unrest in Tibet squarely on the “Dalai Lama
clique” and the “secessionists” and “separatists” followers who sought to undermine the
Olympics, and they brushed aside international media reports of repression as attempts to
politicize a sporting event and an example of external interference in China’s internal

11 Jenny Percival and Elizabeth Stewart, "Olympic Protests Held around the World," The
Guardian(August 8, 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/08/china.tibet.
12 CBS News, "Dozens Reported Killed in Tibetan Protests," CBS /Vew^March 15,
2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/dozens-reported-killed-in-tibetan-protests/;
Jonathan Watts, "Beijing Locks Down Lhasa as Crisis Grows," The Observer (The
Guardian)(March 15, 2008),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/16/tibet.china#.
13 The Economist, "Tibet and the Beijing Olympics: A Sporting Chance," The
Economist(March 27, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/10924179.
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matters.14 Amid the global showdown, the situation was especially sensitive in Nepal and
India, where large numbers of Tibetan exiles and refugees live.
This chapter analyzes Nepal’s opportunities and successes in using wedging
strategies in its interaction with the two major powers in the context o f its evolving
policies and treatment of Tibetan exiles and refugees. The evidentiary pattern o f Nepal’s
evolving policies on Tibetans, those that have settled in Nepal for more than five decades
as well as the regular trickle o f new arrivals, can be tested against the hypothesized
relationship between salient internal and external independent variables and accrual of
material gains by wedge states in their interaction with greater rival powers, as described
previously in the research design chapter. As the host nation of a sizeable contingent of
Tibetan exiles, Nepal faces many competing demands and pressures regarding its policies
on Tibetans. In the recent decades, China has strongly and consistently demanded that
Nepal honor its commitment to one-China policy and stop any and all anti-China
activities that may occur within Nepal’s soil, even demanding that escaped Tibetans be
repatriated. In reaction, global leaders and media have faulted Nepalese policy and
practice regarding the rights of Tibetan exiles by underscoring Nepal’s commitment to
human rights and rights of refugees under international law.15 Various Western donor
states, multilateral organizations and NGOs have been sympathetic to the cause o f the
Tibetan diaspora and consistently raise the issue o f their rights to political activism and
expression. As usual, India views any change in Nepalese internal or external policy with
keen interest. Despite these net o f constraints and pressures, the puzzling situation is that
Nepal has achieved greater autonomy in its policy choice and opportunity for material

14 Xinhua, "Premier: Ample Facts Prove Dalai's Role in Lhasa Riot, Door of Dialogue
Still Open," Xinhua(March 18,2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200803/18/content_7813012.htm; "Lhasa Riot Aimed to Undermine Beijing Olympics:
Veteran Tibetan Official," Xinhua(March 19,2008),
http://news.xinhuanet.eom/english/2008-03/l 9/content_7819061 .htm.
15 Gopal Sharma, "Ex-President Carter Says China Pressuring Nepal on Tibetans,"
Reuters(April 1, 2013), http://www.reuters.eom/article/2013/04/01/us-nepal-tibet-carteridUSBRE9300BJ20130401; Jon Krakauer, "Why Is Nepal Cracking Down on Tibetan
Refugees?," The New Yorker(December 28, 2011 ),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/12/why-is-nepal-crackingdown-on-tibetan-refugees.html.
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gains in the last couple o f decades despite the pressure by and preferences o f its Western
aid donors.
The genesis, history and the current manifestation of the issue of Tibetan exiles in
Nepal neither tie neatly to concerns o f adherence to international human rights norms nor
to capitulation in the face o f direct pressures from diplomatic channels. The study below
interrogates the historical context of Nepal’s foreign policy with Tibet, China and India,
and analyzes the effect that the current regional geostrategic context has on Nepal’s
recent policies towards Tibetans within its borders. It traces the many critical junctures of
Nepal’s internal political transformation in addition to the changing dynamics o f regional
diplomatic and economic pressures over the past half century. The analysis highlights the
changing dynamics o f Nepal’s interaction with China and India, including the reasons
behind the crucial fulcrum of a shift in policy in 1989 when Nepal stopped granting
permanent settlement to newly arriving Tibetans. The evidentiary pattern that emerges, at
least in this critical and sensitive political issue, demonstrates the limited extent o f
independence or autonomy that Nepal’s wedging opportunities accrue in its network o f
interactions with China and India plus Western governments, multilateral organizations
and Tibetan exile community.
The evidence as presented below helps answer the two major questions raised in
the literature review and the design o f this research in the previous chapters, namely:
First, did Nepal’s internal change in its political system from autocracy to constitutional
monarchical democracy in 1990 have any affect on Nepal’s policies regarding the
Tibetan exiles issue? Second, does Nepal’s increasing trade dependence with China and
India play a decisive role in the direction of its policy evolution regarding Tibetan
refugees? The analysis produces mixed results, so a quick caveat might be offered now.
Unlike many other tripartite issues o f economic, environmental and strategic interaction,
India’s progressively muted interest on Tibetan cause compared with many Western
governments’ normative and passionate support on behalf of the Tibetan cause muddles
independent effects o f the interaction between the two rival powers on Nepal’s wedging
opportunities. Yet, the analysis leads to the conclusion that Nepal is able to reap
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maximum material, if not political, gains by the resolute application o f its recent policy
direction.
The ultimate cause of the current state o f Tibetan situation—be it in Nepal, India
or in Tibet itself—is the presently intractable nature of the larger Tibetan questions,
including the ultimate status o f Dalai Lama, his followers and their govemment-in-exile
based in Dharamsala, India. China has been increasingly assertive in putting enormous
pressure on Nepal to stem any Tibetan political activities within its borders. Suffering
chronic instability and transition, Nepal, for its part, has been only too willing to abide
the wishes o f its major trading partner and economic patron. On the other hand, being the
providers o f sizeable foreign aid to the impoverished nation, the Western democracies
and NGOs feel obliged to put moral, economic and political pressure to moderate Nepal’s
policies toward the Tibetan exiles. Finally, due to their long-term settlement in the Nepali
society as well as their historical, cultural and religious similarity to a portion o f native
population, the Tibetan community itself exerts significant empathy in the Nepalese
society and polity. The efforts o f the exile government run from India to inform, educate
and mobilize certainly influences many activists from around the world, compels
worldwide journalists to highlight Nepal’s behavior on the issue, and informs common
folks to take interest and build pressure.
Such interactive dynamics animates the puzzle of Nepal’s evolving historical
policies regarding the status and treatment o f Tibetan exiles. It highlights one important
example of Nepal’s inescapable position as a small, weak state between two burgeoning
great powers in a globalized epoch. The tripartite interaction between Nepal, India and
China in myriad issues in the political, social, economic and environmental dimensions
can be understood not just by the internal processes inherent in those issues but also by
the Nepalese strategy of trying to maintain its independence while maximizing the
material and political gains from the competition and cross-cutting demands from its
more powerful partners, India and China. Actually, as a sensitive geopolitical and
strategic issue of utmost concern to China, and also part of one o f the unresolved knots in
the burgeoning China-India rivalry, the question o f Tibet and the fate of Tibetan exiles
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warrant ample analytical results to understand the tripartite dynamic in its crucial
elements. These dynamics have roots deep in history.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows order: the first section gives a brief
overview o f the historical events leading up to the origin of the Tibetan refugee issue; the
second section identifies the interests o f the actors involved, including the three states as
well as the Tibetan diaspora community and the Western states and the multilateral
institutions; the evolution of Nepal’s policies and practices regarding its Tibetan exile
population is charted in the third section; based on that evidence, the fourth section
analyzes Nepal’s wedge prospects in the regional interaction and evaluates the factors
that determine the shift o f its preferences; the final section concludes the discussion.
CONTEXT: HISTORY AND TRANSFORMATION UNTIL 1959
To understand the tripartite relationship between China, India and Nepal and their
current impact on the Tibetan exiles, one has to first understand the historical roots that
have intertwined these states and peoples. Modem history o f the region shows that
China’s capture of Tibet secured its strategic security interests in the vast Southern and
Western frontier. Stunned and alarmed, India’s strategic response was to establish its
South Asian security perimeter extending in the north all the way to the Himalayan
boundary abutting Chinese controlled Tibet. In order to maintain that security perimeter,
India necessarily had to interfere into the affairs o f Nepal and other mountain states. The
ever-changing leadership in Nepal eventually reacted against the pressing Indian
dominance by trying to play the China card as counterweight. Nevertheless, Indian
primacy in the region has been such that Nepal has only been able to counterbalance
using China on limited issue areas, specifically those issues, such as the policy on Tibetan
exiles, on which Indian interests have long been waning.

Historical Pathways
The common expression o f Nepal’s geo-strategic location is that of a ‘yam
between two boulders.’ The metaphor is ascribed to King Prithivi Narayan Shah, who in
1769 AD united the various minor kingdoms o f the time to found the modem nation of
Nepal. Indeed, with the Tibetan plateau of China looming from the North beyond the
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Himalayan range, and the landmass of India surrounding the small nation from the East,
West and South, King Prithivi’s image o f Nepal remains apt. In these early years of the
21s*century, the sleeping giants surrounding Nepal have almost suddenly transformed.
China, the fire-breathing dragon, is on a dizzying flight to reach the economic and
military mountaintop o f the world, apparently razing to ground the remnants of the old
world order. And like a tiger awakened from a long slumber, India has quickly
discovered its footing for a fast chase. On their quests to become major powers, fiercely
competitive though not currently openly adversarial, both countries seem intent to secure
their influence, especially in their immediate neighborhood.
The cultural, economic and military-political interaction between Nepal and Tibet
goes back more than a thousand years. Although separated by the natural boundary o f the
Himalayas, the peoples in the immediate vicinity on both sides have always shared many
familial, cultural and linguistic commonalities and enjoyed everyday travel, movement
and exchanges. Buddhism, which itself had spread from the Indian Gangetic plains via
Nepal north to Tibet, formed the basis o f the religious order that ruled Tibet from
Lhasa.16 Trade and commerce between Tibet and India flowed through Nepal via the
ancient city centered in Kathmandu valley. Not long after its formation as the Kingdom
of Nepal by King Prithivi Narayan Shah in 1769, the martial minded Gorkhali army set
their sights to the north on Tibet to gain the upper hand in the lucrative trans-Himalayan
trade relations and to acquire preferred treatment for Nepali traders. Nepal fought three
major wars with Tibet, the first one in 1786, when the Nepalese forces were able to
dictate the terms o f Tibet’s surrender in terms of favorable trade conditions and yearly
payments. The second Nepalese war on Tibet in 1791 produced decidedly worse outcome
because Nepal’s attack brought China to the aid of Tibet’s defense, when Nepal for the
first time came face to face with the major but distant power o f China. The final war
between Nepal and Tibet in 1854 ended with the Nepal-Tibet Treaty o f 1856, which
established a century long position o f privilege for Nepalese traders in Lhasa and practice
of yearly monetary tribute. Regular trade and exchanges conducted along ancient

16 John Whelpton, A History o f Nepal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
29.
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pathways settled into a pattern o f long and amicable relations with Tibet, which
continued until the mid-twentieth century.17 And in the past five decades the same
traditional pathways have been used by the fleeing Tibetans to cross the Himalayas into
Nepal and beyond, in the process, entangling the modem Nepalese state in sensitive
interaction of strategic, political and economic salience with China, India and the West.
On the Southern front, from the perspective of the British in India, Tibet formed a
natural security buffer in addition to Nepal against China. The insight that the Himalayas
along with the Tibetan plateau served two useful purposes, firstly, by preventing the
encounter between two great civilizations and empires, and secondly, by allowing them
discrete spheres of influence within their respective regions, was older than the arrival of
the East India Company in the sub-continent and it survived their departure.18 In Tibet,
the Lamas maintained stability and control based on their own historical ruling practices;
whereas in Nepal, by mid-nineteenth century, the state had officially fallen prey to the
autocratic and hereditary Rana prime ministers, who received support and protection
from the British. The arrangement was long able to maintain the security buffer, avoid
instability, all the while conserving traditional pattern o f trade and exchange relations
between the Tibetans and Nepalese and beyond to the British and Indians. That historical
pattern was rapidly and irrevocably broken in the middle twentieth century by the
independence of India and the Communist control of China.

Mid-Century Transformation
The basic status of Tibet as well as the core pattern o f the Nepal’s tripartite
relationship with India and China was set in motion during the years 1947 to 1959.
During this juncture the entire region underwent momentous transformations in: the
shape and size o f the new states and the borders between them; the internal political
structures o f those states and the basis of interactions among them; the transformed

17 For detailed review o f Nepalese history and early Nepal-Tibet relations, see Leo E
Rose, Nepal: Strategy fo r Survival (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1971); S
D. Muni, Foreign Policy o f Nepal (Delhi: National Pub. House, 1973); Whelpton, A
History o f Nepal.
18 J Mohan Malik, "South Asia in China's Foreign Relations," Pacifica Review: Peace,
Security & Global Change 13, no. 1 (2001): 76-77.
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conception of their geostrategic interests and the uncertainty o f ambitions between the
newly minted leaders in positions of power in those states. It is safe to say that the
epochal changes in that period have wrought far-reaching regional, and global,
implications, which continue to this day. Although a narrow slice o f the regional picture
now, the issue o f Tibetans in South Asia owes its endurance to that period of turmoil.
When India became independent of the British Raj in 1947, it was simultaneously
partitioned giving birth to Pakistan and ushering into being a still-present dynamic of
conflict, one that Beijing has found so fruitful to exploit. Leading independent India was
the Indian National Congress (INC) party headed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru,
committed internally to their plan o f making democracy work despite the vast diversity of
India. Externally, the notion o f the “magnificent frontier” o f the Himalayas, in Nehru’s
words, persisted from the Indian perspective. In China, it was the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) that came out on top to capture central control in 1949, ending a century of
instability and decline. Beijing’s power consolidated under the forceful leadership o f Mao
Zedong. The new regimes in India and China were intensely nationalistic, proud o f their
civilization and history, and both were eager to claim their places in regional and global
affairs.
These transformations in India and China had critical impact on both Tibet and
Nepal. In Nepal’s case, the autocratically ruling Rana clan, which had maintained
hereditary control o f the isolationist state for more than a hundred years, lost their prime
protectors after the British left India. Educated Nepalese elites and expatriates, who
began agitating for political rights and democracy had hoped to find a committed
democrat in Prime Minister Nehru. But Nehru became wedded to the strategy o f a
“middle way,” by which he hoped to allow needed political reform and some liberty
while preserving the ancient regime in Nepal, and thus limiting the chances of major
upheaval in what he had always considered as India’s proper and strategic northern
frontier.19 Independent India formalized its “special relationship” with Nepal by signing
two far-reaching treaties o f “peace and friendship” and “trade and commerce,” while the

19 Rose, Strategy fo r Survival, 182.
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Rana government still remained in power on July 31, 1950.20 However, the decisive
action of asylum to India by the heretofore figurehead King Tribhuvan as well as
persistent political protest and guerilla action by the out-lawed political parties o f Nepal,
forced Nehru hand. On February 7,1951, the so-called “Delhi compromise” finally
brought about the ouster of the Ranas from absolute power in Nepal and restored the
Shah monarchy to the throne along with the promise o f political rights and democracy for
the people.21 In addition to Nepal and India’s historical and cultural linkages, the
aftermath of the Indian independence and its role in the Nepalese revolution fashioned
the continued pattern o f Indian involvement in Nepal’s political and strategic
developments. Nepalese political structure and historical direction was shaped with India
playing the role of the advisor, mediator, guarantor and the mid-wife.
For Tibet, the transformative juncture of mid-century was all the more definitive.
In October 1950, the communist military forces began the offensive into Tibetan
territories, a process ultimately culminated in taking control o f Lhasa. Beijing justified its
actions as “liberation” of Tibet, over which it asserted controversial and disputed
historical Chinese claims o f suzerainty. The established autonomous rulers of Tibet under
the leadership o f Dalai Lama appealed to India, Nepal and Western powers to protect
them against Chinese annexation. But Prime Minister Nehru was powerless to confront
China militarily beyond the Himalayas, and resorted to diplomatic calls for Tibetan
autonomy, which Beijing swatted as unwarranted “foreign interference” in their internal
matters.22
The invasion of Tibet at the hands o f the Communists was outright alarming for
India. The long-held Indian belief in the buffer role o f Tibet would vanish only to be
replaced by the military might o f the PLA overlooking the South Asian sub-continent
from the Tibetan piedmont. Having apparently lost the traditional Tibetan buffer, India
scrambled to limit the damage. Nehru forcefully argued that the Himalayas were India's
northern frontier and sought to forestall Beijing against further ambitions, warning, “an

20 Ibid., 185-86.
21 Muni, Foreign Policy o f Nepal, 22-27; Rose, Strategy fo r Survival, 187-94.
22 Strategy fo r Survival, 187.
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attack on Nepal would be, in effect, an attack on India.” Nehru elucidated the swiftly
changing strategic landscape in his 1950 speech to the Indian parliament:
"Our interest in the internal conditions o f Nepal becomes still more acute and
personal because of the developments across our borders, to be frank, especially
those in China and Tibet.. . . The Himalayas lie mostly on the northern border of
Nepal. We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the
principal barrier to India. Therefore, much as we appreciate the independence of
Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be
crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security."23
In addition to its clear strategic goal o f making Nepal the new buffer against
China, India sought to minimize the risk of political instability in Kathmandu, as Nepal’s
older political structure began to crumble. Thus, the Indian policy of deep strategic and
political interference into Nepal had the perfect pretext. With Indian guidance, Nepal
maintained studied silence on the matter o f Tibet. The fact of Chinese military footprints
so close to its borders certainly unnerved the Nepalese, especially because o f the
uncertainty o f the extent o f Chinese territorial ambitions and potential claims; after all, in
1939 Mao Dezong had identified Nepal as one o f China’s historical “tributary states.”24
Mired in its political transition Nepal had ample reasons to look towards India for support
and guidance, leading to long-lasting, intense and intimate Indian involvement in the
internal and external matters pertaining to Nepal. The short strip o f land between these
two landmasses had become the battleground between the democratic India intent on
security and harboring ambitions of sole influence in the sub-continent against the
surging Communist China that would eventually test the limits o f Indian power. In the
hopes of befriending Beijing and minimizing the chance o f military confrontation along
the long, undefined and contested Sino-Indian border, Nehru recognized Chinese
sovereignty over Tibet in 1954. Yet, a border war did break out in 1962 tumbling ChinaIndia relations to historic lows. It took another two decades, with leadership changes on
both sides, for India and China to finally see eye to eye on the matter o f Tibet, exactly
along Chinese positions.

23 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Where India Faces China," Foreign Affairs 37, no. 4 (July
1959): 617.
24 Muni, Foreign Policy o f Nepal, 70.
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Unable to placate the maximalist control of the new Chinese rulers in Tibet, Dalai
Lama ultimately escaped to seek refuge in India in 1959 amid the failure o f a violent
Lhasa Uprising against the Chinese rule. This was the genesis o f the question o f Tibetan
refugees, as followers and supporters o f their spiritual leader similarly chose the option to
escape into India, Nepal, Bhutan and Burma. More than a hundred and ten thousand
Tibetans remain in India, a majority in Dharamsala and the rest scattered in a few other
refugee settlements.25 Tibetans fleeing the border regions crossed over into Nepal and
settled in makeshift camps in the immediate aftermath of the failed uprising; eventually,
they were settled in more long-term settlements around the country. Over the decades,
many more arrived in Nepal, so that by now the estimated number o f Tibetans in Nepal
has reached more than twenty thousand.26 The population o f settled resident Tibetans and
the continued influx o f new exiles seeking safe passage into India has given Nepal a very
sensitive and crucial challenge to manage the expectation, demands and pressure from
China, India, the Tibetan leaders and the international community. Successive Nepali
regimes and governments have found ad hoc and strategic policies and practices to deal
with the issue of Tibetan exiles.
The mid-century juncture o f transformation leading to the period o f Tibetan
turmoil and exile is the genesis o f the Tibetan issue. Exiled Tibetans have been a matter
of concern for Nepal since then and this issue is the core problem o f this present study.
That historical juncture first set in motion their exile into Nepal and India and keeping
them in a state o f prolonged limbo, while the three states ascertained the boundaries of
their interests and preferences. The reverberations o f that critical period remains in the
present moment of rising China and India when both seem to be united more by their
economical interdependence and cooperative opportunities than divided on seemingly
settled historical positions, especially regarding Tibet. The next section evaluates the
interests and preferences o f the two rival powers as well as the wedge state and the
25 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, "World Refugee Survey 2009 India," (June 17, 2009), http://www.refugees.org/resources/refugeewarehousing/archived-world-refugee-surveys/2009-wrs-country-updates/india.html.
26 "World Refugee Survey 2009 - Nepal," (June 17, 2009),
http://www.refugees.org/resources/refugee-warehousing/archived-world-refugeesurveys/2009-wrs-country-updates/nepal.html.
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international and Tibetan communities on this issue. Specification o f the interests,
preferences permit their evaluation against the evidence o f the outcomes presented in the
later section.
SPECIFICATION: TRIPARTITE INTERESTS AND PREFERENCES
The possible wedging prospects by Nepal in its tripartite relationship with China
and India can be evaluated by systematically specifying the interests o f the three states
involved—the wedge and the two rival powers—along with that of the Tibetan diaspora
communities and Western states and multilateral organizations. The evidence o f stated
and observed interests o f the actors will produce the specification o f their preferences,
which can be ordered on the basis o f utility maximization. In other words, we can
describe and enumerate Nepal’s interests regarding specific policies for the Tibetan
refugees arriving within its borders, which will inform the specification o f Nepal’s
preferred outcomes of the issue resolution as well. Nepal’s interests and preferences do
not necessarily or always align with those of China and India regarding the very same
issue of the policies on the Tibetans. From the interaction, we are able to identify possible
decision and the final observed outcome gives us a sense of possible gains, if any, for the
wedge state.

Competing Sino-Indian Interests
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) espouses the clearest and most hardened
rhetoric of its interests and preferences regarding the issue of Tibet and Tibetan exiles.
Stated plainly, Beijing’s four top interests and preferences are: the Communist Party of
China (CPC) is the highest legitimate government of the land; China’s territorial
integrity, incorporating all of Tibet, is paramount; the Chinese socialist model is the only
one viable model o f social and economic organization within all o f China; to achieve its
desired position o f global power, China must prevent the rise of a competing actor in the
region. The official white paper o f Chinese State Council asserts that Tibet is and has
always been an integral part of China, and what the Communist Party o f China (CPC)
under Mao’s leadership did in “peacefully liberating” Tibet was fair and far-sighted, not

75

only for Chinese security interests, but more so for freeing the native Tibetans from their
“feudal serfdom” under the autocratic theocracy o f the Lamas.27
Observers and critics o f Chinese misrule charge with the evidence in the early
period o f the cultural revolution and later Chinese direct rule meant an attempt to stamp
out the backward Tibetan religious hierarchy, during which numerous monasteries and
temples were destroyed and their nuns and monks were defrocked so as to bring the Tibet
under Maoist principles of control, while countless ordinary Tibetans were sent to labor
camps or prison amid large-scale migration o f Han Chinese into Tibetan territories.28
However, recent Chinese Tibetan policy has also involved massive capital investment in
infrastructure and manpower in trying to modernize the economy and society o f Tibet,
which has shown undeniable effects in the last two decades. In a 2001 speech in Lhasa to
mark the 50th anniversary of Chinese control o f Tibet, future President Hu Jintao made
the official Chinese interests and preference on Tibet perfectly clear:
“It is only under the leadership o f the Communist Party o f China, only in the
embrace o f the big family o f the motherland and only by firmly taking the
socialist road with Chinese characteristics that Tibet can enjoy today's prosperity
and progress and an even better tomorrow. This is the most important conclusion
that we have drawn from the 50 years o f Tibet's development and also the
fundamental principle that must be followed in building and developing Tibet in
the days to come... Tibet is in the southwestern frontier o f the motherland, with a
vast stretch o f land and a most important strategic position. The development,
stability and security o f Tibet have a direct bearing on the fundamental interests
o f people of all ethnic groups in Tibet as well as ethnic solidarity, national unity
and state security.”29

27 The Information Office of the State Council: China's Cabinet, "Sixty Years since
Peaceful Liberation o f Tibet," (July 11,2011), http://english.gov.cn/official/20U07/1 l/content_l 904075.htm.
28 Wang Ruowang, "The Status o f Tibet: Recalling a Visit to Lhasa," in Tibet through
Dissident Chinese Eyes : Essays on Self-Determination, ed. Cao Changqing and James D.
Seymour (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 71-73; John F. Avedon, "Tibet Today:
Current Conditions and Prospects," Himalaya, the Journal o f the Association o f Nepal
and Himalayan Studies 7, no. 2, Article 4 (1987): 1-2.
29 Hu Jintao, "Full Text of Speech by the Vice-President Hu Jintao at the Rally in
Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Peaceful Liberation o f Tibet," Xinhua(]\i\y
19, 2001), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/20010719/431559.htm.
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From Beijing’s perspective, Tibetan liberation and five-decade long economic
modernization effort reflects Chinese commitment to uplifting the indigenous people of
the Tibetan plateau but also the undeniable fact that Tibet holds the immense geostrategic
importance. In Beijing’s view, those who misunderstand the sensitivity are deluded, that
includes any Tibetan who is unhappy about the arrangement, who could thus be labeled a
“secessionist” and a traitor to the Chinese nationalism. Or they are waylaid by the
spiritual but dangerous rhetoric o f the “Dalai Lama clique,” who have been used by
foreign political forces to destabilize China. Thus, in regards to the issue of Tibetan
refugees, the official Chinese position is that there are no Tibetan refugees; the exiles,
including the leadership o f the govemment-in-exile based in India and aided by Western
forces, have traitorous motives.
From these stated objectives and rhetoric, we may tease out Chinese preferences
regarding the rather narrow matter o f Tibetan exiles living in Nepal. Given the reality of
the situation, Beijing’s one non-negotiable position has been and will remain maintaining
the ultimate authority in all Tibet related matters. Preserving that authority is the first
interest and primary preference of Beijing, which would ideally favor that all the Tibetan
exiles were repatriated to live in Tibet under Beijing’s current direct rule. Inasmuch as
that primary interest collides with the aspirations o f Tibetan exiles and the demands of
the Dalai Lama’s govemment-in-exile, China would surely like to remove that thom from
its side, albeit only in its own terms. The least favorable outcome to Beijing is the
fulfillment of the demand of true autonomy and self-rule by the exiled leadership in
Tibet. Yet, even the talk of Tibetan regional autonomy is only entertained in abstract
rhetoric not as a matter of practical reality. Also, despite two decades worth of
intermittent direct talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama’s associates, there appears
zero likelihood o f true autonomy and self-rule in Tibet, especially not under the current
Tibetan exile leadership.
Therefore, the status quo o f more than one hundred and thirty thousand Tibetan
exiles living in Nepal, India, and around the world, is at least more preferable outcome to
Beijing, than giving any ground to the exile leadership in the matter o f ultimate
autonomy. Maybe a higher preference and the modus operandi of Chinese policy in the
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last two decades has been to use all diplomatic and strategic tools to checkmate the
activities and influence o f the Tibetan exile communities and their leadership at every
step of the way. The goal is no less than effective de-legitimization o f the Dalai Lama
and his leadership as well as the demands o f the entire exile community. To that end,
China has found it in its interest to apply diplomatic pressure on its neighboring states to
recognize to the letter the spirit o f “one-China” policy, demanding restriction of
movement and political activities of the exiles in Nepal or India, using diplomatic and
media channels to slander and delegitimize Dalai Lama personally and his followers in
general. In pursuing these policies, China seems to have met its priorities and second-best
policy preferences. Short of complete repatriation and removal of the Tibetan exile
problem, Beijing accepts the state o f total challenge in all the activities and the ultimate
defeat o f the Tibetan exiles. Also, the larger geostrategic consideration that China enjoys
in Tibet helps extend its interests into South Asia and matches nicely with Tibet’s
continued status quo.
The regional dynamic brings us to the interests that India harbors in relation to the
issues of Tibet and Tibetan exiles. Stated sequentially in terms o f preference, India’s
ostensible interests are fourfold: gaining high confidence in the security of its Northern
frontier; achieving greater autonomy for Tibetans in Tibet leading to lesser role for the
Beijing; the continuing rise o f trade and economic interaction with China coupled with
the status quo on Tibetan issues; and India’s least preferred outcome, which is the
redrawing o f the border between China and India based on possible evidence of Tibetan
claims after repatriation on Chinese terms.
As a rival and historic co-equal to China in the region, India’s interests on the
Tibetan issue have certainly evolved in reaction to successive Chinese policies in the last
six decades. But at its core, India has always seen, even before and after independence,
the Himalayas as the ultimate barrier o f its security buffer against China. Yet, due to
historical—economic, religious, and cultural—reasons Indian interests extended to Tibet,
which served nicely as the independent frontier for the British till the very end o f their
Raj in India. The view that China was too powerless or distant to ever anticipate it
overturning a millennia-long Tibetan independent stability could be counted, in hindsight,
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as sound policy for those times. Hence, right after Communist China’s sudden and
shocking assertion of historical sovereignty over Tibet in the early 1950s, independent
India under the leadership of its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was unable
to mount a challenge to the Chinese military might encroaching on the Tibetan piedmont,
resorted to a supposed realpolitik policy of common cause with the Communist China
against the Western imperialists.30 The short-lived bonhomie came essentially at the
expense o f Tibet's independence with the mistaken expectation that mere recognition by
India would placate Chinese threats o f total control. In a fateful move, that has been
invariably described since as “naive,” 31 Nehru recognized Chinese sovereignty over
Tibet in 1954.
In contrast, since then India's primary interest has been to somehow hope for a
reduction o f China’s total authority and presence over that important northern security
frontier. Widespread public sentiment o f support encouraged Nehru himself to favor such
preference by becoming the political backer of the Dalai Lama and the autonomy o f the
ancien regime that had ruled Tibet for centuries as well as by giving shelter and
settlement to the first wave of Tibetan exiles who followed their leader into India.32 As
the decades o f Chinese rule made their definitive and perhaps perpetual control o f Tibet a
fa it accompli, India has been forced to periodically revise its interests and preferences on
Tibet in order to accommodate the emergent reality. After two decades o f the Sino-Indian
border war in 1962, India finally recognized Tibet as “an autonomous region o f China” in
1984, while progressively lowering the decibel o f its demands o f Tibetan autonomy.33 In
regards to Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees living within its borders, India has
remained a gracious host, hoping for the ideal outcome o f their eventual return to form an
autonomous Tibetan leadership. A less ideal but all the more realistic outcome is the
30 Dawa Norbu, "Chinese Strategic Thinking on Tibet and the Himalayan Region,"
Strategic Analysis 12, no. 4 (July 1988): 372-73.
31 Parshotam Mehra, From Conflict to Conciliation: Tibetan Polity Revisited
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004), 116; Prasenjit Duara, The Global and Regional in
China’s Nation-Formation (New York: Routledge, 2008), 192.
32 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century
(Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2001), 54, 57.
33 Tsering Topgyal, "Charting the Tibet Issue in the Sino-Indian Border Dispute," China
Report 47, no. 2 (2011): 117.
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status quo. As Topgyal has cogently argued, the least preferred outcome for India is the
repatriation of Tibetans after which, based on historical Tibetan claims, they make the
case for disputed Indian territories on China’s behalf.34 Thus, the current Indian
preference on this is to accommodate the Chinese until the border disputes and larger
geostrategic concerns are resolved independently o f the final settlement o f the issue of
Tibetans living within India.
The dimension of disputed borders and competing territorial claims leads us to the
matter o f utmost importance: the larger strategic picture of China-India rivalry and
tension. Both China and India’s respective interests and preferences on the matter of
Tibetan exiles, which is admittedly a smaller concern among many other competing
issues, is played in the context o f their regional rivalry. J. Mohan Malik asserts that since
both states are ancient civilizations and empires, they view their eventual roles as
regional and global leaders. Thus, Malik succinctly argues that China’s primary interest
centers on preventing “the rise of a peer competitor,” in Asia, which is evidenced by its
policy of encirclement o f India in the form of close relationships, based on economic aid
and transfer of military hardware, to South Asian states, primarily Pakistan, but also at
various degrees to Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.35 As for Tibet itself, the fact that
China has amassed large number of PLA personnel along with modem military
installations and infrastructure in the plateau means India certainly feels hemmed in from
the North.
The two basic prongs o f Indian objectives in South Asia have been to maintain
geostrategic insulation in its backyards and to safeguard regional stability near its
borders.36 Both of these objectives had to be recalibrated periodically by events beyond
India’s borders. Starting with Chinese control of Tibet and the flight of the Dalai Lama,
to the partition and independence o f Bangladesh, to the Tamil-Sinhalese civil war in Sri
Lanka, and Burmese military usurping power, the South Asian backyard has been
anything but stable over the decades, allowing China perfect opportunities to extend its

34 Ibid., 127.
35 Malik, "South Asia in China's Foreign Relations," 74-75, 82.
36 Ibid., 74.
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tentacles into the Indian orbit. In the recent decades, the Chinese-Indian rivalry has
outspread to encompass their naval ambitions for supremacy in the Indian Ocean and the
South China Sea. Economic interests and opportunities have provided the counter to
impel both countries to pursue engagement and cooperation in South Asia and beyond.

Divergent Interests: Nepal and Tibetan Community
Dwelling under the strategic context of these two regional powers, Nepal’s
interests on the issue o f Tibetan exiles is absolutely predicated by Indian and Chinese
preferences. Historical ties dictated that Nepal's sense o f security was temporarily rattled
by Chinese expansionism into Tibet in the 1950s. That period also coincided with
extensive intervention by India into Nepal's political transformation leading to the
subsequent decade of “special relationship” between India-Nepal. However, much has
changed since that period of internal and regional transformation. At the moment, we can
identify four major policy objectives and interests that have guided Nepalese actions
regarding the Tibetan exiles issue: continuing cordial relationship with New Delhi but
preferably with less political interference internally; maintaining an across-the-spectrum
friendly relationship with Beijing to achieve material gains from Chinese aid and
investment; maintaining continued flow of economic aid and investment from Western
donor nations, the multilateral institutions and non-governmental organizations; and
finally, the least preferred option, is increasing constraints due to any external pressures,
mainly from the Western actors, to accommodate the political and economic rights of the
Tibetan refugees already living within Nepalese borders. The policy course that Nepal
has adopted since 1989 on Tibetan exiles have been reasonably successful in meeting the
objectives of the three most preferred options listed above.
Nepal's interest in allowing the first wave o f Tibetan exiles to settle within its
territory was purely practical based on humanitarian concerns and inability to stop them
from crossing the unguarded, porous border. Beginning in the 1960s, as Nepal's internal
political calculations as well as limitation o f Chinese ambitions beyond Tibet made it
worthwhile to pursue China as a counterbalance to Indian hegemonic influence, Nepal's
interests and policies on the Tibetans also began to evolve. By the 1980s, China began to
increase its diplomatic pressure on Nepal regarding Tibetans at the same time that India
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downgraded its interests on Tibetans to improve its own economic relationship with
China. Such changing dynamic allowed Nepal starting in 1989 to follow a new policy
direction regarding the Tibetan refugees strictly based on maintaining its friendly
relations with China with the attendant promise of economic aid balanced against the
diffused demands o f the Western-led international community.
The current status quo set in 1989 provides higher material gains to Nepal, if it
remains successful in balancing Chinese demands o f restriction on Tibetans’ political
activities while adhering to the Western governments’ and international organizations’
condition o f non-expulsion and favorable treatment in exchange for continuing the vital
source o f foreign aid.37 Ideally, it might seem that Nepal would prefer the ultimate
resolution o f the status o f Tibetan exiles by peaceful repatriation. But as one o f the
poorest economies in the world, Nepal is reliant on external support and aid— from
Western donor nations and agencies as well as from Chinese and Indian bilateral
economic aid and favorable policies— not just to finance its developmental projects but
also actual running o f government’s regular budgetary needs. Thus, managing a balance
between these incompatible demands, Nepal in the past two decades has preferred a
policy of suppression of political activities by Tibetans already settled in Nepal but not
actual expulsion and allowing transit into India for newly arriving refugees.
Additionally, the Tibetans who have settled in Nepal for more than five decades
have contributed enormously to the growth o f one o f the core sectors o f Nepal’s
economy, the export-led traditional handmade carpet industry and other related
handicrafts commerce.38 Harnessing initial financial support and technical assistance by
the Swiss international aid organizations, Tibetans used their traditional knowledge and
expertise to produce “Tibetan-styled or Tibetan-made” carpets in Nepal, which fetched
37

While never publicly discussed, analysts argue that the United States and the European
Union have periodically conditioned aid with humane treatment and non-expulsion o f
Tibetans settled in Nepal. See page 29, especially footnote 22, in Tibet Justice Center,
"Tibet's Stateless Nationals: Tibetan Refugees in Nepal," (June 2002),
http://www.tibetjustice.org/reports/nepal.pdf. For further evidence o f the role of
international aid see Ann Frechette, Tibetans in Nepal: The Dynamics o f International
Assistance among a Community in Exile (Berghahn Books, 2002), 123.
38 Tibetans in Nepal, 48-51.
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high global prices and became the number one source o f foreign exchange and
employment until the late 1990s.39 Thus, concerns regarding both continuing external
economic aid from the West and China, in addition to internal economic vitality in core
domestic industries means that total repatriation would be a net negative, in strictly
monetary sense, for the Nepalese state and economy.
Advocates of Tibetan rights have actively denounced Nepal's progressive
capitulation to Chinese pressures.40 Nonetheless, Nepal's policy preference on Tibetan
exiles has settled on this course for more than two decades since 1989, despite roiling
internal instability in this period. The fact that neither the disinterested India nor the
divided international community has managed to deter Nepal's behavior shows that
Nepal’s calculation o f economic and political gain from China is paramount. Successive
leaders and governments in Kathmandu have affirmed the inviolable friendship with
China and acknowledged one-China policy as the bedrock of Nepalese foreign relations,
in words similar to the current Ministry o f Foreign Affairs formulation, which is
unequivocally clear about Nepalese position: “Nepal has always been upholding 'One
China' policy and is committed not to allow Nepalese territory to be used against our
friendly neighbor China's core interests.”41
That leaves the interests o f the final interested party, the Tibetan communities in
exile and their leadership, in a very precarious position. Their appeal to the international
community and Western democracies is based on the messages of the endangered cultural
practices, environmental destruction and trampled human rights in Tibet; the historical
fact of Tibet’s independence lost by the forced and brutal Chinese annexation; and the
ultimate hope for autonomy and return to the cherished Shangri-la for the Tibetan
peoples.42 To sustain worldwide attention to the Tibetan cause, the charismatic spiritual
leadership o f Dalai Lama has been channeled and shaped by an efficient, clever public
39 Whelpton, A History o f Nepal, 148; Frechette, Tibetans in Nepal, 54.
40 See the 2002 and subsequent yearly reports by International Campaign for Tibet,
"Dangerous Crossing: Conditions Impacting the Flight o f Tibetan Refguees," (2002),
http://www.savetibet.org/resource-center/ict-publications/publications.
41 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs - Government of Nepal, "Nepal - People's Republic of
China, Bilateral Relations," http://www.mofa.gov.np/en/nepal-china-relations-78.html.
42 Frechette, Tibetans in Nepal, 94-99, 101-03.

83

relations operation started in the 1970s by the govemment-in-exile whose efforts have
successfully generated passionate support from many Western leaders, celebrities, single
issue advocacy groups and common folks, forming the so-called global ‘friends of Tibet’
network bound together on Tibet by their liberal humanism and their concern for human
rights, religious freedom and multiculturalism.43 Yet, all these activities have not met any
real success in their central purpose: politically isolating China on the issue to impair its
stranglehold over Tibet.
The exile leadership has long held on to a “five points peace plan” as the
statement of its ultimate political preferences and has used it as the basis during its
intermittent negotiations with Beijing. The five points peace plan was outlined by the
Dalai Lama during the apogee o f his personal worldwide popularity—he won the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1989— in a speech to the U.S. Congressional Human Right’s Caucus in
1987. The first four conditions of the plan include transforming Tibet into a zone of
peace, abandoning Han migration into Tibet, a guarantee o f basic human rights for
Tibetans, and environmental conservation o f Tibetan lands with discontinuation of
nuclear waste dumping there.44 The final point, later called the Strasbourg Proposal, after
Dalai Lama’s speech elaborating his five points peace plan to the European Parliament in
1988, sought “earnest negotiations” with China with the ultimate goal being full Tibetan
autonomy under a Government o f Tibet responsible for all “non-political” internal and
external policies, with defense and foreign policy managed by government of China 45
The five points plan is the ideal Tibetan preference, which when articulated
succinctly means: full autonomy, just short o f independence, under the exile leadership.
Since those heady days, the developments in the last two decades have proved the

43 For a detailed analysis o f the sophisticated public relations campaign behind the global
visibility and the deeper meaning o f the Tibetan cause, see Frechette’s penetrating
chapter, “Friends of Tibet,” in ibid., 92-119.
44 Dalai Lama, "Five Point Peace Plan: Address to the U.S. Congressional Human Right's
Caucus," (September 21, 1987), http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/five-pointpeace-plan.
5 "Strasbourg Proposal 1988: Address to the Members o f the European Parliament,
Strasbourg, France," (June 15, 1988),
http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/strasbourg-proposal-1988.
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realization full Tibetan autonomy seems remote indeed. The continued economic and
political rise of China has only made its hand stronger. Increasing economic ties and
expanding role o f China in the international system o f governance means that the options
for Dalai Lama’s hopeless followers have reduced to such symbolic acts o f protests as o f
horrifying cases o f self-immolations by Tibetan youths and monks.46 Further concerning
is the fact that international pressure has progressively lost its influence on the Nepalese
or Indian policies on Tibetan refugees. Their freedom of political activism and protest,
maybe even their very existence, appears to be under threat of suppression by the
Nepalese, which appears gradually more concerned with its interest of upholding the
good graces o f Beijing.
We now turn to the evidence o f Nepal’s evolving policies and practices in its
treatment o f Tibetan exiles and refugees. The narrative below explores the critical
junctures where Nepal’s policies shifted, bowing to the demands of shifting regional
context, overt diplomatic pressures and international demands as well as, and most
importantly internal political changes and shifting interests. The analysis highlights
Nepal’s periodic ability and inability to use the issue to further its material gains from its
tripartite relationship.
EVIDENCE: NEPAL’S POLICY EVOLUTION ON TIBETAN EXILES
It has been more than five decades since the first Tibetan exiles crossed the border
into Nepal, and their recent experiences could not be more different than in the first few
decades. What was then welcoming and benign neglect by the Nepalese authorities has
now become more coercive and restrictive, a just tolerant official attitude. Scrutinizing
the evolution of Nepal’s specific policies and treatment of Tibetan exiles shows the effect
not just of internal political changes overtime but of the unalterable external reality of
rising Chinese pressure coupled with Indian indifference amid sympathetic Western
concern on the matter. Still, it can be argued that Nepal’s internal political calculations of

46 News reports o f self-immolations by Tibetans abound; for a cogent analysis o f the
phenomenon see Tsering Shakya, "Self-Immolation: The Changing Language o f Protest
in Tibet," Revue d'Etudes Tibetaines 25 (December 2012).
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its interests are paramount. Tracing the patterns o f this shift yields analytical possibility
of gauzing if Nepal is gaining materially or politically from its evolving polices.

Before and Since 1989
When the Dalai Lama escaped to India, many Tibetans decided to flee South as
well. The situation in Tibet was dire once the PLA finally asserted full control in Lhasa,
crushing violently the Tibetan Uprising of 1959. While much of the early refugees went
to India, many Tibetans from the border areas moved into the Nepalese territory across
the border. Those early arrivals lived in makeshift camps across the border in extreme
circumstances without any aid or concern from the Nepalese state or much attention from
the international aid community.
Eventually the Nepali government permitted the Red Cross to set up settlements
for the burgeoning number of Tibetans in different parts of the country. Aid from the
Swiss international development agencies and the UNHCR as well as the Americans
began to settle the refugees, while the Nepalese government allowed legal asylum and
settlement to these early refugees.47 Until 1989, Nepal allowed Tibetan refugees to settle
in Nepal and provided them with a refugee Registration Card (RC), which permitted
basic protection and identification. Over the decades many Tibetans were able to partner
with native Nepalese to open businesses; they opened schools, which taught Tibetan
languages and culture; and all participated in their religious and cultural practices, so that
by the 1970s, many observers felt that the refugees in Nepal would preserve Tibetan
culture while integration into Nepali society.48
However, things began changing drastically in the late 1980s. On 1989, ostensibly
faced with the influx o f larger number o f refugees escaping that year’s Tibetan uprising
and resulting Chinese crackdown, the government of Nepal scrapped the resettlement
policy, only allowing the UNHCR to label new Tibetan arrivals as “persons o f concern,”

47 Frechette, Tibetans in Nepal, 40-43; Tibet Justice Center, "Tibet's Stateless Nationals:
Tibetan Refugees in Nepal". 33-37.
48 "Tibet's Stateless Nationals: Tibetan Refugees in Nepal". 36.
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who were only permitted to be sent on to India.49 Since, Nepal is not a party to the
international conventions on refugees, there is no formal policy in Nepal’s laws regarding
this shift, only a “gentlemen’s agreement” between Nepal, UNHCR and the U.S.
Embassy, which in practice allowed Nepal to adhere to international human rights
standards.50
Currently there are more than 20,000 refugees who live in Nepal and every year
additional 2500 more make the arduous journey crossing from Tibet over the dangerous
mountain passes into Nepal. The experiences o f Tibetan refugees as they come in contact
with Nepalese state authorities begin at the border and continues throughout their stay in
Nepal. Gathering field data in 2004, Dolma et al. documented the difficulty of Tibetans’
journey due to the harsh terrain, lack o f food, frostbite, and many such hardships due to
the sheer length o f time it takes for them to arrive at their destination, which in average
takes more than 30 days on buses and on foot.51 Their misery worsens when they
encounter Nepalese border guards or militia, who were reported to mete out harsh,
inhumane and illegal harassment, including physical and sexual violence, financial
extortion. Despite Nepal’s international obligations and responsibilities to human rights,
there are reports of routine threats o f refoulement of the refugees back into the yet more
dangerous hands o f Chinese authorities.52
While some of these reported abuses o f the refugees might be chalked up to
administrative failure or indiscipline o f individual border guard or unit, it is nonetheless
instructive to notice a changing pattern o f Nepal’s overall policy on the issue o f not just
o f newly arriving Tibetan refugees but, more importantly, the rights and freedoms of
those that have settled in Nepal since 1959. Many observers find that Nepal’s faithfulness
to the aforementioned “gentlemen’s agreement” o f 1989 has been deteriorating and there

49 UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, "2014 UNHCR Regional Operations Profile South Asia," http://www.unhcr.Org/pages/49e487856.html#NEPKA.
50 Tibet Justice Center, "Tibet's Stateless Nationals: Tibetan Refugees in Nepal". 88-113.
51 Sonam Dolma et al., "Dangerous Journey: Documenting the Experience of Tibetan
Refugees," American Journal o f Public Health 96, no. 11 (2006): 2062.
52 Ibid., 2062-64.
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have been a few instances o f clearly illegal refoulements as well as increasing number of
human rights abuses o f the legally settled refugees in the last two decades.53
Especially worrisome has been Nepal's suppression of and unlawful restriction of
the rights o f the Tibetans in Nepal to freedom of expression, assembly and movement.
The scrutiny and monitoring of Tibetan’s activities has extended from the overtly
political demonstrations to even encompass practice and participation in religious and
cultural activities. While the government officials maintain that only anti-China activities
are restricted, recent reports based on fieldwork and documentation in Nepal lead to the
conclusion that the arbitrary definition o f the threshold o f permitted activities has led
towards increased suppression.54
With the Nepalese state intent on suppression o f their rights o f expression,
political protests by Tibetans, which are not uncommon in Nepal, have become scenes of
state repression. Tibetan protests and political activities have occurred periodically before
the Beijing Olympics and they have continued since. When yet again protests broke out
against the sensitive backdrop o f the Olympics, Nepal found itself needing to negotiate
between the strident demands from its giant northern neighbor to take strict action against
Tibetan protestors on one side, and international pressure to allow them their basic human
rights and freedom o f expression and assembly. Prominent global figures and media
showered attention on the rights o f Tibetan refugees in Nepal to freely associate and
protest, and deplored the heavy-handed, some even claimed inhumane, treatment by the
Nepalese state that arrested and jailed Tibetan protestors, including monks and nuns.55
Human Rights Watch (HRW), the international NGO, published a biting report

53 Krakauer, "Why Is Nepal Cracking Down on Tibetan Refugees?".
54 Niharika Mandhana, "As China Squeezes Nepal, Tibetan Escape Route Narrows,"
Time Magazine^July 17, 2012), http://world.time.com/2012/07/17/as-china-squeezesnepal-tibetan-escape-route-narrows/; Tibet Justice Center, "Tibet's Stateless Nationals:
Tibetan Refugees in Nepal". 74.
55 Andrew Buncome, "Violence in Nepal as Tibetans Protest Olympics," The
Independent (UK) (March 31, 2008),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/violence-in-nepal-as-tibetans-protestolympics-802732.html.
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meticulously documenting the systemic harassment of Tibetan refugees by the Nepali
police and judiciary, denouncing the:
“violations of human rights by the Nepali authorities, particularly the police,
against Tibetans involved in demonstrations in Kathmandu, Nepal. These include
unnecessary and excessive use o f force, arbitrary arrest, sexual assault o f women
during arrest, arbitrary and preventive detention, beatings in detention, unlawful
threats to deport Tibetans to China, and unnecessary restrictions on freedom of
movement in the Kathmandu Valley. Nepali authorities have also harassed
Tibetan and foreign journalists and Nepali, Tibetan, and foreign human rights
defenders.”56
Most international observers, like the HRW report, point the finger o f blame
directly to the immense Chinese political pressure on Nepal, and cite ample international
human rights norms and conventions on refugees to pressure the Nepalese authorities to
moderate the state behavior and allow peaceful protests by the Tibetans.57 More than five
years after the Beijing Olympics, the global attention to the Tibetan cause has receded
from the headlines, but the intermittent international media stories on anti-China protests
by Tibetan exiles in Nepal and the attendant opprobrium meted to the Nepalese state
beholden to Beijing’s diktat continues.58
Such evidence primarily begs the question regarding Nepal's international treaty
obligations and adherence to the customary laws concerning the political rights of
refugees, especially since Nepalese policies were deemed sufficiently democratic and
supportive before 1989. Existing Nepalese domestic law is silent or ambiguous as it
portends directly to the rights o f refugees although the constitution guarantees basic
rights to all “persons” not just to citizens, with certain caveats. In terms o f international
law and regimes, although Nepal has neither ratified the 1951 Convention on the Status
of Refugees nor the related 1967 Protocol, as a member o f the United Nations, Nepal
adheres to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and it also signed the
56 Human Rights Watch, Appeasing China: Restricting the Rights o f Tibetans in Nepal
(New York: Human Rights Watch, July 2008), 4.
57 Ibid., 8-9.
58 Edward Wong, "China Makes Inroads in Nepal, and Stanches Tibetan Influx," The
New York Times(April 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.eom/2013/04/14/world/asia/chinamakes-inroads-in-nepal-stemming-tibetan-presence.html.
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International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1991. While international
law provides for lawful restriction o f the freedom of expression under certain strict
condition, application o f suitable international law that Nepal is party to leads one
observer to conclude that the government o f Nepal's restriction on Tibetan freedom of
expression violates the customary application o f "three-part test," viz. the principles of
predictability and transparency, the principle o f legitimacy, and the principles of
necessity and proportionality.59
Single-issue Tibetan advocacy organizations have meticulously documented the
increasing suppression, violence, and restriction o f Tibetans’ rights o f expression and
assembly, as well as cases of unambiguously illegal refoulements by the Nepalese
authorities in the last two decades. Verification o f such activities has also come from
independent international human rights organizations and NGOs, which have periodically
documented such human rights abuses and faulted the Nepalese state for flouting
democratic process and the rights o f Tibetans to assembly, movement and peaceful
protests.60 The international media, the rights organizations that work on issues o f human
rights, as well as the Tibetan advocacy groups have all made their verdict clear: there is
evidence o f increase in Nepal's suppression o f Tibetan activism including the unlawful
restriction o f their freedom of expression, all of which is against the letter and the spirit
o f international law and norms.
The most relevant question is why the Nepalese state in the last twenty-five years
seen is fit to change its policies towards more suppression of the rights o f Tibetan
refugees’ rights. Contrary to the received wisdom, Nepali leaders from across the
political spectrum as well as the bureaucrats and policymakers in foreign affairs have
been remarkably consistent in their reasoning, which can be summed into a neat threepoint argument as formulated by the Nepalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: PRC is

59 Barun Ghimire, "Lawful Limitation or Northern Influence? Restricting the Freedom of
Expression of Tibetan Refugees in Nepal" (master's thesis, University o f Tromso,
Norway, 2013).
60 See, inter alia, Human Rights Watch, Appeasing China', International Campaign for
Tibet, "Dangerous Crossing: Conditions Impacting the Flight of Tibetan Refguees"; Tibet
Justice Center, "Tibet's Stateless Nationals: Tibetan Refugees in Nepal".

90

Nepal’s most loyal and historical friend; Nepal assiduously supports one-China policy;
hence, Nepal won’t allow any anti-China activities within its borders.61 As described
above, all leaders from the volatile and unstable rotation o f political parties and
policymakers in Kathmandu have used this exact three-part rationale to explain Nepal’s
policy on Tibetan refugees since 1989.
However, this chapter has posited that Nepalese policymakers were able to so
clearly and comprehensively align their interests with the Chinese position because the
third actor in the tripartite relationship, India, became effectively indifferent on this
crucial issue. Thus, it may be instructive to review the evidence of India’s own evolving
policies regarding the Tibetan refugees, which seems to inform quite nicely how Nepal
has handled the issue. Based on the analysis I argue that the reason why Nepal changed
its formal recognition of Tibetan refugees in 1989 to begin to increasingly toe the harsh
and demanding Chinese line on the matter is the removal o f Indian wedging opportunity
on this issue. Since India itself was not going to make Tibet or the rights o f Tibetans a
major issue o f contention in the developing Sino-Indian relationship, Nepal was quite
secure in its policy o f aligning its interests to the specific policy position o f the northern
rival. Nepal’s wedge had been blunted so that it could accrue benefits by following the
wishes o f only China due to the utter detachment o f India.

Mirroring India’s Tibetan Policy
In order to understand Indian interests on the issue o f Tibet and Tibetans, it might
be instructive to review the evidence of the status and treatment o f Tibetans in India.
When Dalai Lama escaped Tibet in 1959, he sought political protection and asylum for
him and his followers in India. The political reception and support the early refugees
received from India was noteworthy. Although, India hadn’t signed on to the 1951
Convention on the Status o f Refugees, that first wave o f Tibetan refugees arriving in
India were given formal asylum as well as material aid in the form o f land and money.
They were also provided with an identification document, called the Registration Card
(RC), which allowed the refugees a host of rights and privileges facilitating education,
61 Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Government of Nepal, "Nepal - People's Republic of
China, Bilateral Relations".
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travel and other activities. However, subsequent waves o f Tibetans arriving after the
1970s found the environment much challenging in India. In 1963, India stopped
recognizing new arriving Tibetans as refugees and by the 1970s, they found it much
harder to receive the identification and protection o f the Registration Card (RC) leaving
them vulnerable to legal protections and drying up of economic and other opportunities.62
It has been argued that India’s abstention from the 1951 Convention on the Status
of Refugees and the related 1967 Protocol on Refugees allows lack o f Indian
accountability regarding the proper and similar treatment of continuing Tibetan refugees
arriving in India. As such, due to the lack o f any international or regional legal
framework, Indian domestic law and its definition of foreigners are used as the legal basis
o f new policy.
However, one might ask, why has there been such a change in India’s policy
regarding Tibetan refugees between those arriving before 1970s with those that arrived
since then? The answer is surely changing national interests regarding the issue o f Tibet
itself and the evolution of the India-China relationship. Domestic leadership changes
replacing the old-guard freedom fighters to the newer generation o f Indian leaders with a
new sensibility about China’s claims on Tibet is surely part o f the answer. That amalgam
of domestic political change and evolving interests regarding China would explain why
India modified its explicit policy on Tibetans. Since the 1990s, Tibetan refugees in India
have found it much harder to engage in many political activities regarding Tibet and
China. They have been harshly barred or discouraged from their rights o f assembly and
protest on many occasions, for example, during the visit of Chinese Prime Minister Li
Peng in 1991, in the months before the Beijing Olympics, and later during the visit o f
Wen Jiabao in 2010.63 The India state used strict police action as well as severe warnings
against any such political activities repeatedly. It would be impossible to imagine any
such qualms against anti-China protests during Nehru’s heyday, when Indians joined

62 Claudia Artiles, "Tibetan Refugees' Rights and Services in India," Human Rights &
Human Welfare Working Papers(20l I),
http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/minority/Tibetan.pdf.
63 Ibid., p. 5.
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Tibetans in staging protests when Zhou En-Lai in 1956 and 1957; o f course, Nehru gave
asylum to the Dalai Lama against the fervent wishes of the Chinese.64
This review o f India’s evolving policies and interests regarding the status and
treatment o f Tibetan refugees sheds light on similar evolution o f policy and practice by
Nepal on the same issue. Nepal also went from welcoming the Tibetans in the early years
and allowing them legal rights and opportunities, to the current state where they are
merely tolerated and ordered to not make any trouble in deference to sensitive political
calculations. Yet, compared to India, as a small wedge state, Nepal’s interests and
preferences are undoubtedly impacted by additional considerations. Chief among such
concerns is the fact that Nepal relies much more heavily on international economic aid
from Western governments and multilateral organizations, which are keen to see proper
treatment o f Tibetan refugees. Also, Nepal’s shared and porous border with Tibet as well
as the historical and traditional interaction o f the peoples on two sides plays into
Nepalese policy formulation. However, the most significant concern on Nepalese policy
making is Chinese diplomatic pressure and opportunities o f gains from heeding such
pressure, in the crucial context that India’s countervailing interests is waning on this
particular issue.

Chinese Promises and Pressures
Most analysts and observers attribute Chinese pressures on Nepal as the most
crucial factor determining the choice o f policy on Tibetan refugees by the Nepalese state.
This chapter has argued that, while Chinese influence is undeniable, we must also look at
Nepal’s own interests as defined by Nepalese policymakers across the political spectrum
to complicate the issue o f first causes. The fact remains that over the last twenty-five
years Nepal’s policy regarding the treatment o f Tibetan refugees within its borders has
changed from before. And only one o f the important facets of explanation comes from
looking at Chinese pressures and promises. This section briefly reviews the growing
Chinese influence along with the evidentiary instances of direct Chinese pressures, and
traces the reasoning of Beijing’s current stance.

64 Garver, Protracted Contest, 53-54.
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It is no secret why Nepal has increasingly begun to apply stiffer suppression for
Tibetans legally settled on its soil for not just their political beliefs but even, in some
occasions, for their religious and cultural practices. The preservation o f Nepal’s friendly
relations with China and the positive and negative costs o f seeming to cause offence to
the northern power is the overriding consideration of Nepal’s recent behavior.
International press and media have been frequent and adamant in their finger pointing
towards China for putting the noose on Tibetan activism by pressuring the instable and
pliant leadership in Nepal.
China, for its part, has not been all that coy about its specific demands on the
stamping out of the Tibetan activism in Nepal. China has repeatedly and openly called on
Nepal to follow the 1960 Nepal-China Treaty o f Friendship to the letter, so as to not
allow any anti-China political activities in Nepali soil. Also, China routinely refers to
Nepal’s utmost adherence o f the one-China policy, which says that both Tibet and
Taiwan are inalienable territorial parts of China. When there are any Tibetan protest
activities in Kathmandu, swift diplomatic pressure from the Chinese embassy has been
noted. Furthermore, it is alleged that Nepal changed its policy o f granting “refugee”
status and asylum to the Tibetans in 1989 because China impressed upon the fact that
there were no human rights abuses in Tibet, which means the exiles cannot be deemed to
be fleeing any sort of persecution. Thus, Nepal has since referred to newly arrived
Tibetans as “persons of concern” and allowed UNHCR, the UN agency for refugees,
minimal role in ensuring their safe passage onto India for long-term settlement. Due to
such Chinese demands, Nepal has begun to subdue the more than 20,000 legally settled
Tibetans, those who arrived before 1989 and their progeny, who had been formally given
rights of resettlement.
The most blatant public show o f Chinese diplomatic pressure on Nepalese
authorities occurred during the period o f Olympic protests, probably due to the
heightened sensitivity regarding the historical event. The then Chinese ambassador to
Nepal, Zhang Xiangling seemed to break diplomatic protocol when he organized a press
conference to vehemently denounce “anti-China” activities carried on by the “anarchists”
in Nepal, and called on the Nepalese government to use maximum force to silence them,
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including not releasing protestors who weren’t formally charged, which is contrary to the
Nepalese law.65 Furthermore, the senior-most bureaucrat o f the Home Ministry during the
period later admitted to a researcher that he accompanied the Chinese ambassador to the
Everest base camp in a helicopter to sufficiently convince the ambassador o f adequate
security preparation.66 However, despite the heavy-handed perception o f Ambassador
Xiangling’s behavior, it has to be reiterated the acute instability in Nepal during that
specific period as well as the fact that Nepalese authorities actually released most Tibetan
protestors very quickly, which adhered to Nepalese law.
The larger Chinese position on the Tibetan exiles in Nepal has not mellowed but
only toughened. The Nepalese policy also seems to be settling on the pattern of dictated
by its adherence to the three-part formulation of loyal friendship with China, commitment
to one-China policy, and no anti-China policy within Nepal. Thus, the report by Human
Right Watch finds a remarkable consistency in Chinese concerns and Nepalese response:
“In May 2005, then Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala assured visiting Chinese
Premier Zhu Rongji that no anti-China activities would take place in Nepal. In
April 2002, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba stated the same. In 2005 the
King o f Nepal, who had then assumed all executive powers, said during a meeting
with China’s Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing that he, too, would not allow antiChina activities in Nepal. In November 2006, Prime Minister Girija Prasad
Koirala, representing the Seven Party Alliance, affirmed that there would be no
anti-China activities permitted in Nepal.”67
This analysis clearly shows not only the consistency o f Chinese demands but also
the across-the-political-spectrum consistency o f Nepalese response based on the threepart formulation deployed by the Nepalese policymakers. We now analyze the presented
evidence to ascertain if Nepal’s prospects for wedging behavior on this issue.

65 Human Rights Watch, Appeasing China, 29-30, 53-56; Ujjwal Prajapati, "Influence of
Foreign Policy on Nepalese Press : A Case Study on Coverage o f Tibetan Protest in
Nepal" (master's thesis, University o f Oslo, Norway, 2011), 10.
66 "Influence of Foreign Policy on Nepalese Press," 17.
67 Human Rights Watch, Appeasing China, 53, citation # 123.
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ANALYSIS: NEPAL’S WEDGE PROSPECTS?
The evidence outlined above o f Nepal’s evolving policy on Tibetan exiles, within
the historical context of its tripartite interaction with India and China, provides ample
material for abstract analysis on the specific questions raised in the literature review
chapter on small wedge states. What does the evidence o f Nepal’s changed policies
regarding the treatment of Tibetan refugees in the last five decades, especially since the
late 1980s, suggest? And how do we evaluate Nepal’s position as a wedge state and the
possibility o f higher material gains based on the observed change in policies and events?
To restate, the pertinent theoretical questions inquired is the possibility that small
weak states may enhance their gains from concurrent interactions with two rival powers;
and, if so, what factors would impact a wedge state’s ability to maximize the level of
material gains (as proxy for strategic autonomy) from such policy interactions. In the
research design chapter, it was postulated that given suitable conditions of tripartite
interactions between the wedge state and two rival powers, many internal and external
factors could impact the level o f possible material gains for the wedge state. For the
scope o f this research, three independent variables (IVs) were identified for analysis: the
domestic political system in the wedge state, whether it is a democracy or dictatorship;
the level o f interdependence or globalization in the system; and the level o f its trade
dependence with either of the two rival powers. The hypothesized relationship between
these IVs and the wedge states’ level o f material gains from tripartite interactions was the
core o f the evidentiary analysis in this chapter.
The first hypothesis (H I) says that democracy in the wedge state is more
conducive than dictatorship to realize higher gains from possible wedging opportunities.
Per the review o f the evolving history o f Nepalese policies and tripartite interaction
presented above, the succinct answer is that Nepal’s major shift in its policy towards
greater suppression of Tibetan activism began in the late 1980s and has progressed since,
which coincides with a period o f the advent o f democratic system in Nepal. From 1959 to
1990, Nepal was a single-party autocracy ruled by the supreme leadership of the
monarch. King Mahendra, who ruled from 1955 to 1973 initiated an avowed policy of
“playing the China-card” to demand respect and concession from India in myriad
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political and economic concerns. Yet, when it comes to Tibetan refugees, it was under
King Mahendra’a autocratic rule that they began crossing into Nepal to eventually settle
in various camps around the country. The then King even found it easy to provide overt
and tacit support to the early settlement process; there is evidence o f him attending public
functions organized by the Tibetan exiled communities, such as the inauguration o f the
first Tibetan handicrafts showroom in 1961.68 It was in those early decades that the
various international organizations—the Swiss Red Cross, UNHCR, and USAID—were
allowed freedom to cater to the basic survival needs and long-term economic livelihood
plans of the settled refugees.
Similar benign supportive approach continued unabated during the autocratic rule
o f King Birendra when he was enthroned in 1972. In the late 1980s, owing to a growing
Indian impatience regarding Nepalese internal politics led to a critical diplomatic and
trade tussle with India as recounted above. One element of friction was a newly signed
treaty with China regarding revised Tibetan policy, which was just one o f the many
particulars o f Nepalese desire to ingratiate itself more to Beijing. Thus, King Birendra
followed his father’s example to attempt to play the China card; the difference being this
instance produced disastrous results when in 1990 a wave o f democratic protests with
tacit support by India led to the loosening o f the absolute monarchical control of the
political system.
The adoption in 1989 o f a more repressive policy towards new Tibetans arriving
in Nepal could be seen as an autocratic monarch trying to oblige the demands of one of
its patrons. However, the supposed democrats, representing political parties from across
the ideological spectrum, who came into leadership positions of control beginning in
1990, have all followed the repressive policies adopted in 1989. It is curious to note that
of all the ostensibly democratic political parties that have rotated into central power in
Kathmandu, none have veered even minutely from the policy o f increasing suppression
and control o f Tibetan refugees in acceding to the Chinese preferences and demands.
Actually, the trend as reported earlier is o f greater restriction and adherence to Beijing’s
wishes in the last two decades of democratic political system in Nepal. While it is true
68 Frechette, Tibetans in Nepal, 41.
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that during this period, Nepal has been constantly gripped by extreme instability and
volatility, the bedrock foreign policy positions o f the political parties have acknowledged
“one-China” policy and the need to preserve the sanctity o f Nepal’s friendship with
China. O f course, left unstated is the fact that India’s massive influence and interference
is always a given. So clearly, democracy by itself has not produced the observed changes
in Nepal’s policy on Tibetan refugees. In this issue of strategic significance for the
weaker state, indeed, external pressure seems to have been more crucial.
Impact o f globalization on Nepal’s wedging prospects constitutes the second
hypothesis (H2). As the evidence suggests, various foreign governments, beside the two
rival powers have tried to influence Nepal’s behavior on the matter of Tibetan refugees.
At many instances, the US government and European states have conditioned
development aid contingent on better treatment o f Tibetans and a pledge to not expel
them. However, the globalization impact also shows the impact o f growing economic and
political interdependence between China, one o f the rival powers, and the Western states,
so that those pressures and influences on Tibetan rights and freedoms have slowly
eroded. Thus, globalization in this aspect has strengthened Chinese position. Also, the
activism and support o f the transnational non-state actors has helped the material and
social well being o f the Tibetan refugees living in Nepal and India. However, their
political influence, although not completely spent, has eroded in the last few decades.
The crucial effect of globalization, as the analysis of the growing Indian
indifference to the issue o f Tibet and Tibetans shows, may have been in changing of
Indian strategic view regarding India-China relationship at the expense o f Tibetan
position. As the analysis shows, as India became greatly bound with China on economic
interdependence, the thom on the side o f Tibetans has slowly been removed. The ultimate
factor of Indian indifference to the issue, has guided the proximate position of Nepal in
favoring Chinese demands on the treatment o f Tibetan exiles in its soil.
The third independent variable (IV) that might explain the possibility and level of
the wedge state’s material gains is its level of trade dependence to its two rival powers.
The hypothesis (H3) says that material gains from an issue o f tripartite interaction moves
in the same direction as the level o f trade dependence. In Nepal’s case, its trade with
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China has skyrocketed since the 1990s and especially in the second half o f the 2000s.69 It
could not be mere coincidence that Chinese demands have begun hardening during that
period; however, the policy of on the Tibetan refugees was adopted a long time before
Nepal became trade dependent with China. By signing the bilateral treaty with Nepal in
August 1955, China had started providing economic aid and capital investments to Nepal
in hopes o f keeping the door ajar on future political influence and the possibility of
puncturing the sphere o f Indian dominance. But the volume o f trade in manufactured
goods spiked significantly only by the late 1990s to coincide with China’s growing
manufacturing prowess as well as the liberalization o f economic policies in Nepal. Yet,
Nepal is too small a market for China’s productive industries although Chinese dry goods
flood Nepalese markets. Along with rising volume of imports, Chinese government has
been quite willing to provide large capital grants and aid to facilitate Nepal’s
development projects and budgetary needs becoming, in the past two decade, a major
donor to compete with India, Japan, the Western states and various aid organizations.
The extreme caution regarding China’s sensitivities and acquiescence to Chinese
demands by all political elites in Nepal in the last couple o f decades could not simply be
mere coincidence. So the effect o f trade dependence on Nepal’s strategic autonomy, and
hence the level of its material gains, from its wedging strategies has to be measured
against the total trade value that Nepal gains from all external sources. In concrete
numerical terms, the ever-rising value and proportion of Chinese aid and trade in that
period makes any deviation from their demands demonstrably costly. Yet, Nepal’s trade
dependence on China is not supreme, given that more than thrice the trade volume is
exchanged between Nepal and India.70 The default mental paradigm o f Nepalese
leadership class, who place Beijing as a probable countervailing force to New Delhi’s
overwhelming influence, must also play a part.

69 Trade and Export Promotion Center; Ministry o f Commerce and Supplies; Government
o f Nepal, "Trade Statistics: Nepal's Trade with China P.R.,"
http://www.tepc.gov.np/tradestatistics/gl-25-trade-with-china.php.
70 "Compare Countries of Multiple Year for Export & Import,"
http://www.efourcore.com.np/tepcdatabank/compareexportimport.php?txtmode=search.
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To summarize, in the context o f the historical regional entanglements, Nepal’s
evolving pattern of policies on Tibetan refugees within its borders shows that the current
status quo of not expelling them but restricting their rights o f political activities and
expression, especially anything that could be construed as “anti-China,” is Nepal’s best
choice, especially in consideration of purely material, economic concerns. Frechette
argues that upon the contending pressures from the China and various intergovernmental
organizations about the treatment o f Tibetan exiles within its soil, the Nepali state has
routinely relied on the “weapons of the weak,” including such tactics as “administrative
delays, false compliance, and feigned ignorance, to maintain state sovereignty in the
context of multilateral intervention.”71 O f course, moral, humanitarian and political
considerations do not seem to be critically operant factors guiding Nepalese decision
making and actual practice on this issue.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has set the historical and contemporary context o f the regional
rivalry between China and India, and analyzed the policy options and preferences
available to Nepal as it has been dealing with the long-term issue o f the Tibetan exiles.
Based on the presented evidence, I have argued that Nepal’s internal political formulation
o f its strategic interests, which involves calculation o f costs and material benefits, has
allowed it to align its policy with Chinese preferences when it comes to the activities o f
Tibetan exiles living in Nepal or passing through its territory. In this matter, Nepalese
leadership and policymakers have to respond to the pressures from various actors
including, India, the international community and the Tibetan exile community.
Ultimately, I have made the argument that the recent status quo policy o f increased
suppression of Tibetan exiles has provided the most utility to Nepal in the form of
material aid from all concerned actors, which I frame as increased “strategic autonomy”
for Nepal in this crucial strategic issue of interaction.
There could be two reasonable criticism regarding the evidence and conclusions
presented in this chapter. First, observers may find the mistreatment of Tibetan exiles by

71 Frechette, Tibetans in Nepal, 123.
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Nepal in the name o f material gains under unjustifiable Chinese pressure morally
objectionable, which is an ethical criticism. To that, I would have to assert that this is a
work of dispassionate social science research not a critical analysis o f the ethical or
normative content o f Nepal’s domestic or foreign policies. If the leadership o f Nepal
finds this course of policy as the most suitable for furthering the national interests o f their
nation, for the purposes o f this research the analysis uses their baseline as valid
expression of Nepal’s interests. Furthermore, it has to be highlighted that Nepal has not
resorted to wholesale expulsion or imprisonment o f Tibetan refugees, in contravention of
its own domestic laws.
The second criticism could come from an empirical or conceptual perspective,
which might sensibly question if the alignment o f Nepal’s policy preference with China’s
does not prove subservience or coercion instead of strategic autonomy. While the
evidence shows minor instances o f Chinese strident demands, even during the periods o f
extreme instability and volatility, Nepalese authorities have been able to uphold domestic
laws and norms in regards to the treatment o f Tibetan refugees. Moreover, it can be
argued alignment of policy choices between Nepal and China may be a necessary but not
a sufficient condition to show Chinese coercion or Nepalese subservience. If Nepal were
following the maximalist Chinese position o f total repatriation of Tibetans, or if there
were no issues o f disagreement to Chinese wishes, or if Nepal were following Chinese
positions which were contrary to Nepal’s own interests, only such conditions would be
sufficient to establish total coercion or subservience by Nepal. As it is, the above analysis
shows considerable influence and interactive effects o f India, and the Western states in
addition to China, when it comes to the full picture of Nepal’s strategic policymaking.
Finally, the major implication o f the argument presented in this chapter is that the
criticism o f lack o f autonomy in the part o f Nepal is wrong because it ascribes all agency,
and the appropriate culpability, to China. If there are moral, ethical or legal objections to
the Nepalese treatment of Tibetan refugees, we might not blame China. We have to point
the finger o f blame strictly at the Nepalese authorities and leadership as well as Indian
indifference because both have chosen these policy directions based on their calculations
of their respective national interests.
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CHAPTER V

C O M PETITIV E H Y D R O PO W E R IN V ESTM EN TS IN N EPA L

THE PROMISE OF NEPAL’S WATER
In 1990, the banned political parties o f Nepal were able to end three-decades long
monarchic autocracy to usher in constitutional monarchy. Coming to power on the heels
o f surging popular demands for democracy and economic development, the new political
leaders promised to unleash Nepal’s vast natural potential to build the country into
another Singapore or harkening to the similarity of its snow-capped mountainous terrain,
the Switzerland of Asia. Their claims were indeed ambitious and reflected to a certain
extent the zeal of the revolutionary moment and the combustible bursting forth of a
famously poor people’s long-held desire for social and economic wellbeing. In the
subsequent decades, those initial hyperbolic promises have either been neglected in the
mire o f transitional politics or only remembered as a cynical joke, almost a pipedream.
Yet, the dream of developmental riches flowing from the bountiful natural resources of
Nepal has a long provenance. It is based on the sliver of possibility that the country’s
immense hydropower potential could indeed be harnessed for large-scale hydroelectric
production, which if realized could add to the national coffers through domestic
productive use as well as lucrative foreign exports.
The previous chapter analyzed the context o f the Sino-Indian interaction on the
political issue of Tibet, the fate o f Tibetan refugees and the resulting effect on Nepal’s
policy autonomy on that issue. Given the regional context of Chinese and Indian
economic rivalry and their contesting regional interests, the possibility that their
competitive geo-economic strategy might have the effect o f benefiting Nepal’s
hydropower quest is all the more tantalizing. In this chapter, I examine the economic
interaction between the two regional powers and specifically question the possibility of
economic gains for Nepal in its hydropower sector. Like in other issue-areas of tripartite
interaction, in the economic realm Nepal’s wedge state status might allow it to benefit
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from higher gains in the form of larger capital investments particularly in foreign direct
investments in hydropower projects with export potential. Analyzing the evolving policy
climate in Nepal towards economic liberalization coupled with the pattern o f competitive
action-reaction chains of Chinese and Indian role in economic aid and capital investments
highlight the extent of Nepal’s wedging aspirations.
As the subsequent analysis will show, Nepal is not bandwagoning with either
major player, but inasmuch as Nepal suffers for underdevelopment and lack of financial
capital, the flow of capital from both India and China in the hydropower sector of Nepal
shows that it is accruing positive material gains. While the evidence for explicit wedging
is presently inconclusive, the evidence presented below finds that the situation is ripe for
Nepal to be able to leverage enhanced gains in the economic realm generally and
specifically in the sector of hydropower development. As for the three test variables,
domestic political system is not directly linked to wedging gains; globalization indirectly
affects Nepalese gains through Chinese and Indian global investment strategies; and trade
dependence is important in that China might acquiesce to higher investment levels to
offset growing trade imbalance.
The premise o f Nepal’s hydropower potential and the proper value o f its vast
water resources can easily be lost in utopian rhetoric of economic transformation, in what
observers have called political “propaganda” 1or “myths.”2 However, the facts regarding
the country’s hydropower production potential and the possible economic value have
now been well established. In 1966, a Nepali researcher conducting his graduate research
estimated that the country possessed a theoretical possibility o f producing 83,000 MW of
electricity.3 Although that mythical figure has been repeated ad infinitum, subsequent
analysis of commercially and technically feasible projects revised the achievable capacity
1 Dipak Gyawali, Water in Nepal: An Interdisciplinary Look at Resource Uncertainties,
Evolving Problems, and Future Prospects (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center,
Environment and Policy Institute, 1989), 99.
2 Prem Jung Thapa, "Water-Led Development in Nepal: Myths, Limitations and Rational
Concerns," Water Nepal 5, no. 1 (1997).
3 Reported from the Russian text o f the graduate thesis by HM Shrestha, "Cadastre of
Potential Water Power Resources of Less Studied High Mountainous Regions, with
Speical Reference to Nepal," Moscow Power Institute, USSR, Moscow (1966).
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to about 43,000 MW, which is the current widely accepted figure.4 To comprehend the
immensity o f such capacity, it is instructive to know that the total installed hydroelectric
capacity o f India, which is 22 times larger geographically and about 40 times larger in
population than Nepal, is only about 40,000MW.5 As of 2013, the actual current total
supply o f electricity in Nepal stands at only 720 MW, of which only 607 MW is
domestically produced hydroelectricity, against a peak demand o f 1090 MW.6 In the
pithy words o f one analyst, current domestic supply o f electricity is “insufficient,
unreliable and expensive.”7 No wonder Nepali politicians and policy-makers see the
development of large-scale hydro-eclectic projects as the magic bullet to raise Nepalese
living standards on its path to a developed economy. In other words, what oil had done
for some Middle-eastern economies, hydropower could do for Nepal.
The manifold excuses for the absence of such dramatic economic gains from
hydropower include limitations o f technical knowledge, political instability, uninviting
and unpredictable regulatory environment, and political and policy malfeasance. Above
all else, the most important reason hindering Nepal’s hydropower development is lack o f
adequate capital. Major hydropower projects require major upfront costs for construction
of large dams; the purchase o f turbines and machinery; and construction of capitalintensive infrastructure such as roads and tunnels. For one o f the poorest economies of
the world, the lack o f capital for investment has hindered the development o f its most
prized asset. Since domestic capital stock is sorely inadequate, in last several decades
foreign aid agencies and donor governments have stepped in to provide much needed
capital. Since the 1970s, international financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB)

4 Government of Nepal Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, "National Water Plan
- Nepal," (September 2005), http://www.moen.gov.np/pdf_files/national_waterjplan.pdf.
5 1 mega watt (MW) = 1000 kilo watt (kW); Population, size and hydroelectric capacity
data courtesy of: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "The World Factbook," (n.d.),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/guidetowfbook.html.
6 Nepal Electricity Authority, "Annual Report of Nepal Electricity Authority - Fiscal
Year 2012/2013," (2013), http://www.nea.org.np/images/supportive_docs/A-Year-inReview-FY-2012-13.pdf.
7 Madeline Bergner, "Developing Nepal’s Hydroelectric Resources: Policy Alternatives,"
(2013), http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/researchpdfs/Developing_Nepals_Hydroelectric_Resources_-_Policy_Altematives.pdf.
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and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have been one o f the primary sources o f capital
in Nepal’s embryonic hydropower field, while donor governments such as Japan, Norway
and Germany have also provided aid to the Nepal government to develop some projects.8
Their efforts and aid have been necessary to develop the majority of the current
hydropower plants in operation.
India, Nepal’s near neighbor, has been by far the largest player in providing and
offering to provide extensive capital stock to develop major hydropower projects.
Similarly, Nepalese politicians pin their hopes on the economic might and largesse o f the
other neighbor China were they able to lure that country into becoming a major investor.
One o f the geographic determinants o f Nepal’s position is the boundary shaping
Himalayas, the source o f its water resources. This geographic fact directly informs
Nepal’s social and political discourse and practice because the national mantra has been
the goal o f turning the economic potential o f Himalayan hydropower into reality. In its
interaction with the neighbors India and China, the matter o f responsibly and sustainably
developing Nepal’s water resources are always front and center, and in the last three
decades the main objective guiding the policy debate in this arena has been to attract
foreign capital to develop hydropower projects. Thus, while developmental aid from
multilateral institutions has been utilized for many existing projects, the state is
increasingly looking to other sources o f public and private capital, especially from the
two large neighboring countries to enhance funding opportunities. As the government and
private sector of China and India become more capital-abundant, they also look to
projects that serve their economic interests in Nepal.
There is more than pure economic rationale for most o f the larger proposed
hydropower projects in Nepal. Political consideration o f all three actors plays an equally
important factor in determining if certain projects get funding and get to the building
stages or completed. The problem is one o f coordination in that Nepal would like the
maximum number of projects developed, which requires varied sources o f foreign

8 Government o f Nepal Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, Energy Sector
Synopsis Report, (Kathmandu, NepalJuly 2010),
http://www.wecs.gov.np/pdf7snyopsis.pdf. 53.
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capital. Furthermore, the problem is also o f distributive gains in that Nepal needs to be
able to obtain the highest negotiated rates for exports of the produced electricity from
multiple large-scale projects. But neither India nor China (or any other foreign investor)
can invest ad infinitum because the number of commercially and technically viable
projects is limited so that one’s profit-motivated investment in a project necessarily
means lesser options for another. India’s investment limits China’s choices and viceversa, if both are interested in the finite number of projects that Nepal wants to develop.
Thus, we can analyze if Nepal has been or is able to leverage its wedge potential in
attracting major investments and negotiating economically beneficial terms.
Furthermore, local, domestic and regional politics frequently intervene in
economic and investment matters. When it comes to the larger issue o f utilizing water
resources various related issues are o f salience: scarcity o f arable land which might be
used up in large-scale projects; the issues o f flood control both in Nepal as well as the
northern Indian plains; utilization o f excess water for irrigation, especially in the dry
seasons; concerns about sustainable development and environmental degradation; and
quite importantly, India’s desire for energy security so it can be the major beneficiary of
this important resource stemming directly from its sphere o f influence. We can group
these concerns into issues of geopolitics o f energy security, commercial and economic
interests, and social or ecological concerns, each o f which is duly analyzed below. The
fundamental question guiding the analysis is whether the pattern of regional economic
and strategic competition between India and China provides Nepal with better negotiating
position and economic gains in seeking capital investments in its hydropower sector.
The rest o f this chapter will proceed as follows: the first section delineates the
economic and political interests of the three actors, Nepal, India and China, regarding the
issue o f hydropower sector development in Nepal; the second section reviews the context
of hydropower sector in Nepal, including the technical and economic concerns, evolution
of the hydropower policy and regulatory framework towards liberalization, and regional
concerns o f sustainable water resources utilization; the third section analyzes the
evidence o f Indian and Chinese economic roles in Nepal, highlighting the action-reaction
patterns in the economic aid and investments, specifically highlighting major hydropower
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projects taken up by each country; the fourth section analyzes the evidence to find
patterns of economic competition resulting in gains for Nepal; and the fifth section gives
concluding remarks.
SPECIFICATION OF INTERESTS
To reiterate, as used in this research wedge states are defined as those small states
that are characterized by their equal affinity with two major competitive or rival powers.
One implication of the wedge state model is that, under favorable conditions o f peace and
issue-sensitivity, the wedge state would be able to accrue economic and other gains due
to the competitive desire of rival major powers for influence. When we consider the
hydropower sector, this theoretical discussion leads us to ask a few relevant questions. In
the case of Nepal as a wedge state between China and India, we may inquire if Nepal’s
hydropower investments receive more benefits due to the interests of China and India to
achieve greater influence over Nepal. In order to analyze that question, we may delineate
the theoretical interests o f each o f the three states and then review the evidentiary patterns
of the evolving interaction in the case o f hydropower investments in Nepal. I proceed by
highlighting the interests of China, India and that o f Nepal.

Chinese Interests
In the issue o f capital investments in major hydropower projects in Nepal, a few
interests may be anticipated for the first major power China. Being a capital rich country
with a reportedly massive stock o f capital, China might be expected to look for promising
investment projects in Nepal. Firstly, China ought to see investment in Nepal’s
hydropower sector as a geostrategic choice. In the last six decades since establishing
formal ties with Nepal, the Chinese Communist Party has maintained a close political and
economic relationship with Nepal. China has showed its commitment to the friendship by
giving aid to build various factories, roads and bridges and other infrastructure projects.
The main reason for such generous aid is to maintain friendly relations with Nepal
but also to remain on par or higher with other donors of such aid, including the U.S.,
U.K., and international financial institutions. But principally China’s ambition surely is to
remain close to India and thwart attempts to solidify a preeminent position in Nepal. So
even as a matter of its competitive influence against that of India, the Chinese might want
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to invest in the projects that Nepal critically needs. Secondly, in addition to large aid
amount, China has invested in profitable ventures in all parts o f the world from Africa to
South America, and in other countries in South Asia. Relatedly, Chinese banks and
construction companies have the necessary expertise in constructing and financing huge
dams and other large-scale infrastructure projects. Those firms may indeed look to
diversify beyond their home markets into Nepal, especially if the Chinese state would
sufficiently nudge them in that direction for geostrategic reasons.
Nonetheless, one may ask why China would find the investments in the
hydropower projects o f Nepal attractive. These projects are costlier than many other
forms o f direct aid. Crucially, China is unable to benefit directly from the subsequent
production o f electricity because o f the geographical and technical challenges of
transmission of Nepali electricity North into Tibet. China is not the market for Nepalese
hydroelectricity that India would so naturally become. Despite this crucial limitation of
actual inability of use, China would be theorized to have the other proximate interests of
geopolitics and maintenance of friendly relations as reasons for investing in Nepal's
hydropower sector.

Indian Interests
India, on the other hand, can derive actual and direct benefits from investing in
and developing Nepal's hydropower projects. Unlike China, which may only see
tangential geopolitical gains, India is interested in supplying electricity to its vast
demand, while building dams in the shared rivers of Nepal could directly benefit India as
a means of controlling regular floods in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh states o f North India.
Additionally, as the lower riparian the utilization of water resources development projects
provides India with a source of irrigation during the dry seasons. Therefore, Indian
interests are primarily based on direct quantifiable gains.
However, geo-strategic concerns are not far behind. India has always been
hesitant to allow other foreign investments in Nepalese infrastructure, especially Chinese
investments in what it considers sensitive infrastructure developments such as roads or
bridges. As the only market for excess Nepalese electricity, India must surely be
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interested in developing the hydroelectric projects rather than allowing Chinese or other
third national investments on such critical projects. Thus, as its proximate sphere of
influence, Indian interests should be in partnering with Nepal to invest and develop
mutually beneficial hydropower projects.
Apart from the Indian central government, regional state governments as well as
business lobbies should be expected to have high interest in developing Nepalese
hydropower projects and also being concerned about how or who are allowed to invest in
that sector. As the primary market for the exported electricity, Indian interests genuinely
encompass the core issues of costs and pricing o f produced electricity, which should
further motivate India to be willing to partner with Nepal in investing in the projects from
the start. As for the business interests, the Nepalese electrical and construction markets
should prove attractive to Indian banking, construction and power companies, be they
private or governmental.

Nepalese Interests
As a capital scarce small state, Nepal's interest in attracting foreign capital to
develop its natural water resources is straightforward. The proximate motivation is of
course fulfilling skyrocketing domestic demand of electricity for consumption and
productivity. Nepalese policymakers and politicians are well aware of the people's
demand for greater supply o f electricity to fulfill the need for household use. More
broadly, massive investment in hydro-projects is seen as a way to raise the living
standards of the Nepalese people if it were able to export excess electricity. The ultimate
interest, to reiterate, is to leverage hydro-fueled economic development.
Yet, within the Nepali state and society there are myriad interest groups that have
their own motivations and preferences in seeing the kind and type o f foreign investment
in the Nepali hydro sector. Theoretically, we can identify the following state and societal
level interests, which in amalgam work together or at cross purposes to hinder a simple
synthesis o f the Nepalese interests in the issue o f hydropower investment by foreign
governments or private companies.
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At the state level, Nepal in recent decades has been characterized foremost by
instability resulting in almost incoherent formulation of its national interests. Numerous
governments have been installed and removed on top o f radical changes on the very
nature of the state from one-party monarchy to multiparty constitutional monarchy on the
road via a civil war to a Republic. Yet, the Nepali state’s unwavering interest in
developing Nepal's water resources using foreign capital investments has remained intact.
Policies have changed from full nationalization to allowing private investments and
creating a business-friendly climate o f investment from before and private sector or in
public-private partnership models. It is the role of the state to seek and administer foreign
aid and to formulate investment related policies and the negotiations thereof. In that
context, Nepal has to look to both India and China in addition to the various donor
governments and agencies for capital and technical transfers. The exact formula for how
to succeed in such plans has been the exercise o f countless reiterative policy debates and
formulations. As part of the state, the hydropower bureaucracy oversees the construction
of projects and infrastructure, the generation and transmission o f electricity and its
subsequent distribution and possibility for export. The interests and roles off the
government bureaucracy is to continue being the controller of bespoke capital projects
and to maintain their central position in the hydropower related societal stakeholders.
At the societal level, we can observe the role of the political parties; civil society
groups including academics, technical experts, and activists; water and environment
related NGOs; the business and corporate groups engaged in the hydro sector; and lastly
the general population. For the political parties the question o f the fruitful utilization of
Nepal's water resources is not merely confined to the policy and technical details, but is
also about the highly contentious issues o f nationalism, ideology, financial and political
power regulation, and often serve as tools o f garnering general political support and
political capital. Each major and minor political party has an ideological stance on how or
if to attract foreign capital for hydro projects, from which sources, and at what cost to
nationalist sentiments. Ever since Nepal began welcoming foreign capital to develop its
water resources, there have been examples o f democratic governments falling due mainly
or in part to the political opposition wielding such slogans as "selling Nepal's rivers" or
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not doing enough to get the best investment deals on major past projects. Civil society
interest groups include academics and technical experts as well as activists and related
NGOs advocating local rights or environmental sustainability. These groups and
individuals spouse a wide range o f interests and preferences regarding the hydro sector
development and investments in Nepal. For example, technical experts disagree among
themselves and cautioned against large dams in favor of small, economically feasible
projects with the domestic capital for local electricity consumption. Academics and
activists highlight the needs o f the local population as well as preserving national
interests above the profit motives o f foreign investors. Many water related NGOs and
activists campaign in support of the local population who may have to bear the costs o f
large-scale infrastructure projects as well as the environmental impact o f such
construction in the fragile Himalayan ecosystem. The interests o f Nepali business houses,
construction companies and financial institutions center around the question o f granting
of licenses for individual projects, the regulations limiting or granting co-ventures, and
the requirement o f local partners for joint ventures.
When it comes to major infrastructure projects, the concerns and voices o f the
general population at large and the local concerned population might also be paramount.
Projects large and small have to address the demands and well-being o f the local
population that may be displaced due to dam construction or whose livelihoods, land and
the local flora and fauna may also be affected. The local population has also demanded an
equity share in the future companies that are built in their lands. Or they have demanded
work during the construction o f the projects in their region. All these groups press the
interests and cases to the political parties, the state and its bureaucracy to recognize their
concerns and to address them when formulating the policies that are the synthetic product
of the national interest of Nepal. The state has to be responsive to these local, parochial
and specific concerns while balancing the national need for more electricity supply to
people like under the yoke of daily blackouts o f up to sixteen hours. The aspiration of
economic development is also a nationwide dream widely shared by the public.
Two examples may serve to highlight the contending interests as discussed above
and their impact in the hydropower sector in Nepal. Indian involvement in the Mahakali
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river project in the early 1990s resulted in major political upheaval in Kathmandu,
causing subsequent government to fall due in part to the political protests generated by
nascent water resources development deals.9 Also, social and community mobilization
reflecting the influence o f civil-society interests groups caused many proposed
hydropower projects to be shelved, abandoned or delayed due to political and social
opposition creating a climate not favorable to development. The prime example o f such a
case is that o f the large-scale Arun III project during the mid-1990s, in which the World
Bank was forced to abandon the plan because o f widespread community activism, both
national and transnational, resulting in major political opposition.10
Channeling of Nepal's national interest when it comes to attracting foreign,
specially Indian and Chinese, capital investments is a delicate balance o f contending
interests from all sections o f state and society. However, the proposition o f Nepal as a
wedge state between competing rivals should suggest that it would try to gain maximum
benefits in this case o f hydropower development. In this context, one expects that Nepal
would try to negotiate the best possible hydropower deals to placate the various internal
interest groups but also to get the best possible package from India due to China's interest
and from China due to India's. To further analyze such interactive dynamics, I begin by
reviewing the larger context o f the hydropower sector in Nepal, highlighting the actual
potential as well as limitations—technical, economic, environmental and political
concerns—that directly inform the negotiation process o f hydropower development.
HYDROPOWER IN CONTEXT: POTENTIAL AND LIMITATIONS
As a landmass sitting on the lap o f the Himalayas, water is Nepal’s largest natural
resource. More than 6000 rivers, small and large, flow from the some of the tallest peaks
of the world through narrow gorges with enough force to be economically feasible to
build hydroelectric plants. There are four main river basins: Kamali, Mahakali, Gandaki,
and Koshi, all of which flow through Nepal to feed into the Ganges in northern India.
9 Dipak Gyawali and Ajaya Dixit, "Mahakali Impasse and Indo-Nepal Water Conflict,"
Economic and Political Weekly (1999).
10 Alfred Escher, "World Bank Withdraws from Arun III Project at Inspection Panel's
Recommendation," Human Rights B rief 3 (l)(¥all 1995),
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v3i l/wldbnk31.htm.
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While the economic impact o f a sufficiently developed hydropower sector could
hardly be overstated, the context o f Nepal’s hydropower sector suffers significant
technical, economic, social and political limitations domestically. In a regional frame, the
complex nature o f the water resources flowing through Nepal into India further
complicates matters geopolitically. We begin here to contextualize such domestic
complexities o f the sector as the first step before analyzing Nepal’s interaction with India
and China regarding hydropower investments in the subsequent section.

Hydropower Potential and Present Reality
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O f the technically feasible capacity o f 43,000 MW o f hydro-electricity, Nepal has
a current installed production o f about 750 MW, or about less 1.75% o f capacity." The
figure above represents the current and proposed major hydropower projects in Nepal.
The consequence of such miniscule utilization o f water resource is felt both in the loss of
economic productivity and social well being, much less the absence o f revenue from
large-scale exports. Most visibly, average Nepali consumers on a daily basis feel lack of
adequate electricity supply. Only about 50% o f the population has actual access to
electric supply in their homes.12 Even those that do have access do not have reliable or
adequate supply to meet their daily demands. For the last two decades, people have
endured daily “load-shedding” or blackouts due to the inability o f the Nepal Electrical
Authority (NEA) to supply adequate electricity. During the dry seasons when the
production dwindles, people in Kathmandu, the capital city face up to 16 hours of
blackouts daily.13 So there is tremendous unmet demand for electricity for household
consumption on top o f spotty coverage that leaves more than half of the population out of
reach o f national electric grids.
Lack of adequate supply also causes industrial loss o f productivity because
factories have to stop production or rely on expensive alternative sources of energy,
which adds to their bottom line. Actually, this loss o f productivity is spread across all the
sectors o f society and economy. Companies and educational institutions cannot rely on
uninterrupted supply o f basic electricity in the information age. In such a scenario,
foreign investment into Nepal is cautious at best or turned away. Another consequence of
inadequate utilization o f the hydropower potential is the cost o f electricity that the
consumers must bear. Rising population and rapid urbanization has spiked demand of
electricity, projected to increase at the rate o f at least 7.5% yearly until 2028 AD from the

" Nepal Electricity Authority, "Annual Report of Nepal Electricity Authority - Fiscal
Y ear2012/2013". 111.
12 Bergner, "Developing Nepal’s Hydroelectric Resources: Policy Alternatives". 7.
13 Deepak Adhikari, "Power to the People? Nepal's Hydropower Debate," China
Dialogue(Jan\xary 24, 2011), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/4070-power-to-thepeople-.
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current demand base o f about 1094 MW.14 Yet, Nepali consumers already pay the highest
tariff for electricity in South Asia region.15 Thus, because o f the lack o f adequate and
economical supply o f electricity, more than 85% of Nepal’s energy usage comes from
wood burning or agricultural waste, which harms the environment while petroleum
imports, which constitutes about 7% o f energy usage, drains the economy o f valuable
foreign currency.16 Yet, the dire consequences of lack of supply are exacerbated,
hindering increase in production, because o f a host of regulatory and policy issues;
technical, economic and environmental limitations; and regional concerns.

Institutional and Policy Evolution
The first hydroelectric project built in Nepal was the Pharping power plant near
Kathmandu. Constructed in 1911 for the private consumption of the ruling elites,
Pharping produced 500 KW o f electricity, which was transmitted to their residences in
Kathmandu by 6 miles o f transmission lines.17 For a half-century since that pioneer
project, development of hydropower projects remained largely dormant. It was only in
the second half o f the twentieth century that the government began to pursue the
hydropower dream by creating various institutional mechanisms and agencies.
Beginning in the 1950s, the policy and regulatory framework in the realm of
hydropower reflected the then Panchayat government’s larger economic policies based on
autarky and state-led development. The First Five-year Plan adopted in 1956 began the
practice o f including large and largely unmet hydropower production targets. A few small
to mid-sized hydropower projects began to be built by the efforts o f the Electricity
Department under the then His Majesty’s Government (HMG), and the establishment of
the Nepal Electricity Corporation (NEC) in 1962 regulated the process of transmission
and distribution o f electricity.

14 Nepal Electricity Authority, "Annual Report of Nepal Electricity Authority - Fiscal
Year 2012/2013". 8, 109.
15 Bergner, "Developing Nepal’s Hydroelectric Resources: Policy Alternatives". 9.
16 Ibid., 9-10.
17 Deepak Adhikari, "Hydropower Development in Nepal," NRB Economic Review
18(2006): 72-73.
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In 1985, the hydropower and electricity regulatory authority was centrally
consolidated by the aegis Ministry o f Water Resources under the newly created NEA,
which assumed sole responsibility for the generation, transmission and distribution of
electricity for the entire nation.18 The institutional set-up included the research and study
functions carried out by the Water and Energy Commission Secretariat (WECS) as well
as the Department o f Electricity Development, both under the Ministry o f Water
Resources established in 1976 and 1981 respectively.19 During the absolute hereditary
Rana rule and the monarchic Panchayat system o f government until the People’s
Movement o f 1990, the hydropower sector was entirely state-based and the productive
capacity was merely increased from 500KW in 1911 to about 235 MW during that period
of eighty years.20
Since the restoration o f constitutional democracy in 1990, successive
governments have produced major policies and regulations to govern the commercial and
social utilization o f water resources, advancing particular incentives to create a favorable
climate for hydropower development. The main policy innovation, maybe reflecting the
larger economic policy trends, is the objective o f attractive domestic and foreign capital
in the hydropower sector and to create an investor-friendly climate. The Electricity Act o f
1992 and the Electricity Regulation o f 1993 first set up the regime of licensing for survey,
generation, transmission and distribution o f electricity for mid-size or higher
71
hydroelectric projects. The avowed aim o f these evolving regulations were to invite
domestic and foreign private capital for hydropower investment projects with such
incentives as income tax and custom tariffs exemptions for technical inputs, five-year
tax-holiday as well as mechanism for repatriation o f invested capital in foreign
currency.22 However, the overarching frame of this, and subsequent water resources and
hydropower laws were based on the doctrine o f public trust that “places HMG as the

18 Ibid., 75.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 75-76.
21 WaterAid Nepal, Water Laws in Nepal: Laws Relating to Drinking Water, Sanitation,
Irrigation, Hydropower and Water Pollution, (February 2005),
http://www.wateraid.Org/~/media/Publications/water-laws-in-nepal.pdf. 52.
22 Ibid., 56.
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trustee o f all natural resources on behalf of the Nepali people. As such the state is
empowered to develop and manage natural resources, including hydropower to serve the
public interest.”23 Thus, for any foreign or domestic private investments in the water
resources or hydropower projects, the role o f the state was and remains central. The state
grants licenses for feasible projects with the prospect of collecting royalties. Also, the
produced electricity, especially for mid-sized to larger projects, is to be fed to the national
grid managed by the only government entity entrusted by such function, the NEA.
A major formulation of the official policies specifically regarding hydropower
sector came in the form of The Hydropower Development Policy o f 2001. This policy
responded to the growing need of an “open and liberal” hydropower development policy,
which was “investment friendly, clear, simple and transparent” and again adhering to the
age-old objective to “develop hydropower as an exportable commodity,” in addition to
realizing Nepal’s potential for low-cost electricity for domestic consumption, rural
electrification and economic development.”24As it relates to the large-scale projects to
produce high quantities o f electricity for consumption and export, the major plank o f the
hydropower development policy o f 2001 is based on creating a favorable climate for
attracting foreign and domestic private capital in conjunction with a strategy o f seeking
“bilateral or regional cooperation in the hydropower development sector taking into
consideration the feasibility of hydropower in Nepal and the demands o f electric energy
in neighboring countries in view o f the fact that development o f hydropower in Nepal
supports not only the domestic but also the regional economy.”25 The policy envisages
foreign investors using joint venture companies with Nepalese investors as well as
public-private partnership ventures for the generation, transmission and distribution
including export of electricity. In order to facilitate such joint ventures, the government
pushed forwards quite liberal regulatory, taxation and industrial policies governing
hydropower projects, such as: the guarantee that projects and plants would not be
23 Ibid., 58.
24 His Majesty's Government o f Nepal Ministry o f Water Resources, The Hydropower
Development Policy, (Singhadurbar, Kathmandu2001),
http://www.nea.org.np/images/supportive_doc s/hydropower_development_policy_2001.p
df. 2-4.
25 Ibid., 5.
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nationalized during the license period; exchange facility for foreign investors to repatriate
capital and profits at market rates in the form o f foreign currencies; ease o f worker visa
for the employees of foreign firms to work in Nepal during the period o f construction and
operation o f the plants; value added tax (VAT) holiday for machineries, equipment and
spare parts for the plants; only one-percent customs duty on technical imports related to
the hydro project construction, etc.26
The envisaged outcome o f such economic inducements to foreign investors are
the following: major hydropower projects are constructed under the concept o f “Build,
Operate, Own and Transfer,” in which foreign investors would seek a license to build and
operate major hydropower projects, the produced electricity would be sold to the national
grid or exported under a strict “power purchase agreement” signed a priori with the
governmental agencies, the government received royalty sums for the use of water
resources which is certain percent of the produced value of electrical energy; and finally
once the license period ends, which can range from thirty to thirty-five years, the
operating plants would be transferred to the ownership o f the Government o f Nepal.27
Along with the particular policies and regulations, the hydropower policy also
mandated a thorough institutional rearrangement so as to respond efficiently to the tasks
of managing the licensing processes, attract major investments as well as operate the
national grid among other functions. Central to the government bodies remains NEA,
which operates the hydropower plants, conducts electricity transmission through the
national grid as well as distribution within the country. The hydropower policy called for
the existing Department o f Electricity Development, under the latterly renamed Ministry
of Energy (MOEN), as the promotional body to provide a “one-window policy” to
facilitate private domestic and foreign investors in the hydropower sector.28
The other major policy documents guiding the hydropower sector are the Water
Resources Strategy adopted in 2002 and the subsequent National Water Plan of 2005,
both o f which were produced with extensive consultations with myriad domestic
26 Ibid., 13-14, 27.
27 Ibid., 10, 12-13, 19, 23-26.
28 Ibid., 30.
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stakeholders and experts. Reflecting the vociferous domestic interests of local
populations, experts and activists, these major policies address overarching national
water-related concerns of fair use, equity, local-level benefits, rural electrification,
pollution and sustainable development.29 In the particular realm o f hydropower, the
policy direction o f attracting private investment and large-scale development is continued
with the major objective being, “cost-effective hydropower developed in a sustainable
manner.”30 These policy statements again contained some ambitious production targets;
just one example, reaching total capacity o f 2230 MW by 2017, which now is surely
unattainable.
Despite the central level water resources and hydropower bodies producing plenty
o f policies and strategies regarding the path to develop major hydropower projects, the
fact that higher level political turmoil and instability with reshuffling cabinets, changing
policy directions and lack of follow-through on stated policy aims have produced less
progress in the level of investments than envisioned. Such climate o f political and policy
instability has caused the government to consistently miss its hydropower production
targets amid projects construction overruns and many more that do not move beyond the
surveying state. Relatedly, another constant criticism o f the governmental bureaucracy is
the lack of a true “one-window” agency empowered to handle the requests and concerns
of potential and current hydropower investors.31

Technical, Economic and Environmental Concerns
Conventional wisdom suggests that Nepal being a poor country, lack o f capital is
the most important cause hindering the proper growth its existent hydropower potential.
While that may well be the case, in his pioneering work on Nepal’s water resources,
Dipak Gyawali problematizes such simplistic views and seeks an interdisciplinary
understanding of the complex system of decisions affecting proper human use o f water

29 Government o f Nepal Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, "Executive
Summary: Water Resources Strategy," (January 2002),
http://www.moen.gov.np/pdf_files/water_resources_strategy.pdf; "National Water Plan Nepal".
30 "Executive Summary: Water Resources Strategy", xv.
31 Bergner, "Developing Nepal’s Hydroelectric Resources: Policy Alternatives". 15.
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and the resulting policies thereof. He highlights how the historical local usage of water by
farmers and villagers often comes in conflict with the grand designs o f state-builders.32
Furthermore, when enumerating technical issues with easy development o f hydropower
projects, the lack o f most and accuracy of the rest of basic scientific knowledge is o f
great concern. For example, geological data of all the water sources; meteorological data
related to the variations in waterfall in different seasons; economic data about the effects
of dam construction on downstream farmers and their livelihoods; as well as
environmental and ecological impact of such construction on fragile and mountainous
locations are sorely lacking to the satisfaction of proper project planning as well as
averting major catastrophes.33 Writing in the late 1980s, Gyawali bemoaned what he
called “donor derived data,” arguing that the project donors necessarily had a bias in
measurement of basic scientific data about the proposed projects so that various foreign
aid schemes came to differing conclusions about similar or same projects.34
Almost twenty years later, the official policy documents governing the water
resources sector also highlighted the lack o f good scientific data and knowledge on
various issues areas, especially the need for data on flood forecasting, hydrogeology, and
geo-seismology.35 The solution is not to blame the donor agencies but to empower the
national and local state and non-state impartial agencies to collect vital relevant data not
only specific projects but also build the vital stock of domestic scientific base, which can
be better utilized in formulating and implementing projects as well as negotiating the
investments in those projects by foreign investors.
The technical concerns and issues regarding Nepal’s geology and topography
reflect directly on the debate regarding the path of hydropower development that would
be suitable for Nepal to follow. Technologically there are two major types of hydropower
projects: the first type is called run-of-river (ROR) and diverts the flow o f the river to a
turbine to generate electricity; the second type called large-storage projects, requires
32 Gyawali, Water in Nepal, 6-7.
33 Ibid., 13-14.
34 Ibid.
35 Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, "Executive Summary: Water Resources
Strategy", v.
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construction of large dams in a reservoir submerging large areas of land from which
water flows into turbines.36 It is established that ROR projects are less detrimental to the
natural trajectory o f the river and also less damaging to the landscape and topography,
but the major benefit and attraction o f the reservoir type dammed-construction projects is
that they can boast much much higher capacity to produce electricity. There are only two
currently operational reservoir-type projects in Nepal. Most o f the planned projects
prioritized by the official bureaucracy and all recent governments, which also the ones
requiring large foreign capital inputs, are these larger, more controversial and higher
capacity reservoir-type dammed plants.
These large-scale dammed or reservoir projects have been criticized by wide
swathes o f activists and groups. Based on Nepal’s geological qualities, topographical
features and seismic fault lines as well as dramatic ecological and climactic variations,
Gyawali argues that construction of large dams is quite unreasonable.37 Also, for the vast
majority o f the rural population who reside in areas far away from the national
transmission grip, small or micro-scale hydropower projects built for local electricity
needs are argued to be more beneficial.38 Using economic analysis of the cost ratio of
production o f unit of electricity in a small-scale ROR project versus a large reservoir-type
project leads Bergner to conclude that the ROR projects would best serve Nepal’s short to
medium term goal of reducing shortage o f electricity leading to the crippling blackTO
outs. Another critique from economic perspective o f the conventional policy regarding
the desire and huge investments in the major hydropower projects is the question of
opportunity costs: by heightening preference for capital-intensive projects built on aid or
loans, what other important and necessary avenues o f social development does the
Nepalese state disregard?40

36 Adhikari, "Hydropower Development in Nepal," 73-74.
37 Gyawali, Water in Nepal, 21.
38 Adhikari, "Power to the People? Nepal's Hydropower Debate".
39 Bergner, "Developing Nepal’s Hydroelectric Resources: Policy Alternatives". 45-46.
40 Thapa, "Water-Led Development in Nepal: Myths, Limitations and Rational
Concerns," 34-35.

121

A national debate about such questions of technical, environmental and economic
cost-benefit analysis has not given sufficiently definitive answer to inevitably privilege
large-scale hydropower development relying on foreign capital transfusion. Thus, the
national and domestic interests from all sectors of society find ample support in opposing
many such projects unless the government and bureaucracy are able to sufficiently
placate them. Such political and social opposition also sway the patterns o f interaction
seen between Nepal and its potential investment partners China and India. Those patterns
o f interaction over time and on two specific representative projects are analyzed in the
next section.
EVIDENCE: ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND INVESTMENTS
Observers o f the budding global game of China-India rivalry find in their
competitive economic statecraft echoes o f the Cold War competition between USA and
USSR in their interaction vis-a-vis the Third World countries. Economic diplomacy is
seen as a prime tool, and far reaches o f the globe such as Africa, South America as well
as Central and South Asia seem like the theater of the competitive drama. In such a
scenario, in the last few years major global media have fervently analyzed the prospect o f
Nepal as a state ripe for swelling Chinese economic and cultural entanglements
signifying increased political influence at the expense of the historically favorable
position enjoyed by India.41 And from the view o f Indian observers, the recent trend of
ever enlarging Nepal-China bilateral trade relations, record economic aid and investment
in sensitive infrastructure projects from China, along with increased number o f Chinese
tourists and mushrooming Mandarin language schools in Kathmandu, all add to imply a
certain nervousness and caution as well as a call for the New Delhi establishment to not
lose the initiative.42 Some recent Indian reports are downright alarmist, painting a gloomy

41 John Daly, "India and China Vie for Influence in Nepal," Oilprice.co/w(March 13,
2012), http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Asia/India-and-China-Vie-for-Influence-inNepal.html; Rajesh Joshi, "Why China's Influence on Nepal Worries India,"
BBC.comQAay 8, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22365488; Wong, "China
Makes Inroads in Nepal, and Stanches Tibetan Influx".
42 Aditya Kaul, "Delhi Loses Initiative as Nepal Seals Power Deal with Beijing," Daily
News andAnalysis{ September 19,2012), http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-delhiloses-initiative-as-nepal-seals-power-deal-with-beijing-1742574.
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zero-sum picture, one in which China is bent on fomenting “anti-India” propaganda in
Nepal based on the platform o f Maoist ideology and carried out on the backs o f the many
China study centers in Nepal as well as by the monetary support for some community
radio stations in the borders town across India that are supposedly used for such
propaganda and training.43 Most o f these reports cite the evidence o f the strengthening
Chinese position in the matter of Tibet and Tibetan refugees in Nepal as the result of
increasing Chinese economic role paying political dividends, as was analyzed in detail in
the previous chapter.
Before the liberalization o f the Nepalese economy in the early 1990s, culminating
with the Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act o f 1992,44 foreign investments
were mainly limited to bilateral or multilateral aid. In the private sector, the FDI trend
during the years 1988 to 2001 showed a clear bias towards Indian investment against that
of the Chinese. Most foreign firms found it best to partner with Nepalese firms to
establish joint ownership. There were 249 approved investment projects with Indian
corporate partners totaling $419.7 million o f which 25.9% equity was held by the foreign
equity partners. For the Chinese firms (including those from Hong Kong), there were 69
approved projects with the total investment amount o f $131.8 million of which
approximately 32% equity was held by the foreign partners. However, the vast majority
of these foreign investments approved projects never got off the ground and were made in
the local service or manufacturing sectors with the intent o f local consumption. Barely
two hydropower projects received FDI.45 The period from late 1990s to mid-2000s saw
significant decline of FDI inflows in Nepal due to the civil war and the deteriorating
security situation. Despite improving conditions since 2008, Nepal only received about

43 Abhishek Bhalla, "Chinese Movement in Nepal Raises Concerns for India's Security
Establishment," India 7Wqy(November 27, 2012),
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/chinese-movement-nepal-cause-of-worry-india-indiatoday/1/234876.html.
44 There was a previous act promulgated in 1982 with the same name but that didn’t lead
to any meaningful FDI inflows, see, G.M. Jha et al., "Determinants o f FDI in South
Asia," International Research Journal o f Social Sciences 2, no. 1 (January 2013): 4.
45 Prema-chandra Athukorala and Kishor Sharma, "Foreign Investment in a Least
Developed Country: The Nepalese Experience," Transnational Corporations 15, no. 2
(2006): 137-38.
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0.8 percent of total FDI inflow into South Asia and was second to last in comparison to
its South Asian neighbors in attracting FDI.46 Given such low level o f success in
attracting private FDI, Nepal has continued rely on bilateral aid and multilateral grants
for major infrastructure projects. Thus, the most visible and noteworthy evidence of
growing Chinese and Indian competition over influence in Nepal is found in the strictly
economic realm o f bilateral aid and investments.
Nepal’s quest to realize its hydropower promise by leveraging foreign capital
makes it an interstate geopolitical problem o f interest to both India and China. The need
for foreign capital has been highlighted earlier. However, another facet of the problem is
finding export markets. Due to geographical problem o f long-distance transmission as
well as the question of commercial feasibility, India is the only viable market for
hydroelectricity exports. The vast population centers o f northern India are in dire need of
excess energy sources, particularly electric energy. However, the only prospect o f Nepali
electricity export is possible only to India means that Nepal is necessary a “captive
market” and the bilateral relationship in this sphere is thus a monopsony 47 The limitation
o f such a condition is that when we speak o f a tripartite interaction between Nepal, India
and China in the development of hydropower sector in Nepal, we have to question if
China even holds any advantage vis-a-vis India. Yet, if we were to look from the
perspective o f the Nepali state and policymakers, the wish is to engage Chinese interests
in the capital transfusion, construction of major projects and technical transfers.
Analyzing specifically the bilateral aid and technical transfer in the hydropower
investment sector also points to possible wedging benefits being enjoyed by Nepal. To
that end, the prior section reviewed the evolution of the policies formulated by Nepal to
create a climate attractive for private and foreign capital in water resources and
hydropower development. Here I present an overview o f the Nepalese economic
interaction with China and India respectively in the realm of the hydropower sector in
particular. Then I analyze a representative investment project, the West Seti Hydropower
Project, to review the pattern o f Nepal’s wedging interaction with the two rival powers.
46 Jha et al., "Determinants of FDI in South Asia," 4.
47 Gyawali, Water in Nepal, 80.
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Expanding Chinese Economic Influence
Nepalese leaders and policymakers have always counted on China to play the
counterweight to the pervasive Indian economic impact. However, in the early decades in
the modem era, in the years since the early 1950s, the young People’s Republic seemed
reluctant to directly challenge the Indian hegemonic role. While China provided not
insignificant aid, ranging from cash and goods, and in helping build various factories in
industries as diverse as shoes, paper products, and sugar in the 1960s. Capital grants for
infrastructure projects included the highly sensitive highway linking Kathmandu to
Kodari, in Tibet, as well as the ring road and a trolley bus line in Kathmandu. However,
Indian unease with a big Chinese footprint was highlighted when Chinese offer to build
part o f a major national highway nearby Indian border had to be turned down. All in all,
as John Whelpton has argued, early Chinese forays into Nepal remained rooted on the
pragmatic notion o f not “unduly provoking India,” a reasoning that was given by the then
Chinese Premiere Zhou Enlai to his Nepali counterpart B. P. Koirala in 1960 to explain
why Chinese aid would be necessarily lesser than that from India.48 Another important
reason, o f course, was the heavy presence o f the American strategic and aid commitments
in Nepal, which tapered off after the Sino-US rapprochement in the 1970s.
Beginning in the 1990s and particularly in the last decade, a few factors led to a
growth in the Chinese private and state investments in Nepal. First of all, the Chinese
liberalization policies created significant number o f semi-state and private firms willing
to venture abroad to find new markets, and engage in trade and investment opportunities.
As Chinese firms began to take global economic proportions, some found economic
reasons to venture into beyond its boundaries, including in Nepal. Thus, globalization of
Chinese capital and firms played a role in expanding Chinese role in trade and economic
relations with Nepal.
Trade between China and Nepal primarily occurs through Tibet and Hong Kong,
and in the past decade the trade imbalance has shown worrying trends. According to the
data from Trade and Export Promotion Center o f the Government o f Nepal, Chinese
imports grew five-fold between fiscal year 2001/2002 to fiscal year 2010/2011 from
48 Whelpton, A History o f Nepal, 133.
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about Nepalese Rupees (NRs.) 8.75 billion to NRs. 45.64 billion, while the trade deficit
rose from NRs. 7.7 billion to NRs. 44.89 billion. Nepalese exports during the same period
hardly rose above an average o f NRs. 1 billion.49 This rate of burgeoning trade imbalance
has rightly drawn the concern of policymakers but also suggests the level o f growth in
trade relations.
Secondly, as described in the previous section, Nepal’s economic liberalization
and the shift to market-friendly regime including in the hydropower sector made it
attractive for Chinese firms in the construction and hydropower business. Tthe desire and
commitment shown by the Nepalese leaders to posit Chinese aid and investments as a
“win-win” for both parties and as a symbol of Sino-Nepalese friendship has only more
germane. Major Chinese construction companies and hydropower developers, such as
Sinohydro, HydroChina Corporation and others have bid for survey licenses and
construction contracts backed by official Chinese government loans or in joint ventures
with Nepalese private companies in the Nepalese hydropower sector. Ministry o f Foreign
Affairs reports that as of 2012, China is the topmost investor in Nepal, with total
committed investment of NRs. 7,860 million in 428 projects, which created 26,651
jobs.50 Although, there were various Chinese funded hydropower and other projects, the
fact was that reaching the top perch in investment in Nepal was majorly based on one
gigantic project commitment in the West Seti hydropower project, which is discussed in
detail as the representative case in the following section. Before that, I review the
enduring and crucial role India plays in the larger Nepalese economy as well as in the aid
and investments in infrastructure projects including in the hydropower sector.

Enduring Indian Economic Interests
As the traditional social, cultural and economic partner India was an early source
o f major aid for Nepal’s infrastructure projects, including in the water resources
development sector. Dating to the 1950s, independent India had its own national interest
front and center in developing water-related projects in Nepal. The first couple such
49 Trade and Export Promotion Center; Ministry o f Commerce and Supplies; Government
of Nepal, "Trade Statistics: Nepal's Trade with China P.R.".
50 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs - Government o f Nepal, "Nepal - People's Republic of
China Relations," (2012), http://www.mofa.gov.np/en/nepal-china-relations-78.html.
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projects involved the two major river systems in Nepal, the Sapta Koshi barrage project
in 1954 and the Sapta Gandaki project in 1959, which were designed almost exclusively
to provide irrigation for the northern Indian plains and to better manage the yearly floods
suffered in those regions.51 Because the direct benefits to Nepal from those early major
projects were miniscule in terms of the amount of hydroelectricity or water for irrigation,
nationalist sentiments in the country began to ally firmly against Indian “big-brotherly”
method o f utilizing Nepalese water resources.52 In the subsequent decades, a segment of
the society and political parties continued to view with suspicion any major deals agreed
with India, resulting in many recent proposed water resources projects drawing political
opposition and delay. However, being situated completely in the major power projection
zone o f India, Nepalese policymakers and leaders o f every stripe are cognizant that Nepal
remains the mercy of patently self-interested economic largesse o f India in terms of aid,
investments and trade relations. Analysts describe land-locked Nepal more properly as
“India-locked,” so that despite some misgivings Indian economic role in Nepal has
always remained paramount.
The early Indian economic role in Nepal in the infrastructure sector included the
construction of the airport in Kathmandu and the Tribhuwan Highway linking
Kathmandu to Birganj, a Nepalese border town with India, both o f which were taken up
in the mid 1950s. Over the decades, other Indian economic aid included infrastructure
projects such as the East-West national highway, aid to establish educational institutions
and provide scholarship opportunities for Nepalese students, hospitals, aid in the
agricultural and irrigation projects, as well as building factories in various industries.
However, the larger economic relationship also suffered from the fact that Nepal relied
heavily on imports from India without the corresponding matching volume in exports
there. Overwhelming trade dependence, exacerbated due to its land-locked geography
requiring the use Indian ports and overland routes, warranted that Nepal has not been able
to sufficiently diversify its trade relations beyond India to other third countries. In the last

51 Santa Bahadur Pun, "Hydropower Development in Nepal: Lessons from Past Models,"
Hydro Nepal: Journal o f Water, Energy and Environment 2(2008),
http://www.nepjol.info/index.php/HN/issue/view791 /showToc.
52 Whelpton, A History o f Nepal, 132.
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two decades, the increasing trade deficit amid ballooning trade figures reflect the
dependent nature of such prolonged economic interaction.
In the arena o f hydropower investments, India has long been the potential source
of major aid and capital. The first hydroelectric project built with Indian aid was the 14
MW capacity facility built at the Trishuli River, which was completed in 1971. While
India also showed interest in developing other potential major and mega-projects over the
decades since, including the Kamali and Mahakali rivers, internal political and policy
uncertainty as well as recurrent opposition to Indian-led proposals stalled those efforts
periodically, well into the 1990s.53 Beginning with the liberalization o f the hydropower
sector in the 1990s, many large-scale hydropower project licenses have been won by
private and semi-private Indian companies. Many o f these proposed Indian-built projects
are export-oriented that are conceived to sell generated power to Indian grid, which
include: the 900 MW Upper Kamali project to be by Indian company GMR; the 900 MW
Arun 3 (which was previously shelved by the World Bank) to be built by quasi-private
Indian firm Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd.; and the 303 MW Namian, which is to be built
by another private Indian firm LANCO Infratech Ltd.54 Although none o f these projects
have begun construction yet, it is interesting to note that survey licenses for a majority of
major hydropower projects have been bid for and won by Indian construction majors with
the express intent of exporting to the Indian market.
When it comes to the Indian government’s direct role via investments and aid in
Nepal’s hydropower sector, there are a few utilitarian motives and interests, and to realize
them we find projects being mooted in a grander scale yet. In the last decade, the northern
Indian plains of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh suffered many devastating flood seasons.
Another important consideration is the growing demand o f electricity in the bordering
regions and the national grid itself. So one o f the major planks of Indian water resources
strategy is to build mega-structures at the source o f the flood-prone river systems in
Nepal, such as at the Sapta Koshi River and at the Mahakali (called the Sarda river in
53 Ibid., 132, 39.
54 Government o f Nepal Department o f Electricity Development, "List o f Issued Survey
Licenses (above 100 MW)," (September 2014),
http://www.doed.gov.np/survey_license_for_generation_above-100mw.php.
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India) river. It was precisely in the former river systems that India helped build earlier
dams in the 1950s; however now their utility and efficiency has eroded and they have
become outmoded. Thus, Indian government has proposed to replace those older
structures with new mega structures such as the 3000 MW Sapta Koshi High Dam
Multipurpose Project55 and the approximately 6500 MW Pancheswar High Dam Project
at the Mahakali river.56 The express interest encompasses high level o f electricity for
consumption, flood control in the plains and water diverted for irrigating the land even
during the dry seasons.
It has to be noted that the neither o f these mega-projects have yet reached final
agreement phases and the political and policy process has been stuck in the initial survey
and technical study phase, while public and political opposition to the perceived “selling
of rivers” to India remains a distinct reality. It bears further noting in this context that the
Mahakali-Pancheswar project was the source of deep-seated political upheaval in
Kathmandu in the early 1990s, when the then government entered an agreement
regarding the construction of the Tanakpur dam on the Nepalese side o f the trans
boundary river, as a part o f that larger project. However, due in part to the widespread
opposition to that “unequal” agreement, the first democratically elected majority
government o f Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala fell in July 1994.57 Subsequent
political instabilities and repeatedly falling governments were also blamed partially on
opposition to water and rivers-related nationalism. Such political rhetoric rests on the
very real upstream costs o f dam construction and mega-projects, namely, the
submergence of valuable land and the disputes related to just compensation to the
affected locals.
However, Indian interests in developing major structures on the primary water
resources o f Nepal are not limited to the utilitarian needs o f electricity, irrigation and

55 Deepak Gajurel, "High Dam Planned for Nepal's Sapta Koshi River," Environment
News Serv/ce(September 20,2004), http://ens-newswire.eom/ens/sep2004/2004-09-2004.asp.
56 Government o f Nepal Department o f Electricity Development, "About Project:
Pancheswar Multipurpose Project," http://www.pmp.gov.np/about-project.php.
57 Gyawali and Dixit, "Mahakali Impasse and Indo-Nepal Water Conflict," 8-10.
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flood control. It may be surmised that as an aspiring regional power, India would rather
not allow a third country, namely China, to control the valuable water resource that had a
direct bearing on its wellbeing and energy security. Thus, if China’s forays into the
hydropower sector in Nepal lead to corresponding Indian assertiveness and attention in
delivering the capital and the wherewithal to actually construct and develop the mega
structures as well as strictly export-oriented major projects in Nepal, we may deduce that
Nepal’s wedge status has produced the desired fruits o f higher material benefits from the
competition o f the two rivals. It is yet to be seen if and how faithfully the emerging
reality matches the trending pattern of action-reaction between the two powers in Nepal’s
hydropower sector. The representative case o f the West Seti Hydropower Project
discussed below encompasses both Indian and Chinese interests in the various phases of
its long-running story and useful to understand as an instance o f growing Indian unease
predicting reactive measures against large-scale Chinese investment commitments in
Nepal.

West Seti Hydropower Project
When it was first conceived, the West Seti hydropower project seemed a perfect
example o f realizing Nepal’s water promise: a mega-project built for lucrative exports.
The genesis o f West Seti goes back to the mid-1990s, when the government had adopted
the policy o f allowing and attracting private capital for development o f hydropower
projects. In 1994, the multi-national Australian construction company Snowy Mountain
Engineering Corporation (SMEC) received the survey license to develop the West Seti
project in the Far Western Development region. The final agreement was signed between
the government of Nepal and SMEC in 2002 with the planed project construction to
begin in 2004 and power generation to commence in 2008.58 The West Seti hydropower
plant was supposed to be the largest in Nepal’s history with installed capacity o f 750
MW, at a time when the country’s cumulative production was less than half that. Up to
90% of the produced electricity was to be sold to India via an agreement with the Power
Trading Corporation of India, Ltd. (PTC), which is the Indian government-owned public
58 "Nepal Signs West Seti Deal with SMEC," International Water Power & Dam
Construction Magazine(November 4, 2002),
http://www.waterpowermagazine.com/news/newsnepal-signs-west-seti-deal-with-smec.
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transmission and distribution company. As royalty, Nepal would receive 10% of
produced electricity free, but subsequent agreements controversially changed that
provision to Nepal receiving the equivalent monetary compensation.59 SMEC through its
wholly owned local subsidiary called the West Seti Hydroelectric Corporation Limited
(WSHL) had completed the feasibility studies and environmental impact assessments.
With the help o f Nepalese government, WSHL began to cobble together a consortium of
financial sponsors for the project. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) joined as
technical sponsor early on and agreed to provide a loan to the Nepal government towards
limited part o f the financing, while the China National Machinery Import and Export
Corporation (CMC) was to be the main financiers for the major portion o f the proposed
cost of US$ 1.2 billion.60 According to a Chinese official at its embassy in Kathmandu,
the ownership stake o f the built plant would be held by CMC at 70% and the remaining
30% by SMEC.61 As per the government’s build-own-operate-transfer policy, after
license period o f 30 years the full ownership o f the plant would revert to the government
o f Nepal.
That SMEC backed West Seti project never got off the ground. During the early
years, a major problem was the timing; by the time the project agreement was signed in
2002, Nepal was in the deep throes o f the Maoists-led civil war, while the royal massacre
the year before had begun the prolonged instability in Kathmandu. The rebel Maoists
party was against the project, complicating the viability o f the location of which was in
the remote mountainous region in the least developed part of the country.62 Furthermore,
local opposition towards the proposed project caused insurmountable delays. The project
called for 1530 households and up to 18,000 individuals to be relocated in order to

59 Thira L Bhusal, "Lawmakers Demand Renegotiation on West Seti Hydro Project,"
Republica September 4,2009.
60 Xinhua, "China, Australia to Invest in Nepal's Biggest Hydro-Electric Project,"
Xinhua(May 17, 2005),
http://english.peopledaily.com.en/200505/l 7/eng20050517_185331 .html.
61 Ibid.
62 Dewan Rai, "About Time: Stalled for 15 Years by Maoist Opposition, West Seti Will
Now Be Built under a Maoist Government by Chinese Investors," Nepali Times March 9,
2012 .
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submerge the area to build the large-storage reservoir.63 While there were provisions for
compensation to the local impacted population, lack of proper communication as well as
uncertainty about the impact and effects o f the humongous project meant that the local
residents never warmed up to the idea and periodically threatened to shut down the
plans.64 Their objections were amplified by national environmental and policy
organizations. By the mid-2000s prominent voices in national media as well as the new
legislature called for renegotiation of the contract finding the arrangement o f selling all
the produced electricity to India problematic and questioning the wisdom and likelihood
o f receiving royalties when much of the country was suffering through crippling power
shortages.65 A group o f affected locals and water rights organizations filed a writ petition
in the Supreme Court alleging that the project was “illegal” and against the “national
interests” o f Nepal creating further controversy and public unease, although the Court in
September 2008 decided for the legality o f the project and allowed the government and
SMEC to proceed.66 Meanwhile, ADB had quietly dropped their financial and technical
backing for the project citing public opposition and lack of good governance, while CMC
also seemed to have lost interest along the way. Finally, in July 2011 after a decade and a
half the government revoked the construction license from SMEC, ostensibly for failing
to initiate the construction o f the West Seti hydropower project.67
To the surprise o f observers, the West Seti project rose from the dead the very
next year. On February 29 2012, the government of Nepal signed an agreement with
China Three Gorges Corporation (CTGC), the state-owned builder of the well-known
Three Gorges Dam, to construct the now estimated US$ 1.6 billion West Seti

63 "Nepal Signs West Seti Deal with SMEC".
64 "Doti Locals Threaten to Shut Down West Seti," The Rising Nepal(January 10, 2009),
http://www.gorkhapatra.org.np/rising.detail.php?article_id=13019&cat_id=27.
65 Bhusal, "Lawmakers Demand Renegotiation on West Seti Hydro Project."
66 Kishor Uprety, "Nepal's West Seti Project Imbroglio: The Supreme Courst Speaks,"
Beijing Law Review 2(2011).
67 "Govt Revokes License o f West Seti Hydropower Project," NepaInews.com(July 28,
2011), http://www.nepalnews.com/index.php/economy/12064-govt-revokes-license-ofwest-seti-hydropower-project.
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Hydropower project.68 While many details of the project remained unchanged, the major
differences were that the CTGC would own 75% o f the constructed plant while the
Nepalese state-owned electricity monopoly, Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) would
own the remaining 25%, and also, more importantly, that the produced electricity was
avowedly to be used primarily to meet the skyrocketing domestic demand rather than to
export to India as was the case with earlier plan.69
What had changed? The erstwhile rebels of the Communist Party o f NepalMaoists (CPN-M) had ended their decade-long civil war, returned to mainstream politics,
successfully led the efforts to end monarchy and declare Nepal a republic in 2008, won
the first election to the new constitution drafting assembly, and formed the ruling
government with promises of good governance and swift policies o f rapid development.
The major economic plank o f the first CPN-Maoist led government in 2008 was the
pledge in their first budget proposal to build a minimum of 10,000 MW over the next ten
years, with the West Seti project a prominent contributor to the total.70 It could be mere
coincidence that a Chinese government owned company offered to finance the largest
hydropower development project in Nepal, which was also the largest ever-single foreign
direct investment vehicle to Nepal, when the Maoists were in power.
However, there were various indications that the timing was right from the
perspective of both sides, which shows the interaction gaining from the wedge status of
Nepal. The CPN-Maoist government that came into power in 2008 brought with it an
almost revolutionary zeal to remake the Nepalese economic climate with special
emphasis on aggressively seeking foreign direct investments on infrastructure and
hydropower projects to meet its 10,000 MW in ten years pledge. The party’s goals
68 Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office o f the Embassy o f the People's
Republic o f China in Federal Democratic Republic o f Nepal, "China Three Gorges
Corporation and Ministry of Nepal Sign MoU on West-Seti," (March 9, 2012),
http://np2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinanews/201203/20120308005977.shtml.
69 "Govt, China Company Ink West Seti MoU," The Kathmandu Posf(February 29,
2012), http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2012/02/29/money/govt-chinacompany-ink-west-seti-mou/232132.html.
70 Hydroworld.com, "New Nepal Republic Proposes Building 10,000 MW o f
Hydropower," (September 26,2008), http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/2008/09/newnepal-republic-proposes-building-10000-mw-of-hydropower.html.
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coalesced around Chinese largesse, among other traditional sources o f capital, including
that from India. Breaking traditional protocol, the Maoist Prime Minister, Pushpa Kamal
Dahal went on his first official foreign visit to Beijing and not New Delhi, causing a mild
concern in India.71 Beginning with the first one, Dahal’s foreign visits, including
subsequently to New Delhi, were explicitly tied to requesting massive capital aid for the
development o f a “New Nepal.” It can be surmised that the People’s Republic would be
highly sympathetic to such a gesture o f equality vis-a-vis Indian position in Nepal and
possibly eager to reciprocate. On the other hand, from the Indian perspective the unease
at these unanticipated developments might also have sent it seeking ways to influence the
trajectory of Nepalese political developments during such a fluid period. Besides many
domestic reasons for the fall o f that first Maoist government in May 2009, explicit lack o f
trust shown by New Delhi should not be discounted.
By the time o f the West Seti agreement with CTGC in 2012, another CPN-Maoist
government had been in place for more than six months. The Prime Minister Baburam
Bhattarai was the architect o f the earlier budget proposal that relied on maximizing
private and foreign hydroelectric investments by cutting the red tape and delays that had
been the endemic feature o f such project proposals. Thus, the memorandum of
understanding for West Seti was signed with the Chinese counterparts without a proper
global tender and bidding process. The rushed handing over of the long-percolating
project of massive proportions to the Chinese state-owned enterprise raised considerable
questions, leading to an enquiry by the parliamentary panel on Natural Resources and
Means Committee regarding the legality o f the agreement, including many o f the finer
details.72 Sufficient political and diplomatic pressure made sure that the committee
reached to a rarely seen swift decision, in only three weeks, to allow the agreement to
stand with some modifications.73 Similar parliamentary enquiries and public protests had
derailed a number o f prior hydropower projects but the fact that CTGC and the Chinese
71 Seema Sirohi, "The Dulcet Damru," Outlook lndia(September 29,2008),
http://www.outlookindia.com/article/The-Dulcet-Damru/238535.
72 Dewan Rai, "The Politics o f Power," The Nepali 7jwes(March 27,2012),
http://www.nepalitimes.com/blogs/thebrief/2012/03/27/the-politics-of-power/.
73 Gopal Sharma, "Nepal Clears China Plan for $1.6 Bln Hydroelectric Dam," Reuters
April 2, 2012.
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government made the deal for West Seti too sweet to derail by any segment of the
political usually rambunctious opposition is significant.74
Equally instructive is the tone o f the official and media coverage o f the West Seti
agreement with CTGC in all three countries. The Chinese ambassador to Nepal Mr. Wu
Chuntai described West Seti as a “new landmark of Chinese-Nepalese friendship,” while
the Chinese official and media reports proudly highlighted the fact that China-financed
West Seti was the largest foreign direct investment project in Nepal while viewing the
project as a sign o f the growing Chinese economic influence in the rapidly changing
Himalayan neighbor.75 On the other hand, Indian observers found the facts of the Chinese
financing of the project of such massive proportions in Nepal portentous and viewed
nervously as a sign of New Delhi losing initiative in similar projects plans. The official
intelligence unit of the Indian government Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) sent a
report to the Prime Minister’s Office detailing the particulars of the project, while the
media showed appropriate alarm in the growing “coziness” between China and Nepal at
the expense of India.76 For their part most of the Nepalese mainstream media projected a
positive attitude towards the project, highlighting the fact that the Chinese had decided to
invest in a very large project and that the produced electricity would be used for domestic
consumption to alleviate the seriously unmet demand.77 The usually vociferous
opposition did not seem to appear uniformly, although there were plenty of technical,
procedural and legal concerns regarding the actual contract minutiae, including
significant details o f the power purchase agreement (PPA).

74 Mukul Humagain and Ashok Thapa, "West Seti Deal Legal, Transparent: Ministry,"
The Kathmandu Post March 21, 2012.
75 Xinhua, "China Becomes Largest FDI Contributor in Nepal," Xinhuanet(Jamary 22,
2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/22/c_l 33066134.htm; "Nepal
Lays Groundwork for China-Assisted Mega Hydropower Project," (November 26, 2013),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/xinhua/2013-11 -26/content_l 0675251 .html.
76 Kaul, "Delhi Loses Initiative as Nepal Seals Power Deal with Beijing".
77 Yogesh Pokharel, "West Seti to Set Climate for FDI," GorkhapatraOnline(n.d.),
http://tm.gorkhapatraonline.com/index.php/op-ed/7232-west-seti-to-set-climate-for-fdiyogesh-pokharel.html; Uttam Mahaijan, "Editorial - West Seti Hydropower Project:
From SMEC to CTGC," The Rising Nepal March 2012.
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The story of the Chinese financed West Seti is not over; the actual construction
has yet to begin. Nepal’s political instability means that the CPN-Maoist government that
signed the agreement is no longer in power giving way to a bureaucratic government led
by the Supreme Court Chief Justice in March 2013, which conducted another constituent
assembly elections. The newly elected government is mandated with governing while the
constitution is finally drafted. The high level political turmoil has meant that the
preliminary project steps are still ongoing.
The trend o f the West Seti project proceeds from one that was predicated entirely
on export of generated electricity to India and also being financed partially by Indian
commercial interests to an entirely new arrangement purposively to be funded by Chinese
state-related firms to produce power for domestic consumption in Nepal is interesting.
Also, in the process the project has become a symbol o f growing Chinese economic
influence in Nepal as the largest single FDI project to be carried out in Nepal. To such
developments, a certain unease and desire for larger symbolic reaction can be found in
the Indian media and policy circles. It is partly in such a context that a recent and urgent
Indian commitment to develop the long-stalled mega-project Pancheswar High Dam
Project (which would cost many times over the cost o f the West Seti project) spearheaded
by the new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his official visit to Nepal in August
2014, although the long-term outcomes o f these recent fluid developments have to be
seen in their own time.78 The next section analyses the central hypothesis regarding small
wedge states using wedging strategies to accrue higher material benefit by Nepal.
ANALYSIS: SITUATIONAL WEDGING?
The historical pattern o f Nepal’s interaction with the two rival powers India and
China in investments in the hydropower sector lends to abstract analysis o f the “small
state problematic” identified earlier in the literature review. Although strictly concerned
with the economic question of whether Nepal’s wedge position allows it to accrue

78 Shishir Prashant, "Modi's Nepal Visit Sparks Hopes; Work on Pancheswar Dam to
Start Soon," Business Standard(A\igust 5 2014), http://www.businessstandard.com/article/politics/modi-s-nepal-visit-sparks-hopes-work-on-pancheshwardam-to-start-soon-114080501843 1.html.

136

material gains due to the competitive relationship between the two rival powers, this case
also touches upon the structural constraints o f the regional geopolitics as well as the
internal dynamics of the wedge state itself. In the structural sense, Nepal was not
bandwagoning with either o f the larger powers but trying to engage and seek investments
from both sources. While the Indian interests of energy security and material benefits in
the form of electricity, flood control and irrigation is paramount, Chinese self-interest in
profit-making opportunities and strategic considerations ensure that both o f the rival
powers show interest in investing in Nepal’s hydropower sector as evidenced by the
numerous infrastructure development projects highlighted above. Evolving international
norms and structures o f foreign development aid and foreign direct investments also
ensure that Nepal is able to extract precious capital from Chinese and Indian firms as well
as their state bodies as well.
In the question of whether Nepal was able to engage in wedging behavior the
evidence present in the analysis above were necessary for the wedging behavior but
weren’t sufficient to conclusively demonstrate it. No direct evidence emerged of Nepal
engaging any form of “competitive bidding.” Yet, in specific projects, Nepal was able to
extract maximum benefits from the competition between India and China, as we can see
that even the modest change in one’s rival power’s action may produce a reactive
counteraction in the form o f other influential aid and investment packages from the other.
The fact that Chinese large-scale investment on the West Seti project was
finalized during the period of Maoist government shows that the domestic political
calculus mattered. Also, in subsequent Indian unease, provides further evidentiary pattern
of competitive behavior, which produces beneficial wedging outcomes. As described
above the evidence from the hydropower investment sector of Nepal shows, the
confluence o f the issue o f interaction matching with the interests o f the rival powers’
desire for influence produces the wedging outcomes o f beneficial distributive gains for
the wedge state o f Nepal. Thus, Nepal’s beneficial outcome can be based on the evidence
o f competitive behavior of the rival powers.
As for the specific test variables and hypotheses generated in the research design
o f this project, in this case o f hydropower investments, the aim is to explain the variation
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in the DV, “the level of gains from the interaction.” The first hypothesis (HI) considered
the effect of the form of government in producing higher gains. The analysis does not
directly compare the autocratic system against democratic system, however, it does point
to the importance of various domestic policy actors to realize beneficial wedging gains in
the hydropower issue. The ideological orientation o f the party in power is conducive to
generating higher gains as is the clarity and evolution of national policy in foreign direct
investments, which is ultimately based on the prerogative o f certain political orientation.
The second hypothesis (H2) said that the net impact o f globalization (in its
institutional, interdependent and transnational guises) would be to raise the gains for the
wedge state. In this case, of hydropower investments, the evidence shows that the global
rise o f India and China and their various state-backed agencies contribute to rising
hydropower investments in Nepal. Those globalized firms require profitable ventures
beyond their borders and may find the neighboring Nepal as attractive. Also, the
proximate effect of the competition between India and China in Nepalese hydropower
sector is played under the global context o f resource security and investment
opportunities.
The third hypothesis (H3) stated that highly dependent trade relation with either
rival power would reduce the efficacy o f wedging strategies and lower material gains
from interaction. In the context o f the Chinese and Indian investments in Nepalese
hydropower sector, that hypothesis was refuted because despite Nepal’s is high trade
dependence with both rival powers, it is generating beneficial gains in this sector. That
supposed anomaly might be explained by either the fact that trade dependence is not
decisive or that other factors are sufficient to explain the wedging behavior. Another
reason may hint to Chinese interests lies in placating the Nepalese leaders and politicians
concerned about the trade imbalance by promising investments and aid.
Furthermore, although these variables were not explicitly highlighted, the chapter
finds that the following two factors were important. First, the evolution of Nepal’s
internal policy climate to create a market more attractive to foreign private and state
capital, with the attendant efforts by various governments over the years to court Chinese
and Indian aid and investment commitments. Secondly, the structural factor o f the
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competing interests of the two rivals themselves as evidenced in their action-reaction
pattern seemed to be quite important as well. Both of these evidentiary factors relate to
the pool of independent variables (IVs) identified in the research design.
CONCLUSION
This chapter traced the evolution o f Nepalese economic policy towards
liberalization and the investment climate away from the strictly statist model based
entirely on multilateral aid-dependence to a emerging free-market built on attracting
private capital, foreign and domestic, especially in arena o f hydropower development,
which has long been the source o f popular Nepali dream o f economic transformation. The
review o f the history o f Nepalese hydropower dream highlighted the importance of this
particular issue but also highlighted the unique geographical, technical, political and
economic limitations hindering the desired development and growth o f Nepal’s immense
hydroelectric potential. The current reality o f Nepal’s lack of adequate electricity for
daily consumption as well as industrial productivity juxtaposes uneasily with the dream
and promise of the riches that could flow from a well-developed hydropower sector, a
fact which underscored the need for vast capital infusion in the form o f foreign direct
investments and economic aid, especially from India and China.
Given such internal context, the aim o f the chapter was to situate Nepalese
economic and investment interaction with its competing rival neighbors India and China
to inquire if such competition allowed the wedge state Nepal to accrue higher material
benefits in the form o f higher investment in the national priority hydropower sector.
Enumerating the material and strategic interests of China and India revealed that although
Indian material utility and strategic sense o f security from developing Nepalese water
resources is paramount, China might also see enough strategic benefit and opportunity for
its increasingly global firms to venture into Nepal. Thus, Nepal may be able gain from
the action-reaction investment decisions from China and India. The long-running saga of
the West Seti hydropower project, which went from being a project aimed for exporting
power to India to a completely domestic utility to be funded by solely by the Chinese as
the largest single FDI project in Nepal’s history, and the subsequent public and policy
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concerns in New Delhi provided some support to the claim regarding higher material
benefits for Nepal.
The history o f economic interaction between China and India with Nepal suggests
that if Nepal is able to create a climate of attractiveness and a policy coherence for
investments and efficient aid, the appealing business climate itself might lead to wedging
outcomes due to the competitive action o f the two rival powers vying for influence and
greater strategic foothold. Such situational wedging might have more room to strengthen
Nepal’s negotiating position and attractiveness, if the current political instability were to
be resolved and if the policymakers and leaders were more attuned to exploit such a
dynamic.
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CHAPTER VI

C LIM A TE C O O PER A TIO N IN TH E H IG H H IM A LA Y A S

A CLIMATE OF VULNERABILITY
In December 2009 Nepal’s ministerial cabinet held a symbolic meeting at
Kalapatthar, located near the Mount Everest Base Camp in the Himalayas. It was a costly
operation involving dozens o f helicopters to ferry the 21 ministers along with the prime
minister and up to a 100 journalists and civil servants in addition to oxygen tanks and
masks to cope with high altitude. Perhaps inspired by a similar meeting a couple of
months before held entirely underwater by the cabinet in Maldives decked in scuba gear
and suits to raise awareness of rising sea levels, the ostensible goal o f such a theatrical
stunt was to send a message regarding the degrading effects o f global climate change on
the fragile natural systems of glaciers and ecology in the high Himalayas. The Nepalese
cabinet adopted the ten-point “Everest Declaration 2009” calling on the international
community to do more to combat climate change and help Nepal deal with its long-term
environmental, social and economic effects, with a view to take Nepal’s appeal to an
worldwide audience during the Copenhagen Climate Summit which was held the week
after.1
The meeting was another reminder of the phenomenon o f global climate change
resulting in rising temperatures that may be causing an alarming rate o f melting o f the
Himalayan glaciers, which in turn has long-term adverse effects on the flow of the rivers
that originate from there. Unlike the prior two issues analyzed in this study—that o f the
policies on Tibetan exiles and o f attracting foreign aid and investments in Nepal’s
hydropower sector—the predicament o f climate change is such that a small state alone is

1Joanna Jolly, "Nepal Cabinet Holds Meeting on Mount Everest," BBC News
(December 4, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/8394452.stm; Gopal Sharma,
"Nepal Cabinet Meets at Everest to Send Climate Message," Reuters (December 4,
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/04/us-nepal-cabinet-everestidUSTRE5B30SH20091204.
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unable to change its global course. Even if Nepal could design perfect policies in tandem
with perfectly cooperative India and China, little could be achieved to halt the tide of the
global process of rising temperatures. Yet, there can be resources and policies in place to
build resilience and adaptive measures in one o f the most vulnerable areas in earth for
climate impacts. Furthermore, unlike the previous two cases that have been unfolding for
many decades, this phenomenon of climate change, and especially the policy engagement
with it are more recent and thus we only have about a decade’s worth o f evidence in
domestic policy formulation and less than that of regional policy interaction to speculate
how the future trend o f such negotiations might unfold. As such, the limitation o f
examining this recent and unfolding case, that is a tough case as underscored in research
design before, is that the expectation of this analysis in testing the hypothesized wedging
behavior is more modest. This issue may also prove to be the difficult case in analyzing
the possibility of such wedging strategies across issue areas.
While the policy engagement is relatively recent, because o f scary prognosis of
the impact of climate change, each of these states might be expected to take steps toward
adaptation to the shared effects o f climate change and work to achieve cooperation in the
realm of environmental issues o f conservation; reducing the runaway use o f fossil fuels;
and designing adaptive institutions and processes. But such an outcome is not a given
because there will be economic and social costs to be borne, must likely, unequally by
each of the states in trying to address processes of mitigation as well as adaptation to the
effects of climate change, each o f which refer to the long-term processes defined and
discussed in detail below. Analyzing the arena of nascent policy evolution between the
wedge state and the rival states in climate-related and environmental issues, I expect that
due to wedging strategies the wedge state might benefit in the form of higher gains or
lower costs of mitigation or adaptation. However, the paucity o f sufficient policy
advancement among the three states might mean relying on current state o f quite limited
interaction to speculate on future possibilities of wedging benefits or lack thereof.
This chapter analyses the case o f interstate environmental cooperation in the
context o f global climate change to explore the small wedge state interaction with rival
powers. The issue of environment cooperation is a coordination problem, such that
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interaction in the response to the climate change presents a different kind o f collective
action problem unlike the two previous cases. In this case, the costs o f melting glaciers or
scarcity o f water resources will have to be borne by all the states in the long-term but the
relative costs might be unequally distributed. Thus, with the prospect o f irreversible
global climate change in the long-term, the environmental issue becomes a question
regarding the “dilemma o f losses,” where each of the state involved wants to incur the
least amount of costs possible on their populations and economy by negotiating the best
bargains in the distribution o f the ever-scarcer resources such as supply o f fresh water. In
this case, the basic structure o f the three-actor collective action problem is based on three
major facts: 1) no single party can solve the problem on its own, which means
cooperation is necessary, 2) none of the actors can opt out o f the larger cooperative
problem, and 3) the costs are not uniform such that some actors pay a higher price. The
implications of such a structure of interaction means that the relative cost o f agreement
may be lowest for the weakest actor. As an upper-riparian state Nepal may paradoxically
enjoy significant bargaining power regarding the usage o f freshwater and rivers, as is
analyzed in the following sections. Informed by this dynamic o f the tripartite collective
action problem on the environmental and climactic concerns, this chapter analyzes the
emerging national and regional policies that have been initiated and avenues of bilateral
cooperation.
To operationalize the tripartite interaction between Nepal, India and China in this
complex realm o f environmental cooperation, this chapter focuses on the particular
transboundary issue o f melting glaciers in the shared Himalayan region and the resulting
long-term prospect o f scarcity o f freshwater resources on which each o f the countries
relies. The major theoretical concern o f this study focuses on the avenues level of
material gains that small wedge states might enjoy from negotiation with the rival major
powers. To reiterate, a significant limitation o f the current state o f affairs in this
interactive policy arena is that the issue o f climate change is a recent historical
phenomenon lacking a long period of engagement and a mature body of policies
formulated or implemented in cooperative regional or bilateral mechanisms. Also, the
global focus on climate change agreements and policy is centered on the discussion and
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lack o f agreement between the industrialized North and the developing South on steps to
mitigate climate change. There is a dearth o f analysis and discussion o f the South-South
negotiation and bargaining to generate cooperative policies addressing the impacts of
climate change, which is a significant limitation o f the current discourse. The dynamics
of South-South cooperation are important because o f the high number o f developing
states in the global South, the increasing contribution of greenhouse emissions by those
states, their large population, and the relative lack of capacity of those states to adapt
their populations to the impending changes in the environment. This research aims to fill
that relative gap.
Despite the absence o f long-term policy engagement, the subsequent analysis
finds that there are already significant actors in both the state and non-state sector,
including multitudes o f national and international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), which are engaged in scientific research, policy formulation and community
awareness regarding climate change in the region. Therefore, because o f the necessarily
in-progress nature o f interstate negotiations as well as nascent domestic policy
framework along with state-society activities, the following analysis expands the analysis
to include the activities o f non-state sector, specifically those o f a regional non
governmental institution that has been able to lead the states structures into cooperative
interaction on transboundary cooperation. Thus the contours o f the emerging tripartite
interaction over the distribution o f costs or lost opportunities due to melting glaciers and
other shared effects of climate change would inform the possibility or lack o f wedge state
policy autonomy and wedging strategies that might be generated over time.
The analysis presented below find that none of the three states have sufficiently
advanced their domestic policies regarding climate change adaptation, while the
mitigation efforts are bogged down in global and regional forums. As such, the analysis
o f evolution of the national policies and the events in the past two decades finds no
evidence o f Nepal engaging in explicit wedging behavior in this case. However, as
evidenced by a unique case of budding tripartite cooperation in the area o f transboundary
conservation, it is concluded that all three states, including Nepal, benefit from
significant technical, research and capacity building resources. The gains from this
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budding cooperative interaction may be higher for Nepal because of its geographically
determined wedge status. But it has to be admitted that these levels o f current gains does
not yet show the expansion o f Nepal’s strategic autonomy in the use o f scarce and shared
resources for now or in the future. So the answer to the central research question on the
possibility o f Nepal’s wedging behavior to accumulate material gains is a cautious no.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: the first section places the issue
of global climate change in context of the shared Himalayan region, summarizing the
observed trends and possible adverse impacts to the three states in consideration; the
second section outlines the emerging global and regional policy framework to address
climate change and the role of the three states in that dialogue; the third section analyses
the domestic policies on climate change and environment in each o f the three states; the
fourth section offers a case study of interstate environmental cooperation initiated by a
regional non-state actor that offers a possible model o f future cooperation; and finally the
last section summarizes the conclusion of this case analysis.
CONTEXT: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOUTH ASIA
The phenomenon o f climate change resulting from the rise in average global
temperatures has global proportions, causes and manifold consequences. Yet, those
global climatic consequences and their implications for human beings may be varied in
the different regions o f the world depending on each region’s unique “geography,
population density and state capacity,” in addition to the current or prior baseline level of
environmental deterioration.2Based on such factors and the potential for large-scale
devastating impacts, the South Asian region, home to one-fifth of the global population
living in high density, is quite vulnerable. As such South Asia has already begun to see or
is expected to face adverse effects in various areas, including “biodiversity, agriculture,
water resources, rainfall patterns, seasons, coastal inhabitations, and high altitude

2 Brahma Chellaney, "Climate Change and Security in Southern Asia," The RUS1 Journal
152, no. 2 (April 2007).
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communities.”3 The compounded outcomes due to these vulnerabilities may be acute in
the coming decades.
To begin to understand the challenges to cooperation in this realm, we have to
understand the regional ecosystem. The Himalayan mountain range extends from
Pakistan in the West through India, Nepal, China and Bhutan in the East. Along with the
abutting Karakorum and Hindu-Kush mountain ranges in its northwest and the Tibetan
plateau in the North, the Himalayas form a unique geographical and environmental
feature o f the region. The Himalayas are responsible for weather events such as the
monsoon as well as being the source o f snow-fed and glacial major rivers in the entire
region. Thus, the range of environmental, geographical and social impact o f the mighty
Himalayas, called the “water towers o f Asia,” can hardly be overstated. The impact of
global climate change on the delicate geography o f the Himalayan would likely result in
unexpected and unpredictable consequences. For the states that share the geography and
the ecosystem o f the Himalayas, Nepal, India and China, due to their unique geography,
physical location and low level o f state capacity, the range o f potential impacts o f climate
change is likely be severe. A salient feature o f global climate change is that it a varied
and multidimensional phenomenon. Although there is budding global scientific
consensus on the range o f possible outcomes and effects o f rising temperatures in the
various regions and unique ecosystems of the earth, there are significant gaps and
variability among regions.
Recent global reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
highlights the extent o f observed climate variability and the range o f effects that South
Asia and the adjacent Tibetan plateau o f China could face. Observed historical data
suggests that the surface to air temperatures in the entire region are rising, with India
seeing a 0.68 degree Celsius rise in the past century, Nepal seeing 0.09° C rise in the
Himalayas and 0.04° C in the Terai plains, while in Tibetan plateau the rise was 0.16° C
annually and 0.32° C during the winter per decade. In all three regions as well as in

3 Alok Bansal and Sreeradha Datta, "The Impact o f Climate Change in South Asia," in
South Asian Security: 21st Century Discourse, ed. Sagarika Dutt and Alok Bansal (New
York: Routledge, 2011), 231.
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China, the rate of rise in temperature was higher during the winter seasons.4 Another
climatic variable with observed historical variance is that o f precipitation levels, with
increases in extreme rainfall recorded in the northwest of India and in the northeast
region of Tibet as well as increasing rain in Western China.5 Considering the regional
picture, the South Asian coastal states including Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as
well as the coastal regions o f India and Pakistan face the dire prospects of sea-level rise,
extreme seasonal storms and inundation with the costly effects o f economic and
demographic degradation. Similar and related effects of cycles o f massive floods and
droughts; loss of freshwater sources leading to severe shortages for use or cultivation;
lost economic opportunities from inoperative hydroelectricity production; adverse
demographic impact faces India, Pakistan, Bhutan and Nepal. Scientific models seem to
predict these climatic changes will increase during the course of the 21st century and the
impact across Asia as well as in the South Asian region to continue ominously.
Such historical rises in temperature and changing patterns in precipitation across
the region has led a host of experts to ascribe a multitude o f adverse climate-related
impacts from global climate change. In the recent decades the rise in extreme weather
events such as recurring massive floods due to melting glaciers, rising sea levels and
extreme storms, and cycles o f heat waves and droughts have been noted; furthermore, the
rise in intensity and frequency o f these extreme trends point to acute human impacts
caused by lowered agricultural capacity and food productivity, scarcity o f freshwater,
inundation in the coastal areas and adverse effects on biodiversity, all compounding to
create large-scale demographic consequences on health, livelihoods and migration
patterns.6 Some o f the projected demographic consequences include: inability to cope
with the basic necessities and public health effects o f recurring natural disasters causing
large-scale population displacement; resource scarcity leading to increase in localized and

4 R.V. Cruz et al., "Climate Change: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability - Asia," ed.
M.L. Parry, et al., Contribution o f Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report o f
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf7assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter 10.pdf.
475.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 475-78.
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interstate violence and conflict; intrastate and interstate mass migration from the
impacted areas, such as from the coastal regions to the hinterlands causing added
demographic pressures in scarce resources.7 Various experts and analysts believe that due
to the above-mentioned perfect combination of adverse factors, South Asia might be
especially vulnerable so that it may experience the worst impacts o f climate change.8
From a regional perspective, then, for South Asia the impact o f global climate
change might be debilitating when considered in conjunction with its high level of
population density, low level of baseline economic development, and relatively lower
level o f state capacity and resources to attend to various mitigation and adaptation
strategies.9 As defined by climate change experts, mitigation refers to technological and
policy instruments used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions so as to decelerate the rate of
climate change, whereas adaptation means those processes and activities employed by
individuals and societies to adjust behavior in response to changes in the environment
due to climate change.10 Both mitigation and adaptation are economically costly
processes with long time horizons requiring major transformations in human activities at
a societal, regional and even global level. While all the states o f South Asia may face
some o f these dire impacts and need to contribute to mitigation and adaptive measures,
each one has to be prepared for specific and unique manifestations o f the effects of

7 Arpita Bhattacharyya and Michael Werz, Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict in
South Asia: Rising Tensions and Policy Options across the Subcontinent, (Center for
American Progress & Heinrich Coll Stiftung, December 2012),
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/11 /ClimateMigrationSubContinentReportsmall.pdf.
8 World Bank, "Climate Change: Why Is South Asia Vulnerable?," (2013),
http://go.worldbank.org/CVAV2OB8N0; Mannava V.K. Sivakumar and Rober Stefanski,
"Climate Change in South Asia," in Climate Change and Food Security in South Asia, ed.
R Lai, et al. (Springer, 2011).
9 For an argument that social capital is the defining variable in how societies manage
natural disasters and sustain resilience, see, Daniel P. Aldrich, Building Resilience: Social
Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery (University o f Chicago Press, 2012).
10 United States Environmental Protection Agency, "Glossary o f Climate Change Terms,"
(September 9,2013), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/glossary.html; Intergovermental
Panel on Climate Change, "Glossary o f Terms Used in the Ipcc Fourth Assessment
Report," (n.d.),
https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_glossary.shtml.
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climate change, and each state needs to prepare unique efforts o f mitigation and
adaptation at great cost. But the policy creativity and political ability to generate needed
changes seem beyond the purview o f a single state and regional cooperation in finding
solutions and distribution o f costs are needed. This makes bargaining among states an
opportunity to shift costs onto others.

Impacts on Glaciers and Water Resources in the Himalayan Region
The risk to the Himalayan glaciers and long-term effect on water resources are the
two main and proximate consequences o f climate change that directly impact Nepal,
India and China. The shared geography of the Himalayan region means that both these
manifestations of climate change will necessarily have transboundaiy impacts, which
would mean that we can expect to see tripartite interaction to engage on this arena and
maybe detect avenues o f Nepal’s wedging behavior. Before analyzing the interstate and
national policy interaction, here I present the current extent o f knowledge and possible
concerns from these two climate impacts in the region.
The Himalayan region contains the world’s highest concentration o f glaciers
outside o f the two Polar Regions in the globe. Scientists have documented that rising
temperature has caused accelerated melting or retreating o f glaciers in the high
Himalayas over the past half century, with the current rate of glacier melt being about 10
to 60 meters per year.11 The primary observed consequence o f melting glaciers is that
they create large pools o f accumulated water with the attendant risk o f glacial lake
outburst floods (GLOFs). Extensive scientific research in Himalayan region using site
visits, GPS and satellite images and historical corroboration have documented the rising
number o f such lakes and noted that the lakes are indeed increasing in size, thereby
raising the probability of catastrophic GLOFs in the coming years.12 A long term study
11 Samjwal Rama Bajracharya, Pradeep Kumar Mool, and Basanta Raj Shrestha, "Global
Climate Change and Melting o f Himalayan Glaciers," in Melting Glaciers and Rising Sea
Levels: Impacts and Implications, ed. Prabha Shastri Ranade (India: The ICFAI
University Press, 2008), 28.
12 Sandeep Chamling Rai, ed. An Overview o f Glaciers, Glacier Retreat, and Its
Subsequent Impacts in Nepal, India and China (World Wildlife Fund Nepal Program,
2006); Arun B Shrestha and Raju Aryal, "Climate Change in Nepal and Its Impact on
Himalayan Glaciers," Regional Environmental Change 11, no. 1 (2011); Samjwal Ratna
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begun in the 1990s by the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development
(ICIMOD), a policy and advocacy research institute working in the states from
Afghanistan to Bhutan in the Hindu-Kush Himalayas, documented the baseline data
which showed there were “ 15,000 glaciers, 9,000 lakes and 200 potentially dangerous
glacial lakes including 21 GLOF events.”13 Given such a geographical reality, major and
recurring flooding could be a regular part of the future o f Nepal, northern India and in the
Tibetan plateau, causing massive infrastructure damage, siltation o f farmlands, and
inundation of downstream settlements. Critical infrastructures such as bridges, tunnels
and hydropower plants might be washed over during such flooding, causing long-term
economic and social impacts.
These varied effects of melting glaciers and glacial floods can only be addressed
by increased regional cooperation coupled with national commitment to significant
mitigation and adaptation efforts. Such efforts to manage the glaciers in the high
Himalayan region need to include their scientific monitoring, installation of early
warning systems to warn o f GLOFs, construction of infrastructures and development
projects in the region with GLOFs in mind, and to prepare downstream population
centers with adaptive measures. The current research focuses on the scientific basis o f the
problem of melting glaciers but in the years ahead the economic and interstate
dimensions of this climactic change will need to be researched and addressed.
The second major consequence o f the global climate change on the Himalayan
region is in the projected long-term insecurity o f the water resources. As has been
mentioned, the greater Tibetan plateau and the Himalayas are known as the “water towers
o f Asia” because they form the originating source of the major river systems including
their tributaries in the region: the Yellow and Yangtze rivers flow into China; the
Mekong, Salween, and Irrawaddy rivers flow into Southeast Asia; and the Ganges,

Bajracharya, Pradeep Kumar Mool, and Basanta Raj Shrestha, Impact o f Climate Change
on Himalayan Glaciers and Glacial Lakes: Case Studies on GLOF and Associated
Hazards in Nepal and Bhutan, (Kathmandu, Nepal: International Centre for Integrated
Mountain Development (ICIMOD), June 2007), http://lib.icimod.org/record/22442.
13 "Global Climate Change and Melting o f Himalayan Glaciers," 34.
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Brahmaputra, and Indus rivers that flow into South Asia.14 O f these rivers, the waters
from the Ganges and its tributaries—Kamali, Gandaki and Sapta Koshi—traverse from
the Himalayas through Nepal into India to drain into the Bay of Bengal, whereas the
Brahmaputra river travels East from Tibet via India into Bangladesh and to the Bay.
These international rivers and the economic utility of their freshwaters necessarily are in
the domain of interstate negotiations and as the effects of global warming put pressure on
vital water resources, they likely will be the cause o f increasing bargaining and possibly
conflict.
In terms o f long-term freshwater resources, the states in the South Asian region
already deal with a myriad of issues. River water pollution is a major concern leading to
public health scares; haphazard development o f local infrastructure including major and
minor hydropower projects takes an environmental toll on the ecosystem; recurring
floods in the transboundary rivers between Nepal and India as well as between India and
Bangladesh produce intense displacement and distress; and fair and proper distribution of
water for irrigation and use during the dry season between the riparian states are issues of
regular concern and negotiations between the states.15
Another aspect of water resources impacts, from the interstate perspective, is the
possible construction of major infrastructures projects to divert waters from
transboundary rivers, which could exacerbate or strain relations between Nepal, India and
China. Major dams and hydropower projects in Nepal, which were analyzed in the
previous chapter, cause variation o f water flow and produce differing costs and benefits
to downstream areas o f India. Similarly, India’s grand plan o f linking the waters of its
major rivers via canals and reservoirs to supply water to its population centers, the socalled National River Linking Project (NRLP), could produce various unintended
consequences in the water relations between that country and its neighbors Nepal and
Bangladesh. Finally, China’s possible utilization o f the Yarlung Tsangpo river (which is
14 Jayanta Bandyopadhyay, "Securing the Himalayas as the Water Tower o f Asia: An
Environmental Perspective," Asia Policy 16, no. 1 (2013).
15 For an on-the-ground reportage of the myriad water crises facing the Ganges river
basin, see Cheryl Colopy, Dirty, Sacred Rivers: Confronting South Asia's Water Crisis
(Oxford University Press, USA, 2012).
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called the Brahmaputra in the Indian territory) from Tibet to divert water north into its the
population and agricultural centers would create possible conflict with India. These
possible hotspots sometimes become fodder for alarmism or downright paranoia about
impending “water wars,” yet in the context o f long-term climate change and shortage and
variability of freshwater, the eventual negotiations about the proper utilization of
transboundary river systems are bound to create avenues for cooperation or conflict.16
Thus, the regional manifestation o f the global warming in the form of melting
glaciers and possible freshwater scarcity could become the major arena of interstate
negotiation and bargaining, even conflict, in the coming decades. For the small and least
powerful among the actors, the wedge state o f Nepal, the solution to the situation
necessarily need to be found in negotiation under bilateral, regional and global regimes
and not conflict. Yet, in the issue of threatened glaciers, the three states have yet to show
concrete interest except for many formal announcements and increased bilateral scientific
research to ascertain the extent o f the problem. On the issue o f the shared water, so far
the attention and bulk of negotiation has been focused on the economic utility related to
hydropower, dam building, flood control and irrigation and not on the possibility of
drastic future shortages.
As discussed earlier, the lack of deep strategic policy engagement in this arena is
a crucial limitation in this case because the issue is a recent, ongoing phenomenon.
Therefore, the long-term consequences o f global warming and the resulting evidentiary
patterns o f the tripartite and bilateral interaction between Nepal, India and China might
be understood for now in the context o f global and regional policy frameworks. Another
avenue to analyze the future contours o f the tripartite interaction is by examining the
patterns of existing cooperation in transboundary conservation efforts, pollution reduction
measures and sustainable development partnerships. The following section reviews the
global and regional policy framework and the participation o f the three states in them; the
16 For an argument on the possibility o f regional "water wars," see Brahma Chellaney,
Water: Asia's New Battleground (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
2011); For a cogent caution against the "hyperbole" o f "water wars," see David Katz,
"Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of
Water Wars," Global Environmental Politics 11, no. 1 (2011).
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subsequent sections analyze evolving national and bilateral policies regarding climate
change, and the current state o f the tripartite interaction.
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS
The global climate change debate and the emerging policy framework o f
responses addressing the mitigation and adaptation efforts has been riven by an acute
chasm between the interests of industrialized states o f the West and the developing states
o f the global South. In 1992, the United Nations (UN) and its member states began the
global climate change framework in the form o f the treaty at the Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
which seeks international action on climate change, has been ratified by all UN members
although binding agreements on climate actions has now ground to a halt because of the
so-called “cleavage” between the West and the newly industrializing states and the
underdeveloped states. When it came to the negotiations regarding the bearing o f costs to
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the matter of equitable compensation for
economic, demographic and social burdens, the deep divisions between the two sides
began with the Earth Summit and through the design and participation in the Kyoto
Protocol framework in 1997 but the chasm has widened in the subsequent rounds of
climate negotiations until present.17
Critics o f the current global policy trajectory blame the wealthy Western nations
o f seeking to hinder the economic development path of the developing countries by using
climate-related obligations, despite the fact o f lower lever of historically aggregate and
current per-capita GHC emissions accrued by the emerging economic regions. Observers
even posit that as the historical source o f great amounts o f GHG emissions, the developed
Western states are doing gross injustice on the rest o f the states in seeking comparable
GHG reductions in the future.18 Current estimates o f GHG emissions show a sharp rise in
cumulative emissions in the developing world, especially in South Asia, which has seen

17 Bansal and Datta, "The Impact o f Climate Change in South Asia," 218.
18 A detailed and cogent quantitatively based analysis o f this idea is presented in J.T.
Roberts and B.C. Parks, A Climate o f Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics,
and Climate Policy (MIT Press, 2007).
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3.3 percent rise in emissions per year since 1990; however, the historical GHG footprint
of the emerging economic regions was low and because o f high population and low
energy consumption in per capita terms, South Asians still only contribute less than onefifth carbon emissions compared to the developed nations.19 The global framework under
the UNFCC does maintain the principle o f “common but differentiated” responsibilities
between the wealthy countries and the developing or less developed countries. However,
disagreements among the major global powers and emerging economies, including the
refusal by the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent global standards,
has meant that a durable global framework to address climate change has failed to
materialize.
As far as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), such as Nepal, and their
adaptation to climate change is concerned, the articles o f UNFCCC pledged support for
economic and technical assistance, a process which in the last decade has begun to be set
in motion. The main vehicle of the assistance process is the drafting o f National
Adaptation Program o f Action (NAPA) by most o f the LDCs, which outlines the current
state o f climate research and findings, reviews the crucial long-term vulnerabilities, and
lists immediate and urgent climate-related vulnerabilities and possible adaptive measures
in projects that could be funded. Projects that are approved are then funded through the
mechanism o f LDC Fund under assistance from the wealthier countries o f North America
and Europe, grouped under the UNFCCC Annex-I. Other goals o f drafting NAPAs and
LDC funding include research and administrative capacity building; creating national
nodal bodies to deal with climate change issues; providing technical training as well as
negotiation and languages training to better equip LDC representatives to state their
unique concerns and positions to influence the global climate process.20

19 World Bank, "South Asia - Shared Views on Development and Climate Change,"
(2009), http://documents.worldbank.Org/curated/en/2009/01/l 1472620/south-asia-sharedviews-development-climate-change.
20 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, "Chronological Evolution
of the LDC Work Programme and Introduction to the Concept o f NAPA,"
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/knowledge_resources/ldc_portal/items/4722.php.

154

On the other hand, two o f the largest newly developing economies and carbon
emitters, India and China, view the UNFCCC process and the goal o f binding
international conventions and caps on carbon emissions as a unfair hindrance to their
right to economic growth. In the last decade, due to pressure from the established
Western economies, global leaders and domestic scientific communities, China and India
have acknowledged the need for action against climate change by embarking in a policy
of adopting domestic, bilateral and regional discussions and exchanges on climate
change, while still refusing to abide by any global emissions standards. Both countries
have produced extensive national action plans and policies—called the National Action
Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC)— to deal holistically with the issue, which is
discussed in detail in the next section. In the bilateral realm, in October 2009 India hosted
an India-China joint workshop to discuss their respective national action plans for climate
change. The conclave produced a five-year accord between the two states, signed by
Indian environmental minister Jairam Ramesh and Chinese vice minister of National
Development and Reform Commission Xie Zhenhua, outlining plans to share technical,
scientific and policy experiences on climate change adaptation measures.21 However, the
true purpose of the meeting was to present a united negotiating front in the upcoming
Copenhagen Summit, where the two nations again called on rich Western nations to curb
their emissions and increase funding and technology transfer to less developed nations,
while also reiterating their commitment to economic development and finding local
solutions to climate change risks. This negotiating strategy, inter alia, scuttled any
mandatory global agreements in the Copenhagen climate summit, while on the sidelines
China and India joined Brazil and South Africa to negotiate a much-limited and voluntary
agreement with the United States.22

21 Sunil Raghu, "India, China Sign 5-Year Pact on Climate Change," The Wall Street
Journal (October 21 2009), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB125610390297898449;
Gaurav Singh and John Duce, "China, India Sign Climate Change Cooperation Accord,"
Bloomberg News (October 21 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=:aFyFHkF6C3Fs.
22 BBC News, "Q&A: The Copenhagen Climate Summit," BBC News (December 21
2009), http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/8278973.stm.
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The prime focus o f the global climate framework under UNFCCC is based on
seeking agreements on the mitigation side of climate change efforts, by setting up the
highly contentious binding limits on GHG emissions. Thus, in the absence o f a globally
binding emissions treaty, the complementary task o f local and limited adaptation
measures has fallen to the individual nation-states that are the most vulnerable or to
regional efforts with economic support from the wealthy nations or international financial
institutions. Regional fora in Asia, such as the Association o f Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have
become venues to engage in environmental discussions and adopt common positions of
the member states for global negotiations. As the pace of economic development as well
as the rate o f climate change accelerates, the states in the global South must certainly be
obliged to begin cooperative and interactive negotiations among themselves. Such a
possibility of South-South negotiations, between the emerging economies such as China,
India, Brazil and others cannot be discounted as the effects o f global climate change
begin to impact their economies and societies.
In the South Asian region, the members o f the SAARC regional body—
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka, with Afghanistan
joining the group later—commenced in the late 1980s a regional process o f consultation
and cooperation on environmental issues. During the early phase o f the budding regional
framework, the rhetoric of “climate change” was not prominent in the regional discourse
because the SAARC member states were mainly focused on the localized environmental
concerns such as degradation o f the regional ecosystems, pollution, transboundary
conservation and dealing with natural disasters that were transboundary in nature.23 The
regional policy process until recently has been focused mainly on commissioning
research on regional environmental issues, setting up a technical committee with the task
of gathering and sharing scientific data on regional environmental issues, and conducting
periodic meetings of the environment ministers to produce repeated proclamations on the

23 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat, "Area of
Cooperation: Environment," (n.d.), http://www.saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/catdetail.php?catid=54.
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need for environmental cooperation rather than adopting and implementing concrete
action plans.
By the mid-2000s, due to intensified global climate discourse as well as the
impetus due to major regional natural disasters like the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the
SAARC member states began to address the regional impacts o f and adaptive measures
to global climate change directly. In 2008 a ministerial level meeting specifically on
climate change was held in Dhaka, which produced the “Dhaka Declaration,” and the
“SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change.”24 The Action Plan formed the basis of
creating a common position o f the SAARC members in global climate negotiations,
specifically calling on the rich, western states to provide financial and technological
commitments per the UNFCCC principles o f “responsibility based on capabilities” to
address the mitigation and adaptation measures against climate change while preserving
the “right to development” of the developing states. Additionally, the member states were
given the responsibility to implement the adaptation and mitigation measures including
cooperation on technology transfer, sharing o f best practices and information in
conservation and disaster preparation, and mass-awareness and media-engagement
campaigns.25 Subsequently, in 2010 the Sixteenth SAARC Summit held in Thimpu,
Bhutan, produced the “Thimpu Statement on Climate Change.” Like the prior
declaration, this statement further served the purpose o f cementing common positions of
the SAARC member states on global climate negotiations based on the principles of
equity and justice, while deepening the thematic cooperation o f further research and
Of*
policy coordination. In addition, there have been investments in scientific exchange,
coordination in nascent regional monitoring efforts, policy exchange via periodic
conferences of the respective agencies dealing with environmental issues, and efforts to
raise awareness on climate change and its impacts. These local efforts are reinforced by

24 Ibid.
25 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), "Dhaka Declaration on
Climate Change," (July 2008), available at: http://saarcsdmc.nic.in/pdf7publications/climate/chapter-1 .pdf.
26 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat, "Thimpu
Statement on Climate Change," (April 2010), http://www.saarcsec.org/userfiles/ThimphuStatementonClimateChange-29April2010.pdf.

157

the activities o f the major international financial institutions, such as the World Bank,
calling for capacity building to choose a path away from the current dependence on fossil
fuels to a “low-carbon growth” strategy of regional economic development.27
However, some significant limitations of the emerging regional policy framework
on environmental cooperation and climate change have been the lack of binding
commitments and leaving the responsibility o f implementation entirely on the individual
member states. Each new round of summits and meetings produce boilerplate calls for
more research, mass-awareness and sharing o f best practices to enhance cooperation. In
other words, the regional framework suffers the same condition as the global framework,
which is lack o f concrete action. The main reasons for lack o f effective cooperation,
argues one researcher, are “lack o f mutual trust, the preference o f India... for excluding
bilateral environmental issues from regional discussions, and a dependence on external
donors for funding in support o f existing regional institutions.”28 Therefore, to locate the
actual policy interaction and development on environmental cooperation in the era of
climate change along with implementation efforts, we have to look within the national
sphere and analyze domestic and bilateral policies. To understand Nepal’s national and
bilateral policy evolution on environmental cooperation with India and China, the next
section analyzes the evidence o f such policies.
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL & BILATERAL POLICIES
The three states, Nepal, India and China, began crafting strategic policies
specifically regarding the impacts and consequences o f climate change in the first decade
of 2000s. In all three states, the bulk o f the emerging policies and their implementation
have been focused primarily on domestic and local levels, dealing particularly with air
and water pollution, efficiency o f resource management, increased scientific funding and
conducting environmental reviews for development projects. The prime consideration is
economic development in the age of climate risks and to pursue national development

27 World Bank, "South Asia - Shared Views on Development and Climate Change".
28 Ashok Swain, "South Asia, Its Environment and Regional Institutions," in
Comparative Environmental Regionalism, ed. Lorraine Elliott and Shaun Breslin (New
York: Taylor & Francis, 2011).
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projects adaptive and resilience to current and fixture consequences of climate change.
Whatever tripartite or regional interactions have been initiated has come mostly in the
realm o f scientific data gathering and knowledge sharing and transboundary conservation
efforts, much o f which has been led by the efforts o f international non-governmental
sector. The review o f the individual state’s national strategic policies on climate change
presented below highlights the current insularity o f adopted measures but also presents
avenues for fixture cooperation and interactive negotiations. Emerging national policies of
Nepal, India and China respectively are analyzed below.
Although the ideas of sustainable development, pollution reduction and
environmental degradation had entered the Nepali policy consciousness beginning in the
1980s, the specific use of the language o f global climate change and policy response to its
impacts were not adopted until the mid-2000s. This was despite the fact that Nepal had
been a signatory o f the Rio Earth Summit and ratified the UNFCC and related
conventions. The official Nepalese development planning policy documents paid scant
notice to climate related risks in its development activities. A thorough review published
in an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report of the
national planning policy documents until the Tenth Plan adopted by the National
Planning Commission (NPC) in 2002 foixnd that until that year climate change risk
management was not an explicit national policy priority.29 This lack o f explicit focus on
climate change impacts suggested lack o f awareness but also the fact that many of the
possible areas of development policy, such as in water resources management and
monsoon related agricultural adaptation among others, were previously targeted under the
rubric of “sustainable development.” The same OECD report also commented that more
than fifty percent of donor-led development projects, especially in water resources and
hydropower sectors, might be vulnerable to climate related risks.30 Because Nepal relies
on foreign aid for more than 70% o f its development budget, the increasing awareness
and concern about climate related risks on donor approved and financed projects would

29 Shardul Agrawala et al., "Development and Climate Change in Nepal: Focus on Water
Resources and Hydropower," Organization fo r Economic Cooperation and Development,
Paris 64(2003): 20.
30 Ibid., 25.
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mean more policy engagement regarding the various inputs of climate change in the latter
half of the decade.
In the arena o f hydropower development, until the mid-1990s, new projects were
not legally required to conduct an environmental impact study and there was no formal
governmental mechanism governing environmental concerns. Large donor-funded
projects did voluntarily conduct preliminary environmental assessments and the
government provided basic guidelines on environmental issues to consider without legal
backing.31 The passage o f the Environmental Protection Act (EPA) and the
Environmental Protection Regulation in 1997 finally provided firm legal requirement for
the need to conduct Initial Environmental Examination as well as a detailed
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) before being granted permission to develop
infrastructure projects, including those related to water resources and hydropower.32
Although the EPA does not mention “climate change,” the law reflects the guiding
principles o f environmental protection o f the time by broadly defining “environment” as
the “interaction and inter-relationship among the components o f natural, cultural and
social systems, economic and human activities and their components,” and “pollution” as
the “activities that significantly degrade, damage the environment or harm on the
beneficial or useful purpose o f the environment, by changing the environment, directly or
indirectly.”33 Obviously, these definitions incorporate the latterly significant concerns of
climate change and its impacts. Therefore, appropriate laws on environmental protection
governing the hydropower and water resources development sector in Nepal, although,
since the long-term climatic impacts of hydro-projects are not immediately discernible, it

31 Dilli Bahadur Singh, "Dealing with the Environment in Hydropower Development,"
(May 2007),
http://www.ncf.org.np/upload/files/582_en_Dealing%20with%20the%20Environmental
%20Chanllenges%20in%20Hydropower%20Development.pdf.
32 Ramesh Prasad Bhatt and Sanjay Nath Khanal, "Environmental Impact Assessment
System in Nepal: Overview o f Policy, Legal Instruments and Process," Kathmandu
University Journal o f Science, Engineering and Technology 5, no. 2 (September 2009):
162-63.
33 Government of Nepal, "Environment Protection Act, 1997," (Kathmandu, Nepal 1997),
2-3.
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is questionable if the EIA process can be instrumental in climate change mitigation and
adaptation.
The first national policy that addressed climate change explicitly came in 2004,
when the then Ministry of Population and Environment o f Government o f Nepal,
produced an initial report on national climate change policies as part o f the reporting
requirements of the conference o f the parties of UNFCCC.34 That document was not
meant to usher in major policy changes or initiatives but to establish baseline state-ofknowledge o f climate change science including the possible impacts on water resources
and livelihoods as well as a catalogue o f the existing environmental policies in the
country. Pertinently, the report highlighted the need for “comprehensive” bilateral
cooperation with both India and China, above and beyond the existent sharing o f
information, on the hydrological impact o f climate change for the rivers that flow across
all three countries.35
In September 2010, Nepal’s Ministry o f Environment completed the
aforementioned National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) and submitted it to the
UNFCCC. Prepared by a large group o f experts after sixteen month-long multi-sector
stakeholder consultative processes, the document presents nine integrated projects for
funding request selected based on “urgent and immediate national adaptation priority.”36
The identified priority projects o f immediate vulnerability include such concerns as:
adaptive measures related to: agricultural, water resources and biodiversity management;
community-based disaster management; GLOF monitoring, early warning and risk
reduction; forestry and ecosystem support; climate induced public health adaptation; and
related issues of climate impacts.37 The combined cost o f the nine projects for which

34 Government o f Nepal Ministry of Population and Environment, Initial National
Communication to the Conference o f the Parties o f the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, (July 2004),
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/nepnc 1.pdf.
35 Ibid., 103-04.
36 Government of Nepal Ministry o f Environment, National Adaptation Programme of
Action (NAPA) to Climate Change, (September 2010),
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/npl01 .pdf. ix.
37 Ibid., 32-49.
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funding is sought is listed as US $350 million, of which about $21 million had been
disbursed by 2013 into various projects through the LDC funding mechanism.38
However, maybe owing to the fact that the NAPA was drafted for UNFCCC LDC Fund
and focused on “urgent and immediate adaptive measures” there was scant mention of
possible bilateral cooperation with either India or China on matters o f water resources or
Himalayan glaciers. Various other donor-funded projects and policies are in place
building on these baseline ideas o f climate adaptation and resilience.39 Subsequently,
building on the guiding principles o f NAPA, Local Adaptation Plans o f Action (LAP As)
and a new Climate Change Policy were adopted in 2011.40
Yet, there are major weaknesses in the focus and direction o f Nepal’s climate
change institutional and policy practices. As noted in the analysis above, most climate
change policy advancements are based on the global framework and domestic adaptation
and localized developmental needs. Bilateral and regional policies have not been pursued
as a complement to all the policy advancement in the domestic and local level; there is a
pronounced, artificial and disappointing separation between the two levels of
policymaking. Other weakness stem from instable institutional structure guiding climate
change policy; for example, the ministry responsible as the nodal agency for international
interaction on climate change, Ministry o f Environment, has been reorganized and
restructured a few times in the past decade. Added to institutional instability is the regular
chum o f personnel and lack o f coordination among the many bodies, agencies and levels
of administrative units, from the center to the local governments.41 In such an
environment o f instability and lack o f coordination, lots o f waste, duplicated efforts and
blind spots are to be expected.

38 UNFCCC, "Status of NAPA Implementation under the LDCF," (n.d.),
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/knowledge_resources/ldc_portal/ items/5632.php.
39 Some o f the current projects and policies at the national level include: National Climate
Change Support Program (NCCSP); Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR);
Second National Communication Project (SNC).
40 Government o f Nepal Ministry o f Environment, "Climate Change Policy," (2011),
http://www.climatenepal.org.np/main/?p=research&sp=onlinelibrary&opt=detail&id=419
41 Ryan Bartlett et al., Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation in Nepal (Colombo, Sri
Lnaka: International Water Management Institute, 2010), 19-20.
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In the case o f India, in June 2008, the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
adopted that country’s first National Action Plan for Climate Change (NAPCC), which
set out the need for sustainable development amid the growing impact o f climate change
in India. In a larger picture, on principle, Indian view of global climate change hinges on
the idea that the developed Western economies must share most o f the responsibility for
the current situation; however, Indian policy reflects the necessity o f beginning to address
climate mitigation and adaption to achieve sustainable economic development.42 The
NAPCC document called for the relevant government departments to draft long-term
policy goals and implementation plans of mitigation and adaptation policies related to
eight core national mission areas: solar energy, energy efficiency, sustainable habitat,
expanding forests, sustainable agriculture, study of climate science as well as water
resources and sustaining Himalayan ecosystem.43
The last two missions, on water resources and Himalayan ecosystem, which
includes glacial retreat, ultimately require regional and tripartite interaction with Nepal
and China. However, the NAPCC doesn’t mention those countries by name; the major
points of water mission focus primarily on the needs of greater domestic efficiency of
water management but the Himalayan ecosystem mission acknowledges the need to share
scientific data and expertise in studying the extent o f glacial retreat among the states of
South Asia which share the Himalayan ecosystem and to create a credible monitoring
network of the Himalaya environment in “cooperation with neighboring countries.”44 In
his 2009 remarks on the national mission on the Himalayan ecosystem, PM Singh
reiterated the very high importance o f the Himalayas for the livelihoods o f millions of
people, commented on the continued degradation of the fragile ecosystem of the region
and called for coordinated and comprehensive climate action plan for the entire
Himalayan region to be developed in cooperation with the other Himalayan states, Nepal,

42 Government of India Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change, "National Action
Plan on Climate Change," (n.d.), http://www.moef.nic.in/modules/about-theministry/CCD/N AP_E.pdf.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., 4.
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Bhutan, China and Pakistan.45 To that end, in subsequent SAARC summits, India
reiterated the need for regional cooperation on climate related impacts, as described in the
previous section, and India also hosted a SAARC Ministers Conference in 2009 to help
prepared a joint action on climate change; yet specific agreements on the Himalayan
issue haven’t materialized 46 On the other hand, India’s bilateral engagement with China
on climate change was initiated with the 2009 conference held in New Delhi. As
discussed above, the five-year accord signed then proposed increasing knowledge sharing
and interaction on climate related activities. Another, and most important, reason for the
Sino-Indian accord was to present unified bargaining position with the Western nations in
global climate negotiations. So far, the latter mission has held largely intact.
A recent independent review o f the India’s NAPCC produced in consultation with
numerous experts in the field has found myriad technical and policy limitations inherent
in the formulation o f such a holistic and wide-ranging plan, which requires coordination
from more than five ministries and multitudes o f agencies and departments o f the
government to progress.47 One o f the strategic concerns voiced by the reviewers was the
competition from Chinese firms in the solar energy sector to under Indian manufacturers,
thus hindering the goal o f sustainable economic development.48 When it comes to the
mission o f sustainable Himalayan ecosystem, the Indian national policy is thin in details
on generating coherent policies coordination with the other states that share the
ecosystem.49 Similarly, on the mission o f efficient water utilization, the weakness o f the
current iteration o f the national policy is a lack of any engagement with the possible
impacts of climate change on water resources, while focusing solely on domestic

45 Prime Minister's Office - Government o f India, "Introductory Remarks by Prime
Minister at the Meeting of Pm's Council on Climate Change on the National Mission on
Sustaining the Himalayan Eco-System," (October 26, 2009),
http://www.moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/PM_speech.pdf.
46 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat, "Area of
Cooperation: Environment".
47 Sujatha and Rajan Byravan, Sudhir Chella,, "An Evaluation o f India's National Action
Plan on Climate Change," (January 3, 2013), Available at SSRN:
http://ssm.com/abstract=2195819.
48 Ibid., 12.
49 Ibid.
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concerns of efficiency and coordination.50 These concerns highlight the paucity of a
mature Indian policy on regional solutions and interactions in addressing climate change.
Such state of affairs provides little confidence that climate concerns would be prioritized
in Indian strategic and economic negotiations with its neighbors, especially Nepal and
China at the present time. However, it must be highlighted that this is a new domain for
all states concerned to establish the expertise and best practices, and in due time cogent
policies as well as strategic interests o f all parties would be revealed.
When it comes to China’s climate change mitigation and adaptation policies, the
country has sought to remain unencumbered of global mandatory limits to continue
unabated on its path o f economic growth and infrastructure development. But as the
world’s largest emitter o f GHG emissions, Chinese policymakers and leaders have for the
last two decades been cognizant o f the increasingly dire environmental problems
produced by its breakneck pace o f development and economic growth at the domestic
level. In the late 1990s, Chinese official policy moved environmental degradation and
climate change from a merely scientific issue to one o f sustainable developmental priority
establishing the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC), while
the 10th Five Year Plan of 2001 to 2005 included a thorough research agenda to ascertain
the vulnerabilities and adaptation needs o f climate and environmental impacts.51
In the years leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, major stories o f large-scale
river water pollution, smog clouds in the cities, and desertification in the Northwest
began to dominate the Western and national news reports, spurring the leaders to take
significant measures to address the climate vulnerability. A year before the Olympics in
June 2007, the powerful central body National Development and Reform Commission
unveiled China’s National Climate Change Program (CNCCP), which accepts the reality
of climate change’s impact on China, outlines the official policies regarding mitigation
and adaptation to climate change while maintaining the pace o f sustainable economic
50 Ibid., 13.
51 Rebecca Nadin, China: National Adaptation Programs and Strategies, (Presented at
Asia Adaptation Meeting: Adapting to Climate Change in China (ACCC), 2012),
http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/ACCC/National-Adaptation-Programs-andStrategies.pdf.
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development.52 As a signatory to the UNFCCC and a developing economy, CNCCP
called on the developed economies to bear their historical burden by funding and
transferring technology to the developing nations, and by accepting binding emissions
themselves while allowing the developing economies to their right of social development
and poverty eradication. Thus, the plan did not include any quantifiable targets or limits
on emissions.53 In the years since issuing CNCCP, China has adopted widely discussed
domestic regulatory, technological and economic policies to enhance environmental
protection, increase the use of renewable sources such as solar and hydropower to shift its
energy profile from coal dominance, with the long-term salutary effects o f such efforts
still being debated.54 China has also stepped up engagement in regional and bilateral
climate related exchange and cooperation agreements. One example o f such bilateral
cooperation was China’s five-year climate change cooperation accord with India signed
in 2009, which as discussed above was based primarily on scientific collaboration and
exchange of knowledge.
China-Nepal bilateral relation on climate change has so far been limited to the
scientific study o f the Tibetan plateau and the entire Hindu-Kush-Himalayan region. The
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) launched the Third Pole Environment (TPE)
program in 2009 to scientifically study the climate change’s impact on the Tibetan
plateau’s long-term future. In 2014, CAS signed several memorandum o f understanding
(MOU) with various educational and research institutes in Nepal to enhance scientific
exchanges and cooperation on the issue of Himalayan ecosystem and glaciers.55 Similar
scientific exchanges, conferences and workshops have been held regularly between China
and its Third Pole neighbors, including Nepal. Other bilateral interaction between Nepal

52 Xinhua, "China Issues National Plan to Address Climate Change," (June 4, 2007),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-06/04/content_6196302.htm.
53 "Press Conference on National Climate Change Program," (June 4, 2007),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-06/04/content_6197309.htm.
54 Joanna Lewis, "Energy and Climate Goals of China's 12th Five-Year Plan," Center fo r
Climate and Energy Solutions (March 2011), http://www.c2es.org/intemational/keycountry-policies/china/energy-climate-goals-twelfth-five-year-plan.
55 Xinhua, "Nepal, China Join Hands in Tackling Climate Change," Global Times (April
8,2014), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/853123.shtml.
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and China on hydropower investment and economic aid also ties in tangentially to
concerns of environment and climate changes related to specific project impacts.
The foregoing analysis o f the national and emerging bilateral policies o f Nepal
and its rival neighbors, India and China, shows that each of the states are pursuing
primarily domestic-based policies responding to global framework related to climate
change and environment. The trend is noticeable even in the issues of bilateral and
trilateral concerns, such as the Himalayan glacier retreat and long-term water resources.
While there have been policy innovation in the regional forum such as SAARC, there is
distinct lack o f the expected tripartite interaction. Thus, the current state o f policy does
not directly allow us to test the theory of wedging and provide evidence or lack thereof in
Nepal’s wedging behavior. As has been stated, this maybe simply due to the fact that the
issue o f climate change is so recent that the structure of competition and bargaining has
not been reflected in the tripartite negotiations. While we may not make bold claims on
the central question of wedging, it is still possible to see signs o f possible future material
benefits that Nepal might enjoy from its geographical condition o f being a wedge. Below
I analyze one such instance o f tripartite collaboration on environmental issue; however,
the instigating agent o f that budding interaction is none o f the three states but an
international non-governmental organization, a non-state actor.
A CASE OF TRANSBOUNDARY CONSERVATION
In the fragile and shared ecosystems of the Himalayas, various forms of
governance and cooperative partnerships among different sets o f actors operate. The
adjoining state-level should be expected to be the primary and leading actors of
transboundary cooperation in the interstate regions of the mountain ranges. And indeed
many national conservation reserves and protected areas are situated in the bordering
areas with the adjoining transboundary region also being conserved. In eastern
Himalayas, the Kanchenjunga Landscape includes various conservation areas in Nepal,
India, and Bhutan and in the central Himalayas, including the Everest region, several
conservation areas cross borders between Nepal and Tibet. Yet, the state-level
transboundary conservation agreements between Nepal and its Himalayan neighbors have
been insufficient and insubstantial.
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However, for the last several decades numerous international non-state actors
engaged in local and regional, transboundary conservation efforts have occupied the
policy space vacated by the states. Some of those actors include the World Wildlife Fund,
World Resources Institute, International Rivers, and International Union for Conservation
of Nature, among many other local NGOs as well as the interstate body United Nations
Environmental Program. In the context of this study, the net accrued gains o f these non
state activities has been on the whole beneficial to a developing Nepal—especially, in the
form of accumulated scientific knowledge, development in technical and human
resources, and financial grants and projects o f various types— although they do not
accrue from state-level wedging strategies but are simply the product o f Nepal being the
geographic wedge in the Himalayan region.
That forms o f non-state governance structures have matured in one case to attract
state-level support and coordination o f the neighboring states. The case of International
Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) and its Kailash Sacred
Landscape (KSL) project is just such an example and is reviewed below.

ICIMOD and Mt. Kailash Transboundary Conservation
ICIMOD was founded in 1984 as an international center based in Kathmandu for
research, scholarship and partnership for the wellbeing of the hill farming community in
the Hindu-Kush Himalayan region. ICIMOD members include eight states, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, India, China, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar, each represented by an official in its
governing board, as well as other experts and outside representatives. Initially, the
financing was donated funds by a few European donor governments but now member
states provide funding as do other international funding agencies. In those early years of
its existence, the mere fact that a single regional organization would be able to bring
together these states despite their simmering conflicts and border disputes for the sake of
the livelihoods o f the Himalayan peoples seemed a tall task.56 In the last three decades
ICIMOD has met that challenge to become a well-established and respected policy and
partnership organization in the arena o f mountain ecosystem and livelihood conservation,
and it has also been able to engage the governments of each of its member states,
56 Kanak Mani Dixit, "ICIMOD Searches for Its Soul," HIMAL Southasian May 1987.
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including the initially reluctant Myanmar and China, in various conservation initiatives,
conducting collaborative research projects and policy exchanges.57
In the Southwestern part o f Tibet, adjoining Nepal and India, there is a mountain
that has remained sacred to the Hindus, Buddhists and other regional religious traditions
for centuries, called Mount Kailash. Every year thousands of pilgrims and tourists from
South Asia and beyond make the arduous journey to this remote area to see the mountain
and to visit the nearby holy lake called Mansarovar. The religious, cultural and ecological
importance of the sacred landscape surrounding Mt. Kailash has made it been the site of
large-scale conservation effort in the last half-decade. The unique fact about this
conservation effort is that the Greater Kailash region conservation area spans an area of
over 31 thousand square kilometers and includes territories of the three states, China,
India and Nepal.58 The region is a transboundary conservation area (TCA), which is
defined as “an area that straddles international boundaries and is managed cooperatively
for conservation purposes and may include adjacent national parks and other protected
areas,” and have been in existence for a long time to meet the needs o f conservation and
traditional biodiversity and habitat preservation across bordering regions all over the
world.59
Called the Kailash Sacred Landscape Conservation and Development Initiative
(KSL), the project was spearheaded by the efforts o f ICIMOD with initial funding from
the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the German government foreign
development assistance. With the stated mission o f promoting a “regional collaborative

Saleem H. Ali, Ecological Cooperation in South Asia: The Way Forward (Washington
DC: New America Foundation, January 2013),
http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/flles/policydocs/Ali_EcologicalCooper
ation_NAF_0.pdf. 7.
58 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), "South-South Cooperation Case
Study: Transboundary Biodiversity Initiative between China, India and Nepal for the
Conservation of the Mount Kailash Sacred Himalayan Landscape," (n.d.),
http://www.unep.org/SOUTH-SOUTH-COOPERATION/case/casefiles.aspx?csno=49;
Press Trust o f India, "India, China, Nepal Agree on Kailash Issue," (December 19, 2010),
http://ibnlive.in.com/news/india-china-nepal-agree-on-kailash-issue/137938-2.html.
59 Conservation.org, "Transboundary Conservation,"
http://www.conservation.org/publications/Pages/transboundary_conservation.aspx.
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program to promote transboundary cooperation for biodiversity conservation and
sustainable development,” KS1 led by ICIMOD’s leadership has been able to obtain the
buy-in from the three states involved. ICIMOD also serves as the coordinating body of
KSL-related activities as they are conducted by the governmental institutes and
ministries.60 The various participating governmental and educational agencies in the three
member states include: GB Pant Institute o f Himalayan Environment and Development
(GBPIHED) under the Indian Ministry o f Environment, Forests and Climate Change; the
Institute of Geography Sciences and Natural Resources Research (IGSNRR), under the
state body Chinese Academy o f Sciences (CAS); and the Department o f Forests under the
Nepalese Ministry o f Soil Conservation and Forests as well as the Central Department of
Botany, at Nepal’s national university, Tribhuvan University.61 These institutions and the
national governments have begun to engage in collaborative research and policy
exchanges.
The KSL conservation initiative is a long-term project, which only completed its
first phase in January 2011. That phase produced a Regional Cooperation Framework
with the agreement with the three member states. That phase also produced a Regional
Conservation Strategy to promote the goals o f biodiversity and sustainable development;
and the Comprehensive Environmental Monitoring Strategic Plan, which is the long-term
capacity building and research plan to study the impacts o f climate change in the Kailash
Landscape region.62 Currently, the KSL initiative is in its second five-year phase of
implementing the consolidated plans 63 ICIMOD and KSL’s achievement in bringing the
three states together in an enduring cooperative project plan o f conservation o f the shared
environmental region is unique.

60 Ali, Ecological Cooperation in South Asia: The Way Forward
61 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), "South-South Cooperation Case
Study: Transboundary Biodiversity Initiative between China, India and Nepal for the
Conservation o f the Mount Kailash Sacred Himalayan Landscape".
62 Ibid., 5.
63 ICIMOD, Kailash Sacred Landscape: About the Programme, (n.d.),
http://www.icimod.org/?q=9457.
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CONCLUSION
The case of environmental cooperation in the face of climate change has proven
to be a tough case to demonstrate evidence of Nepal’s wedging behavior. The reason for
this is the fact of this phenomenon’s recent emergence compared to other cases and the
fact that the intractable global and regional frameworks constitute the bulk of the
emerging policy framework. The foregoing analysis is unable to decisively answer the
existence of Nepal’s wedge state benefit, and the existing state o f data is found to be
insufficient to confirm or deny the validity of the two of the three test hypotheses and is
refuted in the third hypothesis. Regarding the independent effects o f the domestic system
of government (HI) on the climate change negotiations or regional cooperation, the
analysis does not find conclusive evidence either way. The third hypothesis (H3), on the
negative effect o f trade dependence on wedge state gains, can be refuted because the
growing trade dependence has had no effect on the outcomes o f the nascent policies on
environmental cooperation.
We can still observe some pertinent findings for the second hypothesis (H2)
regarding the positive effect o f institutional, interdependent and transnational forms of
globalization in the matter o f interstate environmental cooperation producing wedging
behavior. Based on the impact of internationally funded, transnational research
organization, ICIMOD and the KSL project, a narrow argument can be made regarding
the positive impact of globalization on the possibility of interstate environmental
cooperation. Still, even that case doesn’t provide us much evidence of wedging or
material gains for the wedge state, other than Nepal’s minimal gain in capacity building
and research exchange, which might have been possible regardless o f the wedge state
status. The global climate framework, UNFCCC, and its LDC Fund, which has begun to
fund a number o f climate adaptation projects in Nepal, can also been seen as evidence o f
the effects of globalization leading to direct material benefits of Nepal. But that instance
does not obtain from the tripartite interaction or the status of Nepal’s wedge status, which
are the core concerns of this research.
The possible contours o f the regional and bilateral policies in environmental
cooperation and adaptive measures to climate change effects in the Himalayan region is
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yet to be seen. As this chapter has analyzed, the region and the three states are faced with
long-term challenges in the form o f retreating Himalayan glaciers and availability of
freshwater resources, among many shared climate vulnerabilities and impacts. The
negotiations in the global framework might eventually bear positive fruit. Yet, the current
stance of both China and India for their right to economic and social development seems
likely to preclude a grand bargain in the short to medium term. The policy negotiation in
the regional forum is inherently limited by the lack of resources o f the member nations
and the lack o f leadership by India. Finally, although the national policies are slowly
beginning to take shape, they may either be too insular or are to be implemented too far
in the future to provide concrete avenues o f cooperation in the short-term.
The review o f the official national and regional policies reflects the absence of
tripartite interaction in environmental cooperation and climate change. The evidence
suggests that we cannot speak of Nepal’s gaining material benefits from wedging as
hypothesized. However, the negotiations and bargaining in water resources might occur
in an ad hoc bilateral basis when the issue o f hydropower projects, dam building,
irrigation and flooding arise. In future research, those negotiations could be analyzed to
test if Nepal’s share o f benefits is higher than would be expected or its share o f costs are
lower having been borne by one of its richer rival power neighbors.
Finally, the case o f the ongoing transboundary conservation in the KSL can be
seen as an instance o f a newer form o f tripartite cooperation in promoting the ideas of
“international environmental regimes” which may benefit all the member states. The
mode o f governance in these regimes might not follow the tradition state-to-state
negotiations based on strategic benefits-costs analysis. These newer forms of cooperative
regimes may feature non-state actors as leaders and shapers o f cooperation. This
development relates to the influence of societal actors and the effects o f globalization in
the interaction between small wedge states and rival major powers. All we can say is that
if such novel forms of policy advancement continue, the metric of strategic autonomy and
gains have to be thoroughly reimagined.
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CHAPTER VII

D ISC U SSIO N A N D C O N C LU SIO N S

At this early period o f the 21st century, the global system o f states is characterized
by the fact that, in sheer numerical terms, small states far outnumber larger states. The
number o f smaller states began swelling in the post-war years with the break-up of
empires and the process o f decolonization.1 Despite the increase in their number, small
states have not received adequate, systematic and careful scholarship in the field o f
international studies.2 There are many reasons for the dearth o f extant scholarship of
small states. Foremost is the fact that most studies on small states suffer from their focus
on matters o f definitions and categorical comparison at the expense of analyzing their
roles and functions in today’s globalized world. If they are considered by the major
theoretical schools o f international relations at all, small states are consigned to a
prescribed theoretical function o f “balancing, bandwagoning or buffering” to explain
away their independent existence. Additionally, most studies o f major power-small state
dynamics proceed from the perspective o f the major power, categorically denying
decisive authority to small states in interstate interactions, reminiscent of the ancient
wisdom that “the strong do what they will, while the weak suffer what they must.” This
study shows that despite the ambiguities o f definition or the dismissive inclinations of
mainstream theory, small states can be fruitfully studied and analyzed to help us better
understand their roles and behaviors in the interstate system, which is an important
dynamic o f global politics.
The primary goal of this study is to fill the analytical blind spot on small states by
extending the small states scholarship from mere debates o f definition and categorization
to their unique and evolving roles in the distinctive system o f states that is emerging
today. To that end, the major contribution o f this study is to theorize the existence,
1 Lake and O'Mahony, "The Incredible Shrinking State: Explaining Change in the
Territorial Size o f Countries."
2 Ingebritsen et al., Small States in International Relations.
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distinguishing characteristics and the range o f interstate behavior o f a subclass o f small
states, that I call wedge states. The study contributes to the process o f theory building and
preliminary analysis o f this category o f small states by systematically using theoretically
derived hypotheses to conduct empirical analysis of a single unit o f analysis of a wedge
state in its distinctive tripartite interaction with two rival major powers. Furthermore, the
design of the study and the selection o f the wedge state case o f Nepal in its interaction
with India and China allows methodical analysis o f the wedge state interaction in three
distinctive cases of trilateral, as well as regional and global, salience. This concluding
chapter shall briefly: review the theoretical context o f the wedge states in global politics
and the expectations thereof; present a synthesis of findings from the case studies;
analyze the implications and rival explanations as well as limitations of the findings on
the theory o f wedge states; and identify avenues for future research on small and wedge
states scholarship.
THEORY OF WEDGE STATES AND EXPECTATIONS
Contrary to much o f extant scholarship in IR, the current study proceeds from the
puzzle of the smaller and weaker members o f the present interstate system. The point of
departure is the claim that small states must possess some strategic autonomy in their
interstate interactions with greater powers given the empirical reality o f many smaller
states that are thriving economically and politically rather than being acutely vulnerable.
In this age characterized by globalization, the small states in Northern Europe are the
striking example of such anomaly, but so are many other small states as diverse as Chile,
Uruguay, Qatar and Singapore, which have been able to overcome their prescribed
vulnerability. What explains the seeming anomaly?
Because there are regional, historical and individual circumstances inherent in the
explanations o f each o f these cases, I argue that not all small states can be lumped into
one “residual category”3 as has been done in most traditional theories. That tendency has
produced the theoretical muddle so that there are as many definitions o f small states as
there are observers. Therefore, some small states may be more systematically

3 Ibid., 4.
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characterized as small wedge states, based on their geography and simultaneous
interaction with two major powers that are competitive or engaged in regional or global
rivalry. The proposed theory of wedge states states defines them as those small states
situated in an interactive and simultaneous relation with two rival powers such that the
wedge states are expected to be able to engage in “wedging strategies” with those rival
powers to expand their space for strategic autonomy. Wedging strategies denote any
negotiations, bargaining and statecraft vis-a-vis the two rival powers that allow a wedge
state to expand its payoffs. The expected outcome of expanded strategic autonomy may
be observed in the higher level of material and political gains the wedge states receive
from the interaction with the rival powers.
As a subclass of small states, we may analyze wedge states by deducing what the
extant IR theories imply for small states. There are two primary goals o f this direction of
inquiry in this study. First, we want to explain the mere existence of wedge states. Do the
states situated in a wedge position between two rival, greater powers even engage in
strategies to maximize their gains? Second, we want to analyze the factors that might
explain the level o f gains accrued by the wedge state from its tripartite interaction with
the rival powers. The extant theoretical perspectives inform our analysis o f wedge states,
making us aware of the types o f factors and conditions necessary for wedge state
behavior.
Four major theoretical perspectives are used to analyze the small, or wedge, states
puzzle, all o f which classify the wide-ranging concerns of their existence and functions
for systematic analysis. The first theoretical tradition, the structural perspective, holds a
deterministic view of small states and posits that the relative power differential between
major powers and small (read, weak) states means that the latter have no strategic
autonomy in the state system. In contrast, the evolving system o f states perspective views
the historical development o f the current state system as imbuing the global arena with
the laws, practices and norms o f sovereignty, respect for international boundaries and
institutional mechanisms of redress. All o f these allow the small states to feel much more
secure about their borders and to engage with major powers in interstate interactions on
practically equal footing. The third perspective, the societal actors perspective, views the
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internal dynamics of small states, their policies, processes and personalities, to explain
the varying outcomes for different small states. For instance, a visionary leader may use
astute statecraft to generate strategic autonomy in a small state despite its vulnerability, or
the domestic institutional development and political maturity may explain the ability of
some states to overcome their seeming vulnerability. Finally, the perspective of
developmental studies and economics focuses on the inherent economic vulnerability of
small states due to their low population levels and production capacities. These features
make them price-takers in the global market system, swinging with the global market
forces with no autonomic policies. The related view of critical international political
economy (IPE) centers on the methods and ways to help small states build resilience by
capturing niche markets or using global norms of fairness against the impersonal,
hegemonic forces o f the global capitalist system.
Each of these theoretical orientations implies and privileges the importance of
certain factors and expectations regarding wedge states and wedging behavior. The
evolving state system perspective identifies the two independent variables: type of state
system and extent o f sovereignty norms. The structural IR perspective posits the
following IVs: the distribution o f power, level o f institutionalism and level of
interdependence in the system. The societal actors perspective find these IVs to be
important: the type of domestic political system, level of political stability, and the role of
non-state actors in the wedge state. Finally, the developmental economics perspective
highlights the importance o f these IVs: level o f trade dependence and level o f economic
development in the wedge state. While each o f these IVs could be intensely analyzed,
heeding the methodological advice o f Arend Lijphart,4 this study selects the following
three IVs to generate test hypotheses: the type o f domestic political system, whether it is
authoritarian or democratic; the level of systemic interdependence, or political and
economic globalization; and the level o f trade dependence o f the wedge state on either or
both of the rival powers. The hypotheses from these IVs posit that the direction of the
level o f strategic autonomy (and material gains) is positive for democracy (HI); higher
systemic interdependence (H2); and lower trade dependence (H3). The design o f this

4 Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method."
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study uses a single-unit comparative case study method5 to analyze the impact o f the
independent variables (IVs) on the outcome of wedge state behavior.
COMPARATIVE CASES: FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
The empirical case chosen is that o f Nepal, which is posited to be a typical wedge
state between the two major competitive powers, India and China. These three
neighboring countries share centuries of history that involves trade, social and personal
exchanges, and political interaction, and Nepal has historically sought to maintain a
balanced relationship with both its powerful neighbors. The system o f government in
Nepal changed from an autocratic monarchical system to a parliamentary constitutional
democracy in 1990. Subsequently, in 2008, Nepal abolished the monarchy to become a
republic; however, this study considers the entire period after 1990 as parliamentary
because no new republican constitution has yet been adopted.
In Nepal’s wedge interaction with India and China, three empirical cases are
identified for analysis: the Tibetan refugee case; the case of competitive investment
strategies in Nepal’s hydropower sector; and the case of environmental policy
cooperation between the three states, which share the Himalayan geography highly
vulnerable to climate change impacts. The detailed findings from the individual cases
have been discussed in their respective chapters. Table 7.1 below summarizes the major
findings related to the three hypotheses in each of the comparative cases, which is
followed by a synthesis of the findings and implications.

5 Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?."
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Case 2: Hydropower
Investments

Case 3:
Environmental
Cooperation

H I : Affirmed

H I: Inconclusive

Policies adopted
during monarchy
continued after 1990
during democracy.

Type o f government
did not matter; but the
ideological orientation
o f the governing party
proved quite important.

The climate change
debate began only
after the 1990 change
in the type of
government.

H2: Affirmed

H2: Affirmed

India-China
interdependence
meant that India
became indifferent to
the Tibet issue paving
the path for Nepal
policy direction with
the attendant material
gains.

Indian and Chinese
globalized firms and
state organs have been
aggressively pursuing
foreign investments,
due to which Nepal’s
hydropower sector
benefits.

H3: Refuted

H3: Refuted

Policy direction
adopted before Nepal
became trade
dependent with China.

The effect is reversed;
amid Nepali concerns
of growing trade
imbalance, China tries
to placate with
investment and aid.

Case 1: Tibetan
Refugees

H I: Refuted

Type of
government
(HI)

Level of
Globalization
(H2)

Level of
trade
dependence
(H3)

H2: Inconclusive
Global and regional
forums not functional
but transnational non
state actors have
begun tripartite
conservation efforts,
which benefit Nepal
when India and China
also participate.

H3: Refuted
No effect o f trade
relations in the
budding conservation
policies.

Table 7.1: Comparative Summary of Case Findings

On the narrow question o f Nepal’s tripartite relationship with India and China, the
complex processes of global political and economic interdependence seem to have had
the most salient impact on the material gains in all three cases. This finding broadly
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confirms the implication of the structural liberal theories o f interdependence on small
states, while the developmental economics view o f their enduring vulnerability is not
supported. If a small wedge state has niche areas o f comparative advantage, it may be
able to receive higher level of material benefits from the rival powers in an
interdependent system. Furthermore, the transnational perspective about the utility of
non-state actors is also supported by the example of ICIMOD in the environmental
cooperation case. The important role played by transnational non-state actors also
supports the expectation of the societal actors perspective, which claims independent
effects o f non-state actors on small state gains. Therefore, economic and political
globalization may be the necessary conditions for wedge states to derive higher benefits
from the rival powers, while transnational non-state actors may be the intervening
variables that catalyze such outcomes.
Another broad finding is that, in comparing the three cases Nepal has been able to
maximize its material gains in the case of hydropower developments. Although the
aggregate o f approved projects are nowhere near the country’s natural potential in
absolute terms, the evolution o f Nepal’s policies towards attracting Indian and Chinese
capital as well as the heavy courting by successive political leaders to entice those
sources o f financing shows Nepal’s wedge behavior. These types of wedging activities
are forestalled by China’s sensitivity in the case of Tibetans, and are still nascent and
nebulous in the case of environmental cooperation, which is the one distributive problem
with high costs of inaction for all the parties involved. The reason for the latter may just
be the difficulty o f the global problem and the unsettled nature o f policies and practices
of interstate interaction on climate change in general. The hydropower investment issue is
an instance o f the body o f well-established practices o f capital-poor countries using
appealing terms to attract foreign direct investments, which suggests that other wedge
states might be able to negotiate beneficial bargaining arrangements in their natural
resources sector.
The highly sensitive issue on Tibetan refugees shows that, despite the moral
objections o f state and non-state international friends o f Tibetans everywhere, Nepal is
pursuing a policy that accrues higher material gains, at least in the short-term. The
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evidence is not perfectly conclusive whether the shift in policy is a direct result of
Chinese pressure or due to the indifference o f India. The study finds some evidence for
the latter. Thus, a critical implication may be that acquiescing to Chinese wishes does not
show Nepal’s expansion of strategic autonomy. That criticism assumes that the official
Nepalese position on morality and national interests is strictly aligned with the interests
o f Tibetans. This study uses the evidence o f wedging behavior to see if there are higher
levels of material gains, which Nepal definitely enjoys not only from the largess of China
but paradoxically also by the fact that India is not withholding benefits because of the
Nepal’s Tibetan policy. The structuralist position may be bolstered by this outcome in
that for these cases, which really matter to the powerful states, the outcome favors their
positions. Yet, to reiterate, the function o f Indian indifference complicates the picture.
Therefore, for wedge states generally, we may need to analyze the interests and
preferences both rival powers, even in issues that are politically sensitive to one of the
powers.
The one finding that contradicts the expected outcome is the case o f hydropower
investments in relation to the trade dependence factor, the third hypothesis. As of the
present, at least, Nepal’s growing dependence on Chinese exports and the resulting
escalation of the trade imbalance has produced the effect that China considers the
prospects o f investments in Nepal as a form o f compensation. The investments and aid
that China has made is not close to matching the aggregate o f the balance o f trade for the
last decade. But in the case of hydropower investments, Nepal seems to be accruing
higher material gains despite increasing trade dependence. A similar dynamic governs
Nepal’s dependent trade relationship with the other power, India. This finding is
interesting but it may not be generally applicable to small states. In the sub-set o f small
states, this line of analysis may be necessary to further understand these phenomena.
A single study may not be adequate to confirm the theory of wedge states or make
maximalist claims, but it does find some evidence that Nepal is able to engage in
wedging interactions with the two rival powers, India and China. Also, it finds that the
wedging may be more pronounced in some cases, less in other cases, and maybe not
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present at all in still others. Three cumulative implications from these findings on the
larger theoretical questions regarding wedge and small states are noteworthy.
The first major implication o f this analysis is that interdependence and
globalization may have quite fundamentally changed the interstate dynamic between
small and major rival powers. Curiously, the connecting thread is the possibility of
interdependent relationship between the major powers themselves, which allows the
wedge state to seek positions that generates better material outcomes. In other words,
now when the words “rival powers” are used, it does not signify the all-encompassing
nature of the rivalry prevalent between the US and USSR during the Cold War. In this
age, shared economic interests interconnect both China and India, although that doesn’t
prevent either o f those states from pursuing its national interests vis-a-vis the wedge state.
The second broad implication is that the wedge state has the autonomy define its
own national interests in order to use wedging strategies to pursue them. Be it the shifting
policy on Tibetan refugees or the particular policy evolution on hydropower investments,
Nepal adopted the policies in that direction, although its long-term success in
accumulating high material gains is still to be seen. The final major implication is that the
role of societal or non-state actors cannot be overstated, although it is difficult to quantify
if they are able to affect the wedging dynamics in a consequential and sustainable way.
Either way, transnational and domestic non-state actors operating in small states may be
able to produce cooperative outcomes along with material gains for those states.
An important qualification regarding these findings and implications is that the
variation between the three cases, which are in different realms of tripartite engagement,
should alert us to a definitional problem of small states discussed earlier in the study.
That qualification is the need o f using relational definitions o f small states in their
“spatio-temporal context,” which means to allow the “contextual, temporal and issuespecific” consideration o f the interaction between small states and major powers.6 Small
states may be able to overcome their vulnerabilities only in certain issues and under
6 These concepts are considered in detail in the theoretical discussion in chapter II, and
are derived from the work o f Thorhallsson and Wivel, "Small States in the European
Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?."
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supportive circumstances. This qualification may seem predictable and superfluous, but
as the cases of Tibetan refugees and hydropower investment show, the major powers are
much more amenable to beneficial cooperation in economic, trade and technical issues
while their positions are hardened on the more sensitive, political and geostrategic
interests. It would not be prudent to expect maximal strategic space on the latter category
of cases.
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LIMITATIONS
In terms o f research design for robust testing of the proposed theory, a limitation
of this study is that whatever depth it gains by the choice o f the single-unit o f study is
compromised by the lack of breadth that a research design with more than one unit of
study would consider. For an exercise in nascent theory building, that methodological
limitation is to be expected. The study sought to broaden the applicability of its claims by
choosing three disparate cases for analysis, each o f which highlighted a unique
interactive issue between the three states upon which the external and national forces
acted at different levels. Despite these correctives, the findings o f this study alone are not
enough to make categorical claims regarding the theory of wedge states or the factors that
mitigate the interactions between small states and major powers. A subsequent section on
further research avenues suggests possible extension of this research program, which may
ultimately lead to claims that are more robust. Here I discuss some limitations.
Only the effects of three IVs were explicitly analyzed in this study. Certainly,
there may be rival explanations that would explain the wedge state problematic more
elegantly. The literature review identified seven such prospects, including the
independent effects of systematic influence o f the emerging global system o f states; the
level of political instability; and the level o f development in the wedge state, among
others. The comprehensive case studies also highlighted the need to consider some such
possibilities. Although not tested explicitly, the other societal actor variable—the level of
domestic instability—must be acknowledged in all three cases to be of salience because
for the duration of the study there have been countless government changes in Nepal as
well as a couple major changes to the system o f government itself. Although, political
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instability must have had important effects, the cases were not able to isolate those
effects.
Another explanation for the behavior of Nepal in its interaction with India and
China may be the rational actor model in that each of the successive governments may
have been compelled by circumstantial pressures to engage with either India or China in
the manner they did. Yet, that position may only bolster the case o f increased strategic
autonomy on the part o f internal political processes and competitions o f wedge states,
although it may not say much about the actual phenomenon o f “the power o f the small”
itself.
A major design concern may be that the operational metric o f material gains does
not really capture the essence o f the concept o f strategic autonomy. It can simply be said
that observers need to allow the states themselves to name their strategic space of
independent action. Also, the measurement unit of the concept and the actual observation
o f material gains against the effect o f the independent factors are to a degree subjective in
a qualitative study. So it would be better if in future research endeavors a quantitative
research design could be applied to the operationalization of the variables to verify the
validity and the robustness of the findings from this study.
Other significant limitations of this research do not have to do with such
theoretical or methodological concerns. The more arresting limitations are entirely based
on empirical reality. During the period o f this study, political developments in the real
world seemed poised to overtake the results. On the larger claim o f sacrosanct norms o f
small state sovereignty, the events in Ukraine that began in March 2014, and slowly took
shape in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, showed the limits o f the evolution of a calcified
state system. The Russian power seems to have punctured, what Stephen Krasner so
memorably termed, the “organized hypocrisy” o f the institution o f sovereignty.7 Yet, the
fact that Kiev remains independent and not under the thumb o f the Kremlin may suggest
that even a small regional state situated under the shadow o f a superpower may possess a
modicum o f strategic autonomy, albeit at great cost. O f course, Ukraine is not going to be

7 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy.
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able to join the European Union or NATO anytime soon, but the newly elected
government in Kiev remains staunchly pro-European in the face of suffocating pressure
from the Kremlin. Also, the Western condemnation and sanctions against Russian acts of
“aggression” show that those principles o f international laws on state boundaries are not
totally a sham. Therefore, at present, the Ukrainian example is still in flux and does not
completely shatter the claims o f small state sovereignty and security.
In regards to the empirical cases, the Tibetan refugees issue has been stuck in an
intractable state. But in the other two cases, recent developments in the political realm
began to influence the tripartite dynamic from what was observed in period o f this study,
although the direction of change suggested more wedging dynamics and not less. In those
cases, new developments will have to be considered in future studies of the tripartite
interaction.
In August 2014, the new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid a state visit
to Nepal, 17 years after the last time an Indian PM came to Nepal. The visit showed that
Mr. Modi’s mass popularity transcends the border as he came bearing gifts and gave a
highly publicized speech in the parliament. One of the most important matters on the
agenda was Indian investment in large-scale hydropower projects in Nepal, many of
which had been proposed more than two decades prior. These projects, including the
6500 MW jumbo-project o f Pancheswor, have languished because of political distrust
and instability as well as technical disagreements on the rates o f sale o f the produced
electricity. The Indian Prime Minister gladdened the hearts o f Nepali hydro-dreamers
when he said, “Nepal can free India o f its darkness with its electricity. But we don’t want
free electricity, we want to buy it. Just by selling electricity to India, Nepal can find a
place in the developed countries o f the world.”8 The actual material outcome o f the visit
was that the two states agreed to expedite the stalled power trade and power development
agreements, which would govern expanded Indian investment in Nepal and allow the
proposed projects to move forward. However, the breakthrough may yet be some time
8 Rama Lakshmi, "Modi's Speech in Nepal Shows India Is Paying Attention to Its
Neighbors," The Washington Pos/fAugust 5, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.eom/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/08/05/modis-speech-innepal-shows-india-is-paying-attention-to-its-neighbors/.
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away. Mr. Modi also sweetened the deal by announcing to offer Nepal a $1 billion
concessional line o f credit.9
If the promised projects materialize, this important visit and the aftermath may be
seen as just another chapter o f the two powers engaging in their rivalry to the benefit of
Nepal. Clearly the subtext o f the Indian promise of economic largesse was, o f course, the
new administration’s goal o f exceeding the intensified Chinese economic role in Nepal’s
energy and infrastructure sector in the last two decades.10 Nepalese leaders sought to gain
as much Indian support and financing from Mr. Modi, given the subtext that Beijing was
already doing so much in the past two decades o f what S. D. Muni, a famed analyst of
Indian foreign policy, called “alienation between India and Nepal.” 11 Predictably, a
slightly mocking headline in the Chinese official news agency emphasized the fact that
no actual hydropower deals were signed during the visit, despite glittering rhetoric from
Mr. Modi.12
There were two additional regional and global developments towards the end o f
2014, each of which may influence the third case o f climate change cooperation. The 18th
SAARC Summit was held in Kathmandu in November, and was expected to bring the
member states into closer cooperation on environment. However, the summit ended
without any such accord, sidetracked by the latest India-Pakistan row. Another
development o f note was the fact that some leaders from Pakistan and Nepal discussed
granting full membership to China in the South Asian regional body to which India
remained entirely unsympathetic. The calls from loyal partners for China, which has been
an observer in SAARC since 2006, to be promoted to full member suggests Chinese
9 Paavan Mathema, "Narendra Modi Announces $1 Billion Line o f Credit for Nepal,"
Live Mint, India{August 3, 2014),
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/vWAKyIbE2DHu3EHxN0vU5L/Narendra-Modiembarks-on-Nepal-visit.html.
10 Agence France-Presse (AFP), "China-India Energy Rivalry in Spotlight as Modi Visits
Nepal," (August 2, 2014), http://www.afp.com/en/news/china-india-energy-rivalryspotlight-modi-visits-nepal.
1 Mathema, "Narendra Modi Announces $1 Billion Line of Credit for Nepal".
12 Zhou Shenping, "Modi Fails to Ink Hydropower Deal in Nepal, Hailed for Rhetoric,"
Xinhua{August 04, 2014),
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=233452.
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intentions of deeper, multi-dimensional interest in the South Asian region. Therefore, it
can be surmised that the rivalry between China and India in the subcontinent has only just
begun.
In the global climate change policy front, UNFCCC held the 20th Conference of
Parties (COP) summit in Lima, Peru in early December 2014. Maybe owing to recent
failures on achieving binding global agreements, expectations from the summit were low.
Therefore, it was not that surprising that Lima COP was able to reach a global accord that
is not a game-changer. States agreed to pledge to minimum voluntary emissions cuts,
which is to say non-binding, so that all eyes are now trained in the next COP summit in
Paris in 2015.13 The upshot is that the cooperative policies on climate change are still
evolving. Thus, neither the regional nor the global framework on climate change
cooperation has changed enough to have any discernible effect in the tripartite dynamic
in the Himalayas.
FURTHER RESEARCH
This study has largely been concerned with theory building to expand the scope of
scholarship on small states in the fields o f global politics. Subsequent studies could test
the robustness o f the proposed theory by applying the concept o f wedge states to other
states that exhibit wedging interaction with rivals that are more powerful and to historical
instances o f wedge states. Accumulation o f a number of case studies of wedge states in
their interactive behavior with their respective rival powers would help the cause of
theory building. Just in the region of South Asia, states such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka
and Myanmar maybe studied in the context o f their tripartite relationship with India and
China. If those states, which do not directly border both the rival powers, exhibit wedging
characteristics, it would also bolster the theoretical claim in that a wedge state need not
necessarily be geographically located between two major powers. It may be pointed out
that the case o f Bhutan, which closely aligns with India would be the potential theory
disconfirming case of a geographical wedge state that does not engage in wedging

13 BBC News, "Un Members Agree Deal at Lima Climate Talks," (December 14 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-30468048.
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behavior. However, since Bhutan and China have outstanding unresolved border
disputes, the case is dissimilar to the other natural candidates of wedging.
Other wedging case studies might expand to other continents or circumstances. It
would be productive to study the case o f South America, where a number o f states are
engaged in tripartite interaction with Brazil and Argentina. Europe is a difficult case at
the moment, given the situation in Ukraine and the Russian actions, which as as discussed
above seem to negate the claims made by the evolving state systems perspective of
respect for boundaries and sovereignty norms leading to small states feeling secure within
their borders. Yet, there may be many other cases o f historical and present wedge
situations in Europe, which has been the cradle o f the founding international institutions
of sovereignty that took centuries o f advancements and setbacks to emerge. The
scholarship would benefit from the study o f historical cases, such as Poland or Finland, of
wedge states in Europe and elsewhere. Also, cases involving wedge situations where
there are more than two rival powers operating on the wedge state, such as the historical
case of Belgium, may be found and analyzed.
Another avenue to further research on the theory o f wedge states and the topic of
small states in general, is to apply a quantitative approach. It would be beneficial to
further theory building as well as robust testing, if the various proposed independent
variables (IVs) could be quantified and measured to explain the quantitative variance in
the operational dependent variable (DV), the level o f material gains from tripartite
interaction, which would measure the effect of expanding strategic autonomy. In such a
project, IVs other than the three used in this study could be researched for their
independent effects to explain more the wedge dynamics. Ultimately, a global
quantitative study o f all possible small states to discern their outcomes in the measures of
various IVs and the variance o f their material gains and strategic autonomy would be the
defining study in this research program on wedge states.
The present study is just one strand on the question o f the power o f small states in
a system dominated by big powers that should animate IR for a long time. The additional
webs o f global and regional institutions, regimes and transnational actors should further
complicate the small-large interaction. The increasing salience of cross-boundary arenas
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o f cooperation such as the environment, global finance and migration and many more,
suggest expanding role and power of decisions for small states. The implications o f this
study o f one small, wedge state indicates as much. As long as the global system o f states
contains both yams and boulders, they will be forced to interact resourcefully and
cooperatively, just like Nepal, “a yam between two boulders,” does with its two giant
neighbors.
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